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  We	   are	   social	   animals.	   But,	   so	   are	   penguins.	   However,	   unlike	   us,	   penguins	   don’t	  make	  Turkish	  delight,	  or	  any	  other	  dessert	  for	  that	  matter.	  Turkish	  delight	  may	  or	  may	  not	  be	  to	  everybody’s	  taste,	  but	  it	  is	  one	  of	  the	  things	  that	  make	  human	  sociality	  unique.	   Like	   pagan	   rituals,	   computer	   software,	   alphabets,	   divorce	   law,	   and	  presidential	  campaigns,	  it	  is	  the	  product	  of	  a	  sophisticated	  cumulative	  process	  that	  is	  cooperative	  in	  essence.	  It	  takes	  a	  multitude	  of	  individuals	  engaging	  in	  a	  series	  of	  intricately	  complex	  interactions	  to	  develop	  a	  recipe	  and	  to	  carry	  it	  over	  generations.	  Cooperation	  is,	  perhaps,	  the	  most	  outstanding	  feature	  of	  human	  sociality.	  	  Collaborative	  pursuits	  of	  joint	  outcomes	  require	  that	  individuals	  need	  to	  have	  their	  respective	   intentions	   and	   action	   plans	   interlocked.	   How	   does	   individual	   social	  cognition	  support	  such	  an	  interlocking?	  How	  do	  the	  dynamics	  of	  social	  interactions	  exploit	  and	  constrain	  individual	  cognitive	  mechanisms?	  Perhaps	  most	  crucially,	  how	  do	   individuals	   explain	   and	   anticipate	   each	   other’s	   behaviour?	   These	   questions	  canvass	  the	  general	  theme	  of	  this	  thesis.	  	  The	  question	  of	  how	  we	  make	  sense	  of	  others’	  behaviour	  has	   long	  been	  a	   focus	  of	  developmental	   enquiries	   of	   social	   cognition.	   Theory	   of	   Mind	   (ToM)	   (Premack	   &	  Woodruff,	  1978),	   the	  ability	   to	  ascribe	  mental	   states	   (e.g.	   false	  beliefs;	  Wimmer	  &	  Perner,	  1983)	  to	  others	  has	  widely	  been	  studied	  in	  human	  infants	  and	  adults	  (for	  a	  review,	  see	  Frith	  &	  Frith,	  2003)	  emphasizing	  the	  role	  of	  explicit	  reasoning	  in	  social	  cognition	   and	   social	   interaction.	   Research	   in	   Cognitive	   Neuroscience	   has	   since	  identified	  a	  cortical	  network	  in	  the	  human	  brain	  that	  is	  involved	  in	  ToM	  reasoning.	  Furthermore,	   recent	   inquiries	   have	   accumulated	   a	   considerable	   body	   of	   evidence	  demonstrating	   that	   human	   infants,	   as	   well	   as	   some	   non-­‐human	   species,	   have	   a	  capacity	  to	  efficiently	  process	  beliefs	  and	  other	  mental	  states,	  suggesting	  an	  implicit	  form	  of	  mentalizing	   that	   bypasses	   conceptual	   explicit	   reasoning	   (for	   an	   overview,	  see	   Apperly	   &	   Butterfill,	   2009).	   For	   example,	   it	   has	   been	   shown	   that	   we	   can	  efficiently	   and	   effortlessly	   compute	   others’	   visuo-­‐spatial	   perspectives	   (Samson,	  Apperly,	   Braithwaite,	   Andrews	   &	   Scott,	   2010)	   belief-­‐like	   states	   (Kovacs,	   Teglas	   &	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Endress,	   2010),	   or	   tasks	   (Sebanz,	   Knoblich	   &	   Prinz,	   2003).	   Thus,	   sometimes	   we	  know	  what	  others	  know,	  believe	  or	  intend	  without	  a	  cost	  to	  our	  cognitive	  resources.	  Mentalizing	   processes	   help	   us	   to	   derive	   the	   most	   likely	   reasons	   behind	   others’	  behaviours.	  With	   the	   recent	   popularity	   of	   embodied	   approaches	   to	   social	   cognition,	   basic	  perception	   action	   links	   (Jeannerod,	   1999)	   have	   gained	   prominence	   as	   non-­‐conceptual	   means	   for	   interpersonal	   connections,	   	   providing	   yet	   another	   way	   to	  think	   about	   social	   cognition.	   In	   the	   action	  domain,	   perception	   action	   coupling	  has	  been	  implicated	  in	  simulations	  of	  observed	  actions	  that	  recruit	  the	  observer’s	  motor	  system	   (Decety	   &	   Grezes,	   2006).	   Behavioural	   evidence	   in	   support	   of	   this	   claim	  reveals	   that	   action	   simulations	   service	   explaining	   and	   predicting	   others’	   actions	  (Wilson	   &	   Knoblich,	   2005).	   Neurophysiological	   studies	   have	   identified	   a	   cortical	  network	   in	   the	   human	   brain	   that	   resonates	   with,	   or	   ‘mirrors’,	   the	   actions	   one	  observes	  (for	  a	  recent	  review,	  see	  Rizzolatti	  	  &	  Sinigaglia,	  2010).	  A	  similar	  mirroring	  mechanism	  leads	  to	  resonance	  of	  others’	  sensations	  and	  emotions,	  and	  offers	  a	  non-­‐conceptual	  account	  to	  empathy	  (de	  Vignemont	  &	  Singer,	  2006).	  	  Thus	  there	  are	  different	  types	  of	  cognitive	  and	  neural	  mechanisms	  that	  allow	  us	  to	  establish	  interpersonal	  connections	  and	  to	  gain	  epistemic	  access	  to	  the	  minds	  of	  one	  another.	  These	   include	  mentalizing	   (ToM)	  and	  action	  simulation.	  This	   list	   is	  by	  no	  means	   exhaustive,	   nor	   are	   its	   items	  mutually	   exclusive.	  Different	   aspects	   of	   social	  cognition	  require	  different	  types	  of	  processes	  that	  may	  or	  may	  not	  be	  active	  at	  the	  same	   time.	   These	   processestelef	   range	   from	   symbolic	   thought	   to	   sensorimotor	  computations	   and	   they	  work	   in	   remarkable	   harmony	   to	   allow	   us	   to	   perceive	   and	  understand	  the	  actions,	  goals	  and	  mental	  states	  of	  individuals	  we	  encounter	  and	  the	  social	   interactions	   they	   engage	   in	   with	   other	   people.	   Central	   to	   this	   thesis	   is	   the	  question	  of	  how	  individual	  cognitive	  and	  neural	  processes	  support	  perception	  and	  understanding	  of	  others’	  behavior.	  The	  following	  chapters	  describe	  four	  studies	  that	  investigated	   social	   perception	   processes	   by	   employing	   three	   different	   forms	   of	  social	  interactions	  or	  social	  contexts	  (Figure	  1.1):	  observing	  an	  individual’s	  actions,	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interacting	   with	   another	   individual	   to	   jointly	   perform	   a	   task,	   and	   observing	   an	  interaction.	   Specific	   questions	   addressed	   in	   each	   chapter	   are	   as	   follows.	   Do	  individual	  motor	  processes	  and	  their	  neural	  correlates	  contribute	   to	  perception	  of	  another	   individual’s	   action	   (Chapter	   2	   and	   3)?	   How	   do	   thought	   processes	   exploit	  and	  constrain	  the	  sensorimotor	  system	  to	  support	  social	  interactions;	  and,	  how	  are	  thought	   and	   memory	   processes	   are	   influenced	   by	   the	   requirements	   of	   social	  interactions	   (Chapter	   4)?	   How	   are	   mentalizing	   and	   action	   perception	   processes	  recruited	  when	   ascribing	   intentional	   relations	   to	   observed	   social	   interactions	   and	  what	  are	  the	  associated	  cortical	  regions	  (Chapter	  5)?	  	  	  	  
	  	  
Figure	  1.1:	  The	  different	  social	  contexts	  addressed	  in	  this	  thesis.	  Black	  circles	  represent	  the	  observing	  agent	  (the	  participant),	  blue	  circles	  represent	  the	  observed	  agents.	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Observing	  you:	  Perception-­‐action	  matching	  and	  motor	  simulation	  A	  vast	  amount	  of	  evidence	  has	  accumulated	  over	   the	   last	   two	  decades	   that	  speaks	  for	   the	   claim	   that	   perception	   and	   action	   are	   tightly	   linked	   through	   common	  underlying	  representations	  (Jeannerod,	  2001;	  Prinz,	  1997).	  Accordingly,	  perceived	  actions	   are	   matched	   with	   action	   representations	   that	   are	   part	   of	   the	   observer’s	  motor	   repertoire.	   Extending	   on	   early	   theories	   of	   voluntary	   action	   control	  (ideomotor	  theory;	  James,	  1890)	  common	  coding	  theory	  postulates	  that	  actions	  are	  specified	   in	   terms	   of	   their	   distal	   perceptual	   effects	   (Hommel,	   Muesseler,	  Ascherlsleben	  &	  Prinz,	  2001;	  Prinz,	  1997).	  These	  perceptual	  effects	  are	  assumed	  to	  activate	   a	   corresponding	   representation	   in	   the	   observer,	   leading	   to	   “motor	  resonance”.	  In	  other	  words,	  common	  codes	  act	  as	  an	  interface	  between	  perception	  and	  action,	  thus	  implying	  functional	  equivalence	  between	  motor	  representations	  for	  actions	  and	  for	  perceptions.	  	  To	   illustrate,	  when	  my	   friend	  pours	  water	   into	  a	  pot	  as	  she	  starts	  making	  Turkish	  delight,	   the	   trickling	   sound	   of	   the	  water	   against	   the	  metal	   surface	   triggers	   in	  my	  motor	   system	  previously	   acquired	  action	   representations	   that	   are	   associated	  with	  the	  action	  of	  pouring	  water.	  Thus	   the	  assumption	  of	  common	  coding	  predicts	   that	  perceiving	   another	   perform	   an	   action	   should	   facilitate	   executing	   the	   perceived	  action	   because	   it	   results	   in	   an	   activation	   of	   motor	   representations.	   Indeed,	  individuals	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  faster	  at	  performing	  a	  particular	  movement	  when	  they	   watch	   somebody	   perform	   the	   same	   movement	   than	   when	   they	   watch	   the	  person	   perform	   a	   different	   movement	   	   (Brass,	   Bekkering	   &	   Prinz,	   2001;	   Kilner,	  Paulignan	  &	  Blakemore,	  2003;	  Bach	  &	  Tipper,	  2007).	  	  Evidence	  from	  neurophysiological	  studies	  suggests	  that	  a	  common	  coding	  system	  is	  implemented	  at	  a	  neuronal	  level.	  Mirror	  neurons,	  initially	  discovered	  by	  single-­‐cell	  studies	   on	   the	  macaque	   brain	   (di	   Pellegrino,	   Fadiga,	   Fogassi,	   Gallese	   &	   Rizzolatti,	  1992;	   Gallese,	   Fadiga,	   Fogassi	   &	   Rizzolatti,	   1996)	   offer	   a	   neural	   substrate	   of	  common	  coding	  through	  which	  perception	  and	  action	  become	  coupled	  (for	  a	  review,	  Rizzolatti	   &	   Sinigaglia,	   2010).	   Mirror	   neurons	   are	   essentially	   motor	   neurons	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(involved	  in	  action	  production)	  that	  also	  respond	  to	  perceived	  movements.	  In	  other	  words,	  they	  map	  perceived	  actions	  to	  executable	  motor	  representations.	  A	  wealth	  of	  neurophysiological	   studies	   indicates	   the	   presence	   of	   an	   analogous	   mirroring	  circuitry	  in	  the	  human	  brain.	  Comprising	  	  motor	  areas	  that	  are	  involved	  in	  execution	  of	   actions	   (i.e.	  premotor	   cortex,	   inferior	  parietal	   lobule	  and	   the	   superior	   temporal	  sulcus)	  the	  human	  mirror	  network	  similarly	  responds	  to	  execution	  and	  observation	  of	  corresponding	  actions	  (e.g.	  Calvo-­‐Merino,	  Glaser,	  Grezes,	  Passingham	  &	  Haggard,	  2006;	   Hamilton	   &	   Grafton,	   2006;	   2008;	   Kilner,	   Neal,	   Weiskopf,	   Friston	   &	   Frith,	  2009).	  	  It	  has	  also	  been	  postulated	  that	  once	  a	  match	  between	  the	  observed	  and	  performed	  action	  has	  been	  established,	   the	  motor	  system	  of	   the	  observer	  runs	  simulations	  of	  the	   observed	   action	   as	   it	   unfolds	   in	   real	   time	   (Wilson	   &	   Knoblich,	   2005).	   Motor	  simulations	   capitalize	   on	   internal	   predictive	   models,	   which	   comprise	   one’s	   own	  biomechanical	   constraints	   and	   previously	   learned	   associations	   between	   self	  produced	   actions	   and	   their	   perceivable	   consequences	   (Wolpert,	   Doya	   &	   Kawato,	  2003),	  and	  that	  are	  used	  to	  plan	  and	  execute	  one’s	  own	  actions.	  Action	  perception	  exploits	   internal	   models	   in	   our	   motor	   system,	   allowing	   for	   accurate	   predictions	  about	   the	   likely	   perceptual	   consequences	   of	   the	   observed	   actions	   (Wilson	   &	  Knoblich,	  2005).	  That	  is,	  as	  my	  friend	  starts	  moving	  in	  order	  to	  place	  the	  water	  filled	  pot	   on	   the	   stove	   I	   can	   simulate	   the	   consequences	   of	   the	   action	   and	   accurately	  predict	  what	   it	  will	   feel	   like	  to	  grab	  the	  plastic	  handle	  of	   the	  pot,	  how	  much	  effort	  will	   be	   needed	   to	   lift	   it,	   and	   where	   on	   the	   stove	   it	   will	   end	   up—because	   I	   have	  performed	   those	   actions	   before.	   However,	   if	   she	   was	   to	   do	   an	   acrobatic	   flip	   I	  wouldn’t	   be	   able	   to	   predict	   when	   her	   feet	   would	   touch	   back	   on	   the	   ground—because,	  never	  once	  in	  my	  life	  have	  I	  managed	  to	  do	  a	  flip,	  and	  so	  I	  do	  not	  have	  an	  appropriate	  internal	  model	  for	  it.	  	  Several	  research	  lines	  have	  empirically	  tested	  these	  claims.	  One	  such	  research	  line	  investigated	   the	   effects	   of	   motor	   expertise	   in	   action	   perception.	   There	   are	   now	  numerous	  studies	  indicating	  that	  one’s	  level	  of	  motor	  skill	  determines	  the	  degree	  of	  
•	  	  	  CHAPTER	  	  1	  	  •	  	  	  GENERAL	  INTRODUCTION	  	  	  •	  
	   15	  
neural	  activation	  in	  the	  mirroring	  circuitry	  when	  observing	  an	  action	  that	  requires	  the	   same	   skill	   (e.g.	   Calvo-­‐Merino	  et	   al.,	   2005;	  2006).	  One’s	  predictions	   concerning	  the	  outcomes	  of	  actions	  are	  also	   influenced	  by	  motor	  expertise.	  For	  example,	  elite	  basketball	   players	   outperform	   novices	   when	   predicting	   the	   success	   of	   basketball	  shoots	   (e.g.	   Aglioti,	   Cesari,	   Romani	   &	   Urgesi,	   2008).	   These	   findings	   clearly	  demonstrate	   that	   perception	   of	   an	   action	   is	   directly	   linked	   to	   the	   motor	  representations	  that	  govern	  one’s	  execution	  of	  an	  observed	  action.	  It	  follows	  that,	  an	  acquired	   permanent	   impairment	   in	   production	   of	   a	   movement,	   that	   has	   likely	  altered	   the	   internal	   models,	   is	   expected	   to	   impede	   one’s	   perception	   of	   another’s	  performance	  of	  the	  same	  movement.	  	  This	  hypothesis	  will	  be	  addressed	  in	  detail	  in	  the	  second	  chapter.	  Another	   line	   of	   research	   investigated	   whether	   motor	   laws	   influence	   action	  perception.	  Motor	  laws	  capture	  physical	  principles	  that	  govern	  execution	  of	  actions.	  If	   perception	   and	   action	   rely	   on	   a	   common	   coding	   system,	   both	   execution	   and	  perception	  of	  actions	  should	  be	  subject	  to	  the	  same	  governing	  principles.	  Research	  on	  Fitts’	  law	  (Fitts,	  1954)	  provides	  strong	  support	  for	  this	  claim.	  Fitts’	  law	  captures	  the	   trade-­‐off	   between	   speed	   and	   accuracy	   in	   biological	  movements	   and	   combines	  both	   parameters	   in	   the	   index	   of	   difficulty.	   Fitts’	   law	   is	   one	   of	   the	   most	   robust	  principles	   of	   human	   motor	   production	   (Plamondon	   &	   Alimi,	   1997).	   It	   has	   been	  shown	  in	  a	  recent	  study	  that	  Fitts’	  law	  also	  constrains	  the	  perception	  of	  movements	  (Grosjean,	   Shiffrar	  &	  Knoblich,	   2007).	  When	   asked	   to	   judge	  whether	   an	   observed	  action	  was	  possible	  for	  a	  human	  to	  perform	  at	  a	  particular	  speed	  between	  targets	  of	  a	  particular	  size,	  participants	  complied	  with	  the	   law.	  When	  a	  perceived	  movement	  violated	  Fitts’	  law	  participants	  found	  the	  movement	  to	  be	  ‘undoable’.	  These	  results	  provide	   direct	   support	   for	   the	   action	   simulation	   theory.	   Biological	   and	   physical	  constraints,	   as	   captured	  by	  motor	   laws,	   are	  encoded	   in	  one’s	   internal	  models	   that	  govern	   one’s	   execution	   of	   actions.	  When	   observing	   another	   performing	   an	   action,	  the	  motor	  system	  of	  the	  observer	  capitalizes	  on	  the	  same	  internal	  models,	  and	  thus	  poses	  strict	  and	  specific	  constraints	  on	  perception	  in	  perfect	  compliance	  to	  the	  laws.	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A	   question	   this	   finding	   promotes	   refers	   to	   the	   neural	   correlates	   of	   motor	  simulations.	   Research	   on	   neurophysiological	   markers	   of	   motor	   resonance	   has	  largely	   been	   concerned	   with	   the	   degree	   of	   matching	   between	   representations	   of	  observed	   and	   representations	   of	   produced	   actions,	   and	   investigated	   the	   effects	   of	  general	   action	   profiles.	   For	   example,	   previous	   studies	   compared	   perception	   of	  movements	  with	  which	  an	  observer	  had	  motor	   familiarity	   to	  movements	   to	  which	  the	   observer	   was	   a	   stranger	   (e.g.	   Calvo-­‐Merino	   et	   al.,	   2005;	   2006).	   Is	   the	   motor	  system	   directly	   involved	   in	   simulations	   that	   incorporate	   detailed	   information	  regarding	   the	   motor	   parameters	   that	   operate	   during	   execution	   of	   actions?	   More	  specifically,	  do	  parameters	  that	  are	  purely	  motor	  and	  not	  directly	  perceivable,	  (e.g.	  effort,	   force	   or	   difficulty)	   drive	   the	   neural	   regions	   that	   support	   action	   production	  when	   observing	   others	   perform	   the	   same	   actions?	   Chapter	   3	   addresses	   this	  question.	  	  
	  
Us:	  Task	  sharing	  and	  co-­‐representation	  Perception	   action	   matching	   and	   action	   simulation	   are	   often	   thought	   of	   as	  involuntary	  processes.	  However,	  the	  constant	  need	  to	  inhibit	  automatic	  tendencies	  to	  mimic	  observed	  actions	  would	  be	  considerably	  resource	  consuming.	  Could	  there	  be	  top-­‐down	  modulations	  of	  a	  general	  readiness	  to	  engage	   in	  action	  matching	  and	  action	   simulation?	   	   Several	   recent	   studies	   have	   identified	   such	   contextual	   factors	  that	  have	  a	  modulating	  effect	  on	  action	  simulation.	  For	  example,	  involuntary	  actions	  are	  not	  simulated	  (Kilner,	  et	  al.,	  2003;	  Liepelt,	  von	  Cramon	  &	  Brass,	  2008;	  Stanley	  Gowen	   &	   Miall,	   2007).	   Social	   relevance	   (Kourtis,	   Sebanz	   	   &	   Knoblich,	   2010),	   the	  intentions	  ascribed	  to	   the	  observed	  actor	  (Sebanz	  &	  Shiffrar,	  2009),	  as	  well	  as	   the	  social	  context	  of	  the	  interaction	  (i.e.	  cooperation	  vs.	  competition;	  Streuber,	  Knoblich,	  Sebanz,	   Buelthoff	   &	   de	   la	   Rosa,	   2011)	   are	   other	   factors	   that	   have	   been	   shown	   to	  constrain	   action	   simulation.	   This	   implies	   that	   action	   simulation	   is	   exploited	   by	  higher-­‐level	   processes	   that	   emerge	   at	   social	   instances	   that	   require	   separate	  representations	   for	   ‘self’	   and	   for	   ‘other’	   (Roepstorff	  &	  Frith,	  2004),	   each	  packaged	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with	  a	  different	  set	  of	  predictions.	  Sharing	  a	  task	  with	  another	  individual	  is	  one	  such	  instance.	  	  When	  watching	  my	  friend	  stir	  a	  pot	  filled	  with	  boiling	  syrup,	  I	  might	  decide	  to	  join	  in	  and	  help	  her	  make	   the	  Turkish	  delight.	   In	  order	   to	  do	   so	   I	  need	   to	   coordinate	  my	  actions	  with	  her	  and	  I	  need	  to	  do	  this	  in	  a	  way	  that	  appropriately	  complements	  her	  actions	  so	  that	  we	  can	  achieve	  our	  now	  common	  goal.	  This	  implies	  the	  need	  to	  know	  the	  right	  actions	  my	  friend	  is	  supposed	  to	  perform	  and	  the	  need	  to	  know	  when	  she	  will	  perform	  these	  actions.	  For	  example,	  when	  she	  reaches	  for	  the	  corn	  flour,	  based	  on	  my	  advance	  knowledge	  of	  how	  to	  make	  Turkish	  delight,	  I	  can	  predict	  that	  she	  is	  going	  to	  add	  it	  to	  the	  boiling	  water.	  Then	  I	  can	  take	  over	  the	  stirring	  with	  the	  spoon	  to	   share	   the	   task.	  Here,	   action	  simulation	  can	  service	  us	  by	  allowing	  each	  of	  us	   to	  predict	  the	  consequence	  of	  the	  other’s	  actions.	  However,	  action	  simulation	  is	  not	  all	  that	  is	  needed	  for	  successful	  completion	  of	  the	  task.	  As	  in	  prototypical	  cases	  of	  joint	  action	  (cf.	  Vesper,	  Butterfill,	  Knoblich	  &	  Sebanz,	  2011)	  each	  of	  us	  needs	  to	  take	  into	  account	  the	  outcome	  to	  be	  achieved,	  our	  own	  part	  in	  the	  task,	  and	  the	  part	  for	  which	  the	  other	  is	  responsible.	  	  A	  recent	  research	   line	  has	  set	  out	   to	  study	  task	  sharing	  experimentally.	  Recruiting	  paradigms	   that	   distribute	   across	   two	   people	   each	   half	   of	   a	   task,	   these	   studies	  suggest	  that	  individuals	  form	  representations	  detailing	  not	  only	  their	  own	  tasks	  but	  also	   the	   task	   for	   their	   interaction	  partners,	  even	  when	  this	   isn’t	  strictly	  necessary.	  Evidence	   for	   ‘shared	   task	   representations’,	   or	   ‘task	   co-­‐representation’,	   has	   been	  established	   by	   a	   wealth	   of	   studies.	   One	   of	   these	   studies	   (Sebanz,	   et	   al.,	   2003)	  capitalized	   on	   a	   known	   spatial	   compatibility	   effect,	   which	   creates	   a	   response	  selection	   conflict	   between	   two	   action	   alternatives	   when	   the	   task	   is	   performed	  individually	  (Simon,	  1990).	  When	  performed	  by	  two	  individuals	  instead	  of	  one,	  the	  same	  compatibility	  effect	  was	  observed	  even	  though	  each	  individual	  is	  assigned	  one	  of	  the	  two	  action	  alternatives,	  and	  the	  co-­‐actor’s	  task	  was	  completely	  irrelevant	  for	  individual	  performance.	  Similar	  co-­‐representation	  effects	  have	  been	  demonstrated	  in	   a	   number	   of	   different	   experimental	   paradigms	   that	   distributed	   standard	   tasks	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used	   in	   Cognitive	   Psychology	   across	   two	   people	   (Simon	   task:	   Sebanz	   et	   al.,	   2003;	  Sebanz,	   Knoblich,	   Prinz	   &	  Wascher,	   2006a;	   SNARC	   task:	   Atmaca,	   Sebanz,	   Prinz	   &	  Knoblich,	   2008;	   Flanker	   task:	   Atmaca,	   Sebanz	   &	   Knoblich,	   2011;	  Wenke,	   Atmaca,	  Hollanaender,	   Liepelt	   &	   Baess	   et	   al.,	   2011).	   Electrophysiological	   evidence	  corroborates	   the	   suggestion	   that	   when	   sharing	   a	   task	   individuals	   perform	   the	  other’s	   task	   vicariously	   (Sebanz,et	   al.,	   1996a;	   Tsai,	   Kuo,	   Hung	   &	   Tzeng,	   2008;	   de	  Bruijn,	   Miedl	   &	   Bekkering,	   2008),	   which	   indicates	   that	   a	   co-­‐actor’s	   task	   is	  represented	  in	  functionally	  similar	  ways	  to	  which	  one’s	  own	  task	  is	  represented.	  	  The	   size	   of	   co-­‐representation	   effects	   is	   modulated	   by	   several	   different	   factors.	  Affective	   (Hommel,	   Colzato	  &	   van	  den	  Wildenberg,	   2009),	   contextual	   (Iani,	   Anelli,	  Nicoletti,	   Arcuri	   &	   Rubichi,	   2011;	   de	   Bruijn,	   de	   Lange,	   von	   Cramon	   &	   Ullsperger,	  2009;	  Ruys	  &	  Aarts,	  2010)	  and	  spatial	  (Guagnano,	  Rusconi	  &	  Umilta,	  2010;	  Welsh,	  2009;	   Heed,	   Habets,	   Sebanz	   &	   Knoblich,	   2010)	   relations	   between	   task	   partners	  seem	  to	  influence	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  individuals	  take	  the	  other’s	  task	  into	  account.	  One	   crucial	   requirement	   in	   forming	   shared	   representations	   is	   the	   co-­‐actor’s	  perceived	  intentionality.	   In	  fact,	   it	  has	  been	  demonstrated	  that	  the	  actual	  presence	  of	  an	  interaction	  partner	  is	  not	  always	  required	  to	  obtain	  co-­‐representation	  effects;	  the	   mere	   belief	   that	   another	   person	   is	   performing	   another	   part	   of	   the	   task	   is	  sufficient	   for	   one	   actor	   to	   represent	   the	   other’s	   task	   (Tsai,	   et	   al.,	   2008;	   but	   see	  Welsh,	  Higgings,	  Ray	  &	  Weeks,	  2007).	  Conversely,	   if	  participants	  are	  led	  to	  believe	  that	  their	  co-­‐actor	  is	  a	  computer	  (Tsai	  et	  al.,	  2008)	  or	  that	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  co-­‐actor	  are	   not	   intentional	   but	   controlled	   by	   a	   machine	   (Atmaca	   et	   al.,	   2011),	   co-­‐representation	   effects	   do	   not	   occur.	   In	   summary,	   the	   evidence	   suggests	   that	   even	  when	   two	   co-­‐actors	   tasks	   are	   independent	   they	   take	   each	  other’s	   part	   of	   the	   task	  into	   account,	   even	  when	   this	   can	   hurt	   their	   performance,	   but	   only	   if	   they	   believe	  that	  their	  partner	  is	  an	  intentional	  agent.	  	  How	   does	   co-­‐representation	   support	   coordination	   in	   social	   actions?	   Evidence	  indicates	  that	  having	  representations	  that	  specify	  a	  co-­‐actor’s	  part	  of	  a	  task	  govern	  online	   processes	   that	   make	   coordination	   possible.	   These	   processes	   include	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prediction,	  monitoring,	  and	  stimulus	  processing.	  Advance	  knowledge	  of	  a	  co-­‐actor’s	  task	   allows	   us	   to	   generate	   accurate	   predictions	  with	   respect	   to	   their	   actions	   and	  thus	  with	   respect	   to	   ensuing	   interactions	   (Ramnani	   &	  Miall,	   2003).	   If	   I	   know	  my	  friend	  is	  on	  board	  with	  making	  Turkish	  delight	  with	  me,	  when	  she	  reaches	  for	  the	  flour	  I	  can	  safely	  predict	  that	  she	  is	  going	  to	  add	  it	  to	  the	  syrup	  rather	  than	  batter	  the	   fish	  with	   it.	  Thus	  shared	  task	  representations,	   firstly	  help	   individuals	  generate	  and	  adjust	  their	  own	  actions	  plans	  in	  a	  way	  to	  complement	  the	  partner,	  in	  line	  with	  a	  shared	  goal.	  Secondly,	  it	  enables	  monitoring	  the	  success	  of	  partners’	  performance	  and	   identifying	   the	   mistakes	   they	   commit.	   Behavioural	   (Schuch	   &	   Tipper,	   2007),	  neurophysiological	   (van	   Schie,	  Mars,	   Coles	  &	  Bekkering,	   2004),	   and	  neuroimaging	  (de	  Bruijn	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  Newman-­‐Norlund,	  Ganesh,	  van	  Schie,	  de	  Bruijn	  &	  Bekkering,	  2009)	   evidence	   suggest	   that	   the	   neural	   and	   cognitive	   processes	   involved	   in	  monitoring	  our	  own	  actions	  are	  also	  involved	  when	  we	  witness	  others	  committing	  errors.	  	  Together,	   the	   studies	   investigating	   the	   co-­‐representation	   effect	   have	   provided	  considerable	   insight	   into	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   social	   interaction	   affects	   cognitive	  processes	  during	  the	  progression	  of	  the	  interaction.	  A	  still	  open	  question	  is	  whether	  co-­‐representation	  also	  enhances	  subsequent	  memories	  related	  to	  a	  co-­‐actors’	   task.	  Do	   I	   remember	  what	   brand	   of	   corn	   flour	  my	   friend	   uses	   even	   though	   it	   bears	   no	  relevance	  for	  what	  I	  have	  to	  do	  as	  we	  make	  the	  Turkish	  delight	  together?	  Research	  on	   social	   memory	   indicates	   that	   individual	   memory	   processes	   are	   susceptible	   to	  social	   influences	   (cf.	  Barnier,	   Sutton,	  Harris	  &	  Wilson,	  2008,	   for	  an	  overview).	  For	  instance,	   it	   has	   been	   demonstrated	   that	   what	   one	   recalls	   can	   be	   subject	   to	   a	  reconstruction	   (Bartlett,	  1932)	   that	   reflects	  what	  another	  already	  knows	   (Basden,	  Basden,	  Bryner	  &	  Thomas,1997;	  Cuc,	  Koppel	  &	  Hirst,	  2007;	  Coman,	  Manier	  &	  Hirst,	  2009).	   This	   so-­‐called	   ‘memory	   conformity’	   (Wright	   &	   Schwartz,	   2010)	   during	  retrieval	   resists	   one’s	   will	   (Basden,	   Basden	   &	   Henry,	   2000;	   Meade	   &	   Roediger,	  2002),	   and	   is	   especially	   strong	   when	   the	   infectious	   person	   is	   physically	   present	  (ibid.).	   Is	  memory	   encoding	   susceptible	   to	   social	   influences	   as	  well?	   	   Particularly,	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does	  acting	  together	  affect	  the	  way	  individuals	  encode	  information	  that	  is	  part	  of	  a	  co-­‐actor’s	  task?	  Chapter	  4	  addresses	  these	  questions.	  	  
	  
Observing	  them:	  Ascribing	  shared	  intentionality	  Cooperative	  social	  interactions	  entail	  more	  than	  representing	  the	  others’	  actions	  or	  the	   tasks	   they	   are	   assigned	   to	   carry	   on.	   Also,	   the	   demands	   cooperation	   poses	   on	  individual	   cognition	   cannot	   be	   met	   by	   reasoning	   about	   another’s	   mental	   states	  alone.	   In	  prototypical	   cases	  of	   cooperative	   social	   interactions	   individuals	   share	  an	  intention,	  be	  it	  to	  accomplish	  a	  shared	  goal	  together,	  or	  even	  to	  stay	  engaged	  in	  the	  interaction.	   Shared	   intentions	   serve	   to	   organize	   the	   roles	   individuals	   take	   on	   to	  perform	  their	  parts	  of	  a	  task	  and	  to	  mutually	  coordinate	  their	  actions	  in	  space	  and	  time.	  This	  is	  essentially	  different	  from	  two	  individuals	  with	  independent	  intentions,	  whose	   actions	   are	   not	   directed	   along	   a	   common	  pursuit	   (Searle,	   1990).	   As	  we	   go	  about	  making	  our	  Turkish	  delight,	  my	  friend	  and	  I	  share	  the	  intention	  that	  we	  do	  so	  together.	   However,	   I	   do	   not	   share	   the	   same	   intention	   with	   her	   roommate	   who	  happens	  to	  be	  in	  the	  kitchen	  with	  us,	  but	  is	  making	  himself	  a	  pizza.	  Accordingly,	  philosophers	  generally	  posit	   that	   the	  defining	   feature	  of	  collaborative	  joint	   actions	   is	   shared	   intentionality.	   In	   fact,	   it	   is	   the	   philosophical	   inquiries	   on	  shared	   intentionality	   have	   the	   initial	   interest	   in	   research	   on	   joint	   action	   (Clark,	  1996).	  One	  of	   the	  resulting	  research	   lines	  seeks	  out	  to	   identify	  the	  phylogenic	  and	  ontogenic	   roots	   of	   cooperation.	   Although	   examples	   of	   coordinated	   collective	  activities,	   such	  as	  group	  hunting,	   are	  observed	   in	   some	  non-­‐human	  species,	   theirs	  cannot	   immediately	   be	   equated	   to	   the	   level	   of	   sophistication	   human	   sociality	  demonstrates.	  Chimpanzees,	  for	  example,	  demonstrate	  some	  rudimentary	  forms	  of	  social	   understanding	   and	   collaboration	   (e.g.	   getting	   help	   to	   retrieve	   food,	   Melis,	  Hare	  &	  Tomasello,	  2006).	  However	  these	  skills	  do	  not	  further	  develop	  into	  the	  level	  of	  complexity	  reached	  by	  the	  social	  behaviours	  of	  human	  infants	  within	  two	  years	  of	  their	   birth	   (Carpenter,	   2009;	   Tomasello	   &	   Carpenter,	   2007).	   The	   difference,	   it	   is	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believed,	  lies	  in	  a	  special	  motivation	  to	  share	  affective	  or	  mental	  states,	  and	  engage	  in	  joint	  actions	  to	  achieve	  a	  common	  goal	  (Tomasello,	  Carpenter,	  Call,	  Behne	  &	  Moll,	  2005).	  	  How	  does	  a	  shared	  intention	  translate	  into	  the	  actualization	  of	  joint	  activity	  where	  individuals	   achieve	   interpersonal	   coordination?	  At	   first	   glance	   it	   seems	   strange	   to	  assume	  that	  groups	  of	   individuals	  can	  intend	  to	  perform	  an	  act	  because	  intentions	  are	  normally	  ascribed	  to	  individuals.	  In	  contrast	  to	  this	  intuition	  is	  the	  observation	  that	   groups	   can	   engage	   in	   actions	   that	   individuals	   alone	   cannot	   perform	   (Clark,	  1996;	   Pettit,	   2009).	   For	   example,	   a	   football	   team	   can	   win	   the	   World	   Cup,	   not	  individual	   players.	   A	   way	   out	   of	   this	   contradiction	   is	   to	   assume	   that	   shared	  intentions	   comprise	   individual	   intentions	   that	   are	  mutually	   interlocked	   (Bratman,	  1992).	  This	   implies	  a	   representational	   structure	  scaffolded	  across	   individuals,	  and	  recruits	   cognitive	   processes	   operating	   at	   varying	   levels	   of	   complexity.	   Such	   a	  structure	   of	   shared	   representations	   orchestrates	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   individual	  behaviours,	   plans,	   goals,	   and	   intentions	   become	   coordinated	   (ibid.).	   Recursive	  attribution	  of	  beliefs	  (Tuomela,	  2006,	  Tomasello	  &	  Rakoczy,	  2003)	  of	  both	  first	  and	  second	  order	  (Frith,	  2007)	  is	  thought	  to	  be	  a	  process	  in	  interlocking	  agents’	  mutual	  intentional	   actions,	   and	   thereby	   carrying	   out	   interactions.	   Indeed	   neuroimaging	  studies	   investigating	   online	   social	   interactions	   have	   implicated	   a	   cortical	   region	  (medial	   prefrontal	   cortex,	   MPFC)	   that	   is	   one	   of	   the	   main	   nodes	   of	   the	   so-­‐called	  theory-­‐of-­‐mind	   network.	   As	   other	   aspects	   of	   interactions	   based	   on	   shared	  intentions,	  mutual	  expectations,	  commitments	  and	  obligations	  (Gilbert,	  1992)	  have	  been	  emphasized	  by	  other	  accounts.	  To	  illustrate,	  if	  I	  am	  under	  the	  impression	  that	  my	   friend	   and	   I	   are	   attempting	   to	  make	   Turkish	   delight	   together,	   I	   expect	   her	   to	  perform	   her	   part	   of	   the	   task,	   such	   as	   moving	   aside	   when	   I	   pour	   sugar	   into	   the	  boiling	  water.	  If	  she	  were	  to	  suddenly	  stop	  what	  she	  was	  doing	  to	  leave	  the	  kitchen,	  I	   would	   naturally	   object	   because	   she	   has	   broken	   our	   commitment	   to	   make	   the	  Turkish	   delight	   together.	   Young	   children	   are	   observed	   to	   have	   acquired	   such	   an	  understanding	   of	   normative	   commitments	   to	   social	   interactions	   (Graefenhain,	  Behne,	  Carpenter	  &	  Tomasello,	  2009).	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The	  subject	  of	  shared	  intentions	  has	  also	  been	  a	  point	  of	  conflict	  for	  philosophers.	  In	  contrast	   to	   Bratman’s	   account	   that	   focuses	   on	   interlocking	   individual	   intentions,	  others	  have	  argued	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  plural	  subjects,	  which	  might	  be	  reflected	  in	  the	  intuitive	  sense	  of	  ‘togetherness’	  commonly	  identified	  with	  shared	  intentionality.	  Accordingly,	  when	   acting	   collectively	   individuals’	   intentions	   get	   organized	   in	   such	  ways	  that	  a	  particular	  intention	  profile	  emerges	  that	  resembles	  that	  of	  an	  individual.	  This	   emergent	   profile,	   so	   goes	   the	   argument,	   cannot	   be	   accounted	   for	   by	   the	  individual	  intentions,	  and	  should	  be	  attributed	  to	  a	  plural	  subject	  that	  holds	  a	   ‘we-­‐intention’	  (Gilbert,	  2009;	  Tollefsen,	  2005;	  Tuomela,	  2006).	  	  An	  open	  question	  concerns	  how	  we	  perceive	   social	   interactions	   that	  are	  based	  on	  shared	  intentions.	  If	  we	  are	  inclined	  to	  represent	  the	  agent	  of	  a	  collaborative	  action	  as	  a	  single	  body	  (e.g.	  football	  team),	  does	  our	  processing	  of	  mental	  or	  affective	  states	  associated	   with	   the	   collective	   behaviour	   resemble	   our	   processing	   of	   those	  associated	   with	   an	   individual	   behaviour?	   When	   we	   attribute	   an	   intention	   to	   an	  interaction,	   do	   we	   attribute	   a	   single	   shared	   intention	   or	   multiple	   independent	  intentions?	   Are	   processes	   of	   action	   perception	   modulated	   by	   different	   ascribed	  intentional	  relations	  (i.e.	  shared	  intentions	  or	  parallel	  intentions)?	  These	  questions	  are	  addressed	  in	  Chapter	  5	  of	  the	  thesis.	  
	  
Outline	  of	  Chapters	  
Chapters	   2	   and	   3	   address	   the	   question	   whether	   motor	   laws	   governing	   action	  execution	  constrain	  action	  simulation,	  particularly	  at	  a	  neuronal	  level.	  Two	  studies	  used	  Fitts’	   law,	   one	  of	   the	  most	   robust	   laws	   in	  motor	  performance	   to	   further	   test	  this	  hypothesis.	  Chapter	  2	  describes	  a	  study	  on	  a	  neuropsychological	  patient	  with	  a	  frontal	  brain	   lesion	  that	  affects	  motor	  areas	  of	   the	  brain.	   It	   investigated	  whether	  a	  particular	   violation	   of	   Fitts’	   law	   the	   patient	   displayed	   in	   performance	   was	   also	  present	   in	   the	   patient’s	   judgments	   of	   the	   feasibility	   of	   movements	   observed	   in	  others.	  The	  study	  presented	  in	  Chapter	  3	  included	  an	  action-­‐perception	  paradigm	  in	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a	  functional	  magnetic	  resonance	  imaging	  (fMRI)	  experiment ⁠	  conducted	  with	  healthy	  adults.	   The	   paradigm	   specifically	   aimed	   to	   manipulate	   the	   motor	   difficulty	   of	  observed	  actions	  while	  controlling	   for	  perceptual	   features.	  The	  neural	  response	  to	  specific	  motor	  parameters	  in	  observed	  actions	  was	  explored.	  	  
Chapter	   4	   reports	   a	   study	   that	   investigated	  whether	   shared	   task	   representations	  during	   a	   joint	   task	   would	   result	   in	   diffusion	   of	   information	   across	   actors	   during	  memory	  encoding.	  Two	  individuals	  performed	  a	  task	  that	  was	  distributed	  between	  them.	   They	   classified	   words	   into	   their	   individually	   assigned	   categories	   and	   were	  later	   tested	   for	   their	   memory.	   Two	   experiments	   demonstrated	   that	   sharing	   task	  representations	   affected	   formation	   of	   memories.	   Individuals	   remembered	   items	  belonging	  to	  their	  partners	  despite	  a	  lack	  of	  incentive	  to	  do	  so.	  This	  finding	  implies	  that	  cooperation	  could	  as	  well	  be	  a	  mechanism,	  among	  others,	  that	  lies	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  formation	  of	  shared	  knowledge	  systems,	  and	  opens	  up	  new	  research	  avenues	  to	  be	  explored.	  	  The	  study	  reported	  in	  Chapter	  5	  compared	  the	  perception	  of	  multiple	  individuals’	  actions	   that	   were	   or	   were	   not	   based	   on	   shared	   intentions.	   The	  main	   question	   of	  interest	  was	  whether	   the	  processing	  of	   joint	  actions	   involving	  shared	   intentions	   is	  subserved	   by	   different	   neural	   computations	   than	   the	   processing	   of	   multiple	  individual	   actions	   without	   shared	   intentions.	   Accordingly,	   in	   an	   fMRI	   study	   I	  compared	   the	   neural	   responses	   to	   observing	   perceptually	   identical	   actions	   of	  multiple	  individuals	  that	  were	  either	  driven	  or	  not	  driven	  by	  a	  shared	  intention.	  
Chapter	   6	   discusses	   the	   theoretical	   implications	   of	   the	   findings	   presented	   in	  Chapters	  2-­‐5.	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Abstract	  
	  Research	  on	  embodied	  cognition	  stresses	  that	  bodily	  and	  motor	  processes	  constrain	  how	   we	   perceive	   others.	   Regarding	   action	   perception	   the	   most	   prominent	  hypothesis	   is	   that	   observed	   actions	   are	   matched	   to	   the	   observer’s	   own	   motor	  representations.	  Previous	   findings	  demonstrate	  that	   the	  motor	   laws	  that	  constrain	  one’s	   performance	   also	   constrain	   one’s	   perception	   of	   others’	   actions.	   The	   present	  neuropsychological	   case	   study	   asked	   whether	   neurological	   impairments	   affect	   a	  person’s	  performance	  and	  action	  perception	   in	   the	  same	  way.	  The	  results	   showed	  that	  patient	  DS,	  who	  suffers	  from	  a	  frontal	  brain	  lesion,	  not	  only	  ignored	  target	  size	  when	   performing	   movements	   but	   also	   when	   asked	   to	   judge	   whether	   others	   can	  perform	  the	  same	  movements.	  In	  other	  words	  DS	  showed	  the	  same	  violation	  of	  Fitts’	  law	   when	   performing	   and	   observing	   actions.	   These	   results	   further	   support	   the	  assumption	   of	   close	   perception	   action	   links	   and	   the	   assumption	   that	   these	   links	  recruit	  predictive	  mechanisms	  residing	  in	  the	  motor	  system.	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Introduction	  The	   assumption	   that	   the	   motor	   system	   supports	   cognition	   has	   gained	   a	   lot	   of	  popularity	   in	   the	   last	   decade.	   It	   implies	   that	   basic	   bodily	   and	   motor	   processes	  constrain	   not	   only	  what	   individuals	   can	   perceive,	   feel,	   and	   do,	   but	   also	   how	   they	  understand	   and	   relate	   to	   others	   (Sommerville	   &	   Decety,	   2006).	   One	   way	   to	  conceptualize	  motor	  contributions	  to	  perception	  and	  cognition	  is	  the	  assumption	  of	  common	   coding	   (Prinz,	   1997;	   Prinz	   &	   Hommel,	   2002)	   that	   is	   inspired	   by	   James	  (1890)	  ideomotor	  principle	  for	  voluntary	  action.	  This	  principle	  states	  that	  imagining	  an	   action	   creates	   a	   tendency	   to	   carry	   it	   out.	   Common	   coding	   theory	   extends	   the	  ideomotor	  principle	  and	  claims	  that	  the	  same	  mental	  representations	  are	   involved	  in	   performing	   actions	   and	   observing	   actions.	   These	   representations	   code	   the	  ‘‘perceivable’’	   effect	   of	   actions.	   During	   performance	   common	   codes	   are	   activated	  from	  the	  inside	  and	  then	  further	  specified	  in	  the	  motor	  system.	  During	  observation	  they	  are	  activated	  from	  the	  outside	  and	  lead	  to	  ‘‘motor	  resonance’’.	  A	  large	  body	  of	  neurophysiological	  evidence	  supports	  the	  assumption	  of	  a	  common	  coding	   for	   perception	   and	   action	   (Rizzolatti	   &	   Craighero,	   2004).	   Mirror	   neurons	  found	  in	  the	  premotor	  cortex	  of	  the	  monkey	  brain	  and	  the	  analogous	  mirror	  system	  in	  humans	  are	  engaged	  in	  perception	  as	  well	  as	  in	  execution	  of	  action	  supporting	  the	  view	   that	   others’	   actions	   are	   coded	   in	   a	   functionally	   equivalent	  way	   as	   one’s	   own	  actions.	  The	  primary	   function	  of	   the	   common	  representations	   implemented	   in	   the	  mirror	   system	   has	   so	   far	   been	   attributed	   to	   action	   understanding	   (Rizzolatti	   &	  Craighero,	   2004),	   that	   is,	   extracting	   the	   goals	   that	   underlie	   observed	   actions	  (Wohlschlaeger	   &	   Bekkering,	   2002;	   Hamilton	   &	   Grafton,	   2006;	   2008;	   Rizzolatti,	  Fogassi,	   &	   Gallese,	   2001).	   However,	   there	   is	   also	   reason	   to	   believe	   that	   mirror	  matching	   contributes	   to	   predicting	   others’	   actions	   in	   real	   time	   (Knoblich	  &	   Flach,	  2001;	   Knoblich,	   Seigerschmidt,	   Flach,	   &	   Prinz,	   2002;	   Wilson	   &	   Knoblich,	   2005).	  Accordingly,	   simulation	   theories	   (Jeannerod,	   2001;	   Wilson	   &	   Knoblich,	   2005;	  Schubotz,	  2007)	  propose	  that	  people	  use	  internal	  models	  (Wolpert,	  Ghahramani,	  &	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Jordan,	  1995;	  Frith,	  Blakemore	  &	  Wolpert,	  2000)	  to	  predict	  the	  future	  sensory	  and	  perceptual	  consequences	  of	  observed	  actions.	  The	  idea	  is	  that	  the	  same	  models	  that	  are	  used	  to	  plan	  one’s	  own	  actions	  can	  be	  exploited	  in	  action	  perception.	  In	   the	   context	   of	   action	   planning,	   internal	   models	   reflect	   previously	   experienced	  relationships	   between	   actions	   and	   their	   outcomes	   (Kawato,	   1999;	   Miall,	   2003;	  Wolpert	   et	   al.,	   1995).	   With	   every	   motor	   command	   generated	   during	   movement	  execution,	  the	  motor	  system	  produces	  an	  efference	  copy	  of	  that	  motor	  command	  in	  parallel.	  Based	  on	  this	  copy,	  the	  forward	  model	  estimates	  the	  sensory	  consequences	  of	   the	   movement.	   The	   estimate	   stands	   in	   for	   the	   re-­‐afferent	   information	   coming	  from	  sensory	  channels	  and	  is	  used	  in	  further	  processing	  until	  the	  actual	  re-­‐afferent	  information	  arrives	  at	  the	  central	  nervous	  system	  (e.g.,	  Frith,	  Blakemore	  &	  Wolpert,	  2000).	   The	   critical	   assumption	   in	   the	   simulation	   accounts	   above	   is	   that	   forward	  models	   are	   instrumental	   in	   action	   perception.	   Accordingly,	   an	   observed	   action	   is	  matched	  with	  our	  own	  repertoire	  and	  is	  simulated	  via	  the	  internal	  models	  using	  the	  same	  efference	  copy.	   In	  other	  words,	  perception	  and	  action	  matching	  allows	  us	   to	  exploit	  already	  existing	  predictive	  mechanisms	  in	  the	  motor	  system	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  others’	  actions.	  In	   summary,	   ‘‘motor	   theories’’	   of	   action	  perception	   suggest	   that	  perceived	   actions	  are	  matched	  to	  one’s	  own	  action	  repertoire	  and	  that	  this	  matching	  activates	  internal	  models	   that	   allow	   one	   to	   predict	   the	   outcome	   of	   perceived	   actions.	   One	   testable	  implication	   of	   these	   assumptions	   is	   that	   the	   principles	   or	   ‘‘laws’’	   that	   constrain	  production	  of	  movement	  should	  affect	  action	  perception.	  The	  reason	   is	   that	  motor	  simulations	   should	   impose	   the	   constraints	   of	   one’s	   own	   motor	   apparatus	   onto	  observed	   actors.	   Before	   describing	   a	   neuropsychological	   case	   study	   on	  patient	  DS	  that	  further	  tested	  this	  claim	  we	  shortly	  summarize	  earlier	  evidence	  that	  has	  been	  obtained	  with	  regard	  to	  two	  well-­‐established	  motor	  laws:	  The	  two-­‐thirds	  power	  law	  (Lacquaniti,	  Terzuolo,	  &	  Viviani,	  1983)	  and	  Fitts’	  law	  (Fitts,	  1954).	  In	  particular,	  we	  will	  focus	  on	  results	  suggesting	  that	  these	  motor	  laws	  affect	  how	  we	  perceive	  others.	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Two-­‐thirds	  power	  law	  The	   two-­‐thirds	   power	   law	   (Lacquaniti	   et	   al.,	   1983;	   Viviani,	   2002)	   describes	   the	  relationship	  between	  the	  velocity	  of	  a	  movement	  and	  the	  curvature	  of	  its	  trajectory.	  The	   law	  states	  that	  as	  curvature	   increases	  one	  needs	  to	  systematically	  slow	  down.	  As	  the	  curvature	  decreases,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  one	  can	  systematically	  accelerate	  the	  movement.	   This	   change	   in	   velocity	   is	   directly	   proportional	   to	   the	   change	   in	  curvature.	   The	   two-­‐thirds	   power	   law	   has	   been	   shown	   to	   hold	   for	   most	   types	   of	  human	   movement,	   including	   manual	   (Viviani	   &	   Mounoud,	   1990)	   or	   eye	   tracking	  movements	   (de	   Sperati	   &	   Viviani,	   1997).	   Studies	   that	   investigated	   perceptual	  judgments	   for	   movements	   indicate	   that	   the	   two-­‐thirds	   power	   law	   constrains	  perception	  of	  action	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  it	  constrains	  production.	  For	  example,	  it	  was	  shown	  that	  people’s	  perception	  of	  geometric	  and	  kinematic	  properties	  of	  end-­‐point	  trajectories,	   such	   as	   drawing	   and	   writing	   (Viviani	   &	   Stucchi,	   1989,	   1992),	   is	  systematically	  biased	  towards	  complying	  with	  the	  two-­‐thirds	  power	  law	  (Lacquaniti	  et	  al.,	  1983).	  Further	  support	  comes	   from	  a	  recent	   functional	  MRI	  study	  which	   investigated	   the	  neural	   correlates	   of	   the	   two-­‐thirds	   power	   law	   by	   presenting	   participants	   visual	  stimuli	  that	  were	  either	  in	  compliance	  with	  or	  in	  violation	  of	  this	  law	  (Dayan,	  Casile,	  Levit-­‐Binnun,	   Giese	   &	   Hendler	   et	   al.,	   2007).	   The	   authors	   found	   that	   the	   stimuli	  obeying	  the	  two-­‐thirds	  power	  law	  yielded	  stronger	  and	  more	  widespread	  activation	  in	   areas	   associated	   with	   action	   production,	   action	   perception	   and	   visual	   motion	  processing.	  Kandel,	  Orliaguet	   and	  Boe	   (2000)	   investigated	  whether	   the	   two-­‐thirds	   power	   law	  also	   influences	   an	   observer’s	   ability	   to	   predict	   the	   future	   course	   of	   handwriting	  trajectories.	  They	  found	  that	  the	  predictions	  were	  most	  accurate	  for	  trajectories	  that	  complied	  with	  the	  law	  and	  became	  less	  accurate	  as	  trajectories	  were	  manipulated	  to	  deviate	   from	   it.	   Flach,	   Knoblich	   and	   Prinz	   (2004)	   reported	   similar	   findings	   for	   a	  representational	   momentum	   paradigm	   (Hubbard,	   2005),	   where	   subjects	   are	  typically	   asked	   to	   predict	   the	   future	   course	   of	   a	   movement.	   Errors	   in	   prediction	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were	   smaller	   when	   the	   observed	   movement	   trajectories	   complied	   with	   the	   two-­‐thirds	  power	  law.	  The	   results	   described	   above	   suggest	   that	   anticipating	   the	   future	   course	   of	   a	  perceived	  movement	   is	   easier	  when	   it	   corresponds	   to	   the	   constraints	   that	   govern	  the	  actions	  that	  produce	  this	  movement.	  They	  can	  be	  interpreted	  as	  support	  for	  the	  claim	   that	  we	  perceive	  and	  understand	  movements	   through	   the	   lens	  of	  our	  motor	  repertoires.	   When	   perceived	   events	   are	   predictable	   by	   an	   internal	   model	   in	   the	  motor	  system	  people	  can	  better	  anticipate	  what	  will	  follow	  than	  when	  the	  perceived	  events	  are	  not	  predictable	  by	  an	  internal	  model.	  Fitts’	  law	  Fitts’	  law	  (Fitts,	  1954)	  is	  perhaps	  the	  most	  stable	  law	  in	  human	  motor	  control	  (for	  a	  review,	   see	   Plamondon	   &	   Alimi,	   1997),	   and	   has	   been	   studied	   extensively	   by	   the	  human	  computer	  interaction	  (HCI)	  field	  as	  well	  as	  psychophysics.	  The	  law	  captures	  the	   speed	   accuracy	   trade-­‐	   off	   observed	   in	   human	  movement,	   and	   states	   that	   the	  average	  time	  it	  takes	  to	  move	  between	  two	  targets	  is	  determined	  by	  the	  width	  of	  the	  targets	   and	   the	   distance	   separating	   them.	   With	   increasing	   target	   width,	   one	   can	  move	   faster	   between	   the	   targets	   without	   missing	   them.	  With	   increasing	   distance	  between	  targets,	  one	  takes	  longer	  to	  move	  between	  them.	  Fitts’	   law	  expresses	  this	  trade-­‐off	  between	  speed	  and	  accuracy	  as:	  MT	  =	  a	  +	  b	  x	  ID;	  where	  MT	  is	  movement	  time,	   ID	   is	   the	   index	  of	  difficulty,	  and	  a	  and	  b	  are	  empirical	   constants.	  The	  critical	  variable	  is	  the	  ID,	  which	  relates	  the	  amplitude	  (A)	  of	  the	  movement	  to	  the	  width	  (W)	  of	  the	  targets.	  It	  is	  expressed	  as:	  ID	  =	  log2	  (2A/W).	  The	  main	  quantitative	  prediction	  that	  can	  be	  derived	  from	  Fitts’	  law	  is	  that	  different	  combinations	  of	  target	  width	  and	  movement	  amplitude	  can	  yield	  the	  same	  index	  of	  difficulty,	   and	   thus	   the	   same	   MT	   (Table	   2.1).	   Fitts’	   law	   holds	   for	   many	   forms	   of	  movement	   production	   including	   different	   effectors	   and	   movement	   contexts,	   with	  only	  a	  few	  exceptions	  (e.g.,	  Chi	  &	  Lin,	  1997;	  Danion,	  Duarte,	  &	  Grosjean,	  1999).	  Decety	  and	  Jeannerod	  (1995)	  were	  the	  first	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  Fitts’	  law	  not	  only	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holds	   for	   movements	   that	   are	   actually	   performed	   but	   also	   for	   movements	   one	  imagines	   to	   perform.	   They	   asked	   participants	   to	   imagine	   walking	   in	   a	   three-­‐dimensional	   virtual	   environment	   towards	   gates	   of	   varying	   widths	   situated	   at	  varying	   distances	   and	   found	   that	   the	  mental	  MT	   it	   took	   the	   participants	   to	  move	  between	   the	   two	  gates	  was	  a	   linear	   function	  of	   the	   index	  of	  difficulty	   (ID),	   just	   as	  predicted	   by	   Fitts’	   law.	   The	   imagined	   MT	   increased	   with	   increasing	   apparent	  distance	  between	  the	  gates,	  and	  with	  decreasing	  gate	  width.	  This	  result	  shows	  that	  imagined	  actions	  maintain	  the	  temporal	  characteristics	  of	  the	  same	  actions	  executed	  (Decety,	  Jeannerod,	  &	  Prablanc,	  1989;	  Sirigu,	  Duhamel,	  Cohen,	  Pillon	  &	  Du	  Bois	  et	  al.,	  1996,	  Sirigu,	  Cohen,	  Duhamel,	  Pillon	  &	  Du	  Bois	  et	  al.,	  1995),	  indicating	  that	  the	  same	  internal	  models	  are	  at	  work	  when	  performing	  and	  imagining	  actions.	  
	  
Table	  2.1:	  Movement	  amplitudes	  used	  in	  the	  experiment	  as	  a	  function	  of	  the	  target	  width	  (in	  cm)	  and	  index	  of	  difficulty.	  	  
	   Index	  of	  Difficulty	  Target	  Width	   2	   3	   4	  2	   4	  cm	   8	  cm	   16	  cm	  4	   8	  cm	   16	  cm	   32	  cm	  8	   16	  cm	   32	  cm	   64	  cm	  	  There	   is	   also	   evidence	   that	   a	   person	   has	   implicit	   knowledge	   of	   Fitts’	   law	   when	  preparing	   for	   future	   movements,	   when	   perceiving	   the	   constraints	   of	   planned	  movements,	  and	  when	  evaluating	  the	  difficulty	  of	  planned	  movements	  (Augustyn	  &	  Rosenbaum,	   2005;	   Sirigu	   et	   al.,	   1995,	   1996;	   Maruff	   &	   Velakoulis,	   2000;	   Slifkin	   &	  Grilli,	  2006).	  Other	  motor	  imagery	  studies	  using	  a	  variety	  of	  tasks,	  such	  as	  walking	  (Bakker,	   de	   Lange,	   Stevens,	   Toni,	   &	   Bloem,	   2007;	   Decety	  &	  Michel,	   1989),	   simple	  hand	   actions	   (Sirigu	   et	   al.,	   1996;	   Choudhury,	   Charman,	   Bird,	  &	  Blakemore,	   2007),	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drawing	   (Decety	  &	  Michel,	   1989)	   or	   reaching	   targets	   (Maruff	  &	  Velakoulis,	   2000)	  confirm	  that	  the	  same	  motor	  representations	  govern	  an	  action	  whether	  it	  is	  real	  or	  imagined.	   Index	   of	   difficulty	   affects	   actions	   in	   the	   same	  way	   irrespective	   of	   their	  modalities.	   Taken	   together,	   similarity	   in	   temporal	   properties	   between	   real	   and	  imagined	   movements	   (Decety	   &	   Jeannerod	   &	   Prablanc,	   1989;	   Decety	   &	   Michel,	  1989)	  suggests	  that	  overlapping	  motor	  mechanisms	  are	  recruited	  for	  both	  types	  of	  movement.	  Results	   from	   another	   recent	   study	   suggest	   that	   observation	   of	   action	  may	   recruit	  similar	   motor	   processes	   as	   performing	   and	   imagining	   movements.	   In	   particular,	  Grosjean,	   Shiffrar	   and	   Knoblich	   (2007)	   have	   shown	   that	   Fitts’	   law	   holds	   when	  people	   are	   asked	   to	   judge	  how	   fast	   another	  person	   can	  move.	   In	   this	   experiment,	  participants	  were	  shown	  alternating	  pictures	  of	  a	  person	  moving	  their	  arm	  between	  two	   targets.	   Index	   of	   difficulty	   (ID)	   was	   varied	   choosing	   appropriate	   movement	  amplitudes	   and	   target	  widths.	  Nine	   different	   amplitude/width	   combinations	  were	  used,	  yielding	  three	  conditions	  for	  each	  of	  three	  IDs.	  The	  participants	  were	  asked	  to	  report	  whether	  the	  person	  could	  perform	  such	  a	  movement	  without	  missing	  the	  tar-­‐	  gets.	  Alternating	  pictures	  were	  chosen	  instead	  of	  video	  clips	  to	  avoid	  any	  additional	  information	  provided	  by	  movement	  trajectories.	  The	  perceived	  MTs	  were	  defined	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  speed	  at	  which	  the	  participants	  reported	  an	  equal	  number	  of	  ‘possible’	  and	  ‘impossible’	  judgments.	  The	   perceived	   MTs	   were	   found	   to	   vary	   linearly	   as	   a	   function	   of	   ID	   (r2	   =	   0.96),	  indicating	   that	   the	   MTs	   did	   not	   vary	   as	   a	   function	   of	   target	   width	   or	   movement	  amplitude	  alone.	  These	  results	  demonstrated	  that	  the	  same	  motor	  law	  constraining	  action	   production	   and	   motor	   imagery	   constrains	   action	   perception	   as	   well.	  Providing	   a	   solid	   support	   for	  motor	   contributions	   to	   action	  perception,	   this	   study	  reinforced	   the	   relationship	   between	   action	   production,	  motor	   imagery	   and	   action	  perception,	   in	   line	   with	   evidence	   for	   overlapping	   neural	   systems	   for	   these	   three	  motor	  domains	  (Grezes	  &	  Decety,	  2001;	  Rizzolatti	  &	  Craighero,	  2004).	  The	   authors	   explain	   these	   results	   with	   the	   following	   model	   (see	   Figure	   2.1)	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Figure	  2.1:	  Proposed	  dual	  route	  model	  of	  action	  perception.	  Contextual	  information	  and	  the	  kinematics	  of	  the	  observed	  actions	  are	  coded	  independently	  via	  separate	  routes	  of	  internal	  simulations,	   The	   two	   routes	   feed	   into	   and	   are	   reconciled	   by	   the	   predictors	   that	   yield	   a	  judgment	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  ‘doability’	  of	  the	  perceived	  action.	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  The	   dynamic	   model	   of	   Erlhagen,	   Mukovskiy,	   &	   Bicho	   (2006)	   suggests	   possible	  neural	   correlates	   of	   these	   separate	   routes.	   In	   this	   model,	   simulation	   and	   action	  understanding	   are	   integrated	   within	   a	   continuous	   dynamic	   process.	   Accordingly,	  contextual	   information,	  movement	   information,	   and	   the	  goal	  of	   the	  movement	  are	  represented	  as	  dynamic	  activity	  in	  layered	  neural	  networks.	  One	  part	  of	  the	  model	  consists	   of	   the	   premotor-­‐parietal-­‐STS	   (superior	   temporal	   sulcus)	  mirror	   circuitry	  responsible	   for	   action	   observation	   and	   action	   execution.	   This	   circuitry	   is	  interconnected	  with	   a	   layer	   in	  prefrontal	   cortex	   (PFC)	   that	   is	   proposed	   to	   encode	  the	  intentional	  action	  goal	  framed	  by	  the	  context	  in	  which	  the	  action	  is	  set.	  If	   the	   contextual	   constraints	   in	   which	   actions	   are	   embedded	   are	   processed	   by	  prefrontal	   areas,	   as	   claimed	   by	   Erlhagen	   and	   colleagues	   (2006),	   then	   we	   would	  expect	  a	  lesion	  in	  this	  area	  to	  misrepresent	  the	  context	  of	  an	  action,	  and	  hence	  the	  reasons	   driving	   it.	   Particularly	   in	   a	   Fitts’	   task,	   a	   patient	   with	   a	   prefrontal	   lesion	  would	   not	   be	   able	   to	   integrate	   the	   task	   layout	   into	   his	   representation	   of	   the	  observed	  movement.	   This,	   in	   turn,	   would	   not	   only	   impair	   his	   ability	   to	   adapt	   his	  movement	  speed	  but	  in	  the	  same	  manner	  his	  ability	  to	  judge	  whether	  an	  observed	  person	  can	  achieve	  a	  certain	  movement	  speed	  or	  not.	  In	  the	  following,	  we	  report	  a	  study	  that	  tested	  this	  hypothesis	  in	  the	  neuropsychological	  patient	  DS	  whose	  lesion	  encompasses	  the	  left	  frontal	  lobe.	  Patient	  DS	  DS	  is	  a	  74-­‐year-­‐old	  former	  train	  inspector	  who	  suffered	  a	  stroke	  in	  1995.	  He	  is	  able	  to	  function	  at	  a	  relatively	  self-­‐	  sufficient	  manner	  despite	  his	  hemiplegia	  of	  the	  right	  side.	   Following	  his	   accident,	   a	  wide	   range	  of	  neuropsychological	  measures	   and	  an	  MRI-­‐scan	   of	   his	   lesion	   were	   obtained.	   His	   MRI-­‐scan	   revealed	   damage	   to	   the	   left	  inferior,	  middle	  and	  superior	  frontal	  gyri	  (Figure	  2.2).	  DS’s	  scores	  on	  low	  level	  visual	  perception	  and	  object	  naming	  were	  relatively	  nor-­‐	  mal.	  He	  scored	  100%	  on	  unusual	  views	   matching,	   and	   86%	   on	   naming	   everyday	   objects.	   Despite	   a	   few	   semantic	  errors	  in	  naming,	  DS	  used	  these	  objects	  appropriately.	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Figure	   2.2:	   MRI	   scans	   of	   patient	   DS.	   He	   suffers	   from	   lesions	   in	   left	   inferior	   middle	   and	  superior	  frontal	  gyri	  due	  to	  a	  stroke.	  
	  
Method	  Participants	  In	  addition	  to	  patient	  DS,	  five	  healthy	  control	  participants	  were	  tested	  in	  exchange	  for	  course	  credit	  or	  money.	  The	  control	  participants	  reported	  normal	  or	  corrected-­‐to-­‐normal	  vision.	  They	  were	  not	  age-­‐matched	  as	  Fitts’	   law	  has	  been	  shown	  to	  hold	  across	  different	  age	  groups	  (Skoura,	  Papaxanthis,	  Vinter,	  &	  Pozzo,	  2005).	  Materials	  Stimulus	   presentation	   and	   response	   registration	   were	   managed	   by	   an	   IBM	  compatible	   computer	   using	   E-­‐Prime	   software	   version	   1.0	   (Psychology	   Software	  Tools,	  Inc.).	  The	  stimuli	  used	  were	  pairs	  of	  digital	  photographs	  of	  an	  arm	  pointing	  at	  one	  of	  the	  two	  targets	  placed	  on	  a	  flat	  surface	  (Figure	  2.3).	  The	  two	  targets	  were	  of	  identical	  widths	   and	  were	   separated	   by	   varying	   amplitudes.	   Across	   trials,	   each	   of	  three	  widths	  (2,	  4	  and	  8	  cm)	  was	  combined	  with	  three	  of	  five	  amplitudes	  (4,	  8,	  16,	  32	   and	   64	   cm)	   to	   make	   up	   for	   three	   IDs	   (2,	   3	   and	   4;	   Table	   2.1).	   The	   pair	   of	  photographs	  was	  repeatedly	  alternated	  to	  create	  apparent	  motion.	  Procedure	  and	  design	  The	   rate	   at	   which	   the	   stimuli	   were	   alternated	   was	   set	   at	   1	   of	   11	   stimulus-­‐onset	  asynchronies	   (SOAs),	   which	   also	   corresponded	   to	   the	   durations	   of	   individual	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frames.	  SOAs	  ranged	  from	  150	  to	  650	  ms	  in	  increments	  of	  50	  ms.	  Each	  trial	  started	  at	  an	  SOA	  of	  either	  150	  or	  650	  ms.	  The	  SOAs	  could	  be	  changed	  with	  key	  presses.	  Key	  (1)	  shortened	  the	  SOA	  by	  one	  step,	  key	  (2)	  lengthened	  the	  SOA	  by	  one	  step,	  and	  key	  (3)	  was	  programmed	  to	  go	  on	  to	  the	  next	  trial.	  The	  task	  was	  to	  choose	  the	  speed	  at	  which	   the	   movement	   between	   the	   two	   targets	   was	   just	   doable.	   The	   participants	  could	  modify	  the	  SOAs	  as	  often	  as	  they	  wanted	  until	  they	  were	  satisfied,	  before	  they	  moved	  on	  to	  the	  next	  trial.	  The	  SOA	  that	  was	  ultimately	  chosen	  on	  a	  given	  trial	  was	  defined	  as	  the	  MT	  that	  was	  perceived	  as	  just	  doable.	  A	  3	  (width)	  x	  3	  (ID)	  x	  2	  (hand)	  factorial	  design	  was	  used.	  Half	  of	  the	  stimuli	  showed	  right-­‐hand	  movements	  and	  half	  showed	   left-­‐hand	   movements.	   Each	   block	   of	   72	   trials	   was	   presented	   to	   the	  participants	  in	  a	  random	  order,	  following	  a	  short	  practice	  session.	  The	  running	  time	  for	  each	  block	  was	  roughly	  20	  min	  and	  three	  blocks	  were	  completed.	  The	   patient	   was	   also	   asked	   to	   execute	   the	   same	   actions	   presented	   in	   the	   action	  perception	  task.	  Targets	  of	  same	  widths	  as	  in	  the	  previous	  task	  were	  placed	  across	  each	   other	   at	   varying	   amplitudes,	   to	   create	   the	   same	   IDs	   (Table	   2.1).	   DS	   was	  instructed	  to	  move	  between	  the	  targets	  as	  fast	  and	  as	  accurately	  as	  possible	  while	  a	  video	  camera	  recorded	  his	  performance.	  Produced	  MT	  for	  a	  given	  trial	  was	  defined	  as	  the	  average	  duration	  of	  a	  single	  movement	  between	  the	  targets,	  i.e.,	  10	  s	  divided	  by	  the	   total	  number	  of	  performed	  movements.	  The	  patient	  could	  perform	  the	  task	  with	  his	  left	  hand	  only,	  due	  to	  his	  hemiplegia.	  Each	  of	  the	  nine	  trial	  types	  was	  tested	  twice.	  Trials	  were	  presented	   in	  a	  random	  order	  within	   the	  same	  block.	  No	  control	  participants	   were	   tested	   for	   this	   task,	   as	   Fitts’	   law	   is	   well	   established	   in	   action	  production	  across	  age	  groups	  (Skoura	  et	  al.,	  2005).	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Figure	  2.3:	  Sample	  stimuli	  with	  different	  combinations	  of	  target	  width	  (W)	  and	  movement	  amplitude	  (A)	  leading	  to	  the	  same	  index	  of	  difficulty	  (ID).	  
	  
Results	  Figure	   2.4	   presents	   the	  mean	   perceived	  MTs	   as	   a	   function	   of	   width	   and	   index	   of	  difficulty	   (ID),	   for	   patient	  DS	   and	   the	   five	   control	   participants.	   The	   results	   for	   the	  controls	   are	   consistent	   with	   Fitts’	   law	   and	   our	   previous	   findings	   (Grosjean	   et	   al.,	  2007).	  Perceived	  MTs	   increased	   linearly	  with	   ID	   (see	  bottom	  panel	  of	  Figure	  2.4).	  The	  regression	  analysis	  yielded	  a	  significant	  r2	  of	  0.91	  (F(1,	  7)	  =	  74.13,	  p<0.001)	  and	  the	  following	  regression	  equation	  for	  MT:	  MT	  =	  269	  +	  48ID.	  In	  contrast,	  the	  data	  for	  patient	  DS	  did	  not	  obey	  Fitts’	  law	  (see	  top	  panel	  of	  Figure	  2.4).	  ID	  only	  accounted	  for	  a	  small	  and	  non-­‐significant	  portion	  of	  the	  variance	  in	  DS’s	  perceptual	  judgments	  (r2	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=	  0.34,	  F(1,	  7)	  =	  3.61,	  p=	  0.099).	  The	  resulting	  regression	  equation	  was	  MT	  =	  219	  +	  51ID.	   Figure	   2.5	   displays	   the	   same	   data	   plotted	   as	   a	   function	   of	   movement	  amplitude	  (A),	  that	  is,	  distance	  between	  the	  targets	  instead	  of	  ID.	  As	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  top	  panel	  of	  the	  figure,	  movement	  amplitude	  was	  an	  almost	  perfect	  predictor	  for	  which	  MTs	   DS	   perceived	   as	   just	   doable,	   as	   evidenced	   by	   the	   r2of	   0.98	   (F(1,	   7)	   =	  451.93,	  p<0.001.	  The	  resulting	  regression	  equation	  was	  MT	  =	  284	  +	  4).	  As	  would	  be	  expected,	  based	  on	  the	  results	  presented	  above,	  movement	  amplitude	  was	  a	  weaker	  predictor	  for	  the	  control	  participants’	  performance	  (see	  bottom	  panel	  of	  Figure	  2.5)	  because	   it	   fails	   to	   take	   into	  account	   the	   influence	  of	  W	   (r2	  =	  0.66,	  F(1,	  7)	  =	  13.83,	  
p<0.01.	  The	  resulting	  regression	  equation	  was	  MT	  =	  371	  +	  2A).	  The	   action	   production	   data	   gathered	   from	   DS	   are	   depicted	   in	   Figure	   2.6.	   As	   was	  already	  observed	  for	  his	  perceptual	  data,	  movement	  amplitude	  (r2=	  0.93,	  F(1,	  7)	  =	  93.44,	  p<0.001,	  regression	  equation	  MT	  =	  257	  +	  3A;	  see	  bottom	  panel	  of	  Figure	  2.6)	  proved	  to	  be	  a	  much	  better	  predictor	  of	  his	  performance	  than	  ID	  (r2=	  0.65,	  F(1,	  7)	  =	  13.03,	  p<0.01,	   regression	  equation	  MT	  =	  176	  +	  46ID;	   see	   top	  panel	  of	  Figure	  2.6).	  Thus,	   both	  his	   perceptual	   and	  production	  data	   violated	  Fitts’	   law	   in	   similar	  ways:	  MT	   was	   linearly	   related	   to	   movement	   amplitude	   rather	   than	   index	   of	   difficulty.	  Finally,	   in	   line	   with	   what	   would	   be	   expected	   if	   DS	   relied	   on	   a	   similar	   set	   of	  representations	   and/or	   processes	   in	   both	   tasks,	   we	   found	   that	   his	   perceived	   and	  produced	  MTs	  were	  almost	  perfectly	  correlated	  across	  conditions	  (r2=	  0.88,	  F(1,	  7)	  =	  50.34,	  p<0.001).	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Figure	  2.4:	  Mean	  perceived	  movement	  time	  as	  a	  function	  of	  target	  width	  (W)	  and	  index	  of	  difficulty	   for	   patient	   DS	   (top	   panel)	   and	   the	   control	   participants	   (bottom	   panel).	   The	  corresponding	  linear	  regression	  lines	  and	  coefficients	  of	  determination	  are	  also	  provided	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Figure	   2.5:	   Mean	   perceived	   movement	   time	   as	   a	   function	   of	   target	   width	   (W)	   and	  movement	  amplitude	  for	  patient	  DS	  (top	  panel)	  and	  the	  control	  participants	  (bottom	  panel).	  The	   corresponding	   linear	   regression	   lines	   and	   coefficients	   of	   determination	   are	   also	  provided.	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Figure	  2.6:	  Mean	  produced	  movement	  time	  as	  a	  function	  of	  target	  width	  (W)	  and	  index	  of	  difficulty	   (top	   panel)	   and	   movement	   amplitude	   (bottom	   panel)	   for	   patient	   DS.	   The	  corresponding	  linear	  regression	  lines	  and	  coefficients	  of	  determination	  are	  also	  provided.	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Discussion	  The	   results	   clearly	   indicate	   that	   patient	   DS	   relies	   solely	   on	  movement	   amplitude	  (the	  distance	  between	  two	  targets)	  when	  judging	  whether	  a	  movement	  was	  doable	  or	  not,	  and	  disregarded	  the	  target	  width.	  This	  suggests	   that	  DS	  seems	  to	  have	   lost	  the	   ability	   to	   integrate	   contextual	   constraints	   in	   action	   simulations,	   resulting	   in	   a	  deficiency	   in	   predicting	   an	   appropriate	   action	   speed	   for	   that	   given	   environment.	  Consequently,	   the	  resulting	  speed	  prediction	  was	  solely	  based	  on	  the	  amplitude	  of	  the	  movement.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  performance	  data	   indicated	  exactly	  the	  same	  deficit	  when	  he	  was	  asked	  to	  move	  as	  quickly	  as	  possible	  between	  the	  two	  targets.	  This	  suggests	  that	  DS’s	  lesion	  affects	  his	  performance	  and	  his	  perception	  of	  others’	  movements	  in	  the	  same	  way.	  Although	   the	   control	   participants	   used	   in	   our	   study	   were	   not	   age-­‐matched,	   it	   is	  unlikely	   that	  DS’s	   results	   can	   be	   attributed	   to	   general	  motor	   deterioration	   due	   to	  aging.	   First,	   Skoura	   et	   al.	   (2005)	   demonstrated	   that	   Fitts’	   law	   holds	   for	   motor	  production	   in	   the	   elderly.	   Potentially	   troubling	   is	   their	   finding	   that	   elderly	  participants	  disregarded	  varying	  target	  widths	  during	  the	  motor	  imagery	  task	  (but	  not	   the	  motor	   production	   task).	   This	   finding	   seems	   to	   converge	  with	   the	   present	  result	   that	  patient	  DS	  disregarded	  width.	   It	   has	   to	  be	  kept	   in	  mind,	  however,	   that	  index	  of	  difficulty	  accounts	   for	  a	  much	   lesser	  amount	  of	  variance	   in	  DS’s	  doability	  judgments	   for	   perceived	  movements,	   than	   it	   accounted	   for	   in	   the	  motor	   imagery	  condition	   (r2	   =	   0.34	   and	   0.89,	   respectively)	   in	   Skoura	   et	   al.’s	   study	   on	   elderly	  participants.	   These	   numbers	   seem	   to	   rule	   out	   the	   possibility	   that	   patient	   DS’s	  selective	  impairment	  is	  merely	  a	  by-­‐product	  of	  aging.	  It	   should	   also	  be	  noted	   that	   Skoura	   and	   colleagues	   attribute	   the	   violation	  of	   Fitts’	  law	   in	   imagined	   movements	   to	   the	   aging	   parietal	   cortex.	   Sirigu	   et	   al.	   (1996)	  similarly	   found	   that	   patients	   with	   parietal	   lesions	   violated	   Fitts’	   law	   in	   the	   same	  domain	  (motor	   imagery).	  The	  possibility	  has	  to	  be	  acknowledged	  that	  patient	  DS’s	  diffuse	  lesion	  in	  the	  frontal	  lobe	  might	  encompass	  this	  area’s	  links	  with	  the	  adjacent	  parietal	  lobe	  and	  result	  in	  his	  selective	  disregard	  to	  the	  target	  widths.	  Importantly,	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however,	   both	  mentioned	   studies	   found	   that	   parietal	   impairment	   did	   not	   yield	   to	  violation	  of	  Fitts’	   law	  in	  action	  production,	  but	  only	   in	  motor	   imagery.	   In	  contrast,	  patient	   DS	   violated	   Fitts’	   law	   in	   both	   of	   the	   tested	   action	   domains.	   Therefore,	   his	  parallel	  impairment	  in	  action	  production	  and	  action	  perception	  cannot	  be	  attributed	  to	  a	  potential	  injury	  in	  his	  parietal	  cortex.	  The	   dynamic	   model	   outlined	   by	   Erlhagen	   and	   colleagues	   (2006)	   provides	   a	  plausible	   explanation	   to	   patient	   DS’s	   data.	   In	   this	  model	   the	  mirror	   circuitry	   (i.e.	  superior	   temporal	   sulcus,	   inferior	   parietal	   lobule	   and	   the	   inferior	   frontal	   gyrus)	  performs	  the	  matching	  of	  observed	  actions	  with	  the	  existing	  motor	  repertoire.	  The	  PFC,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  acts	  as	  the	  ‘goal	  layer’	  (ibid.	  p.	  177)	  and	  encodes	  the	  goal	  of	  the	  observed	  action,	  which	  is	  constrained	  by	  the	  action	  context.	  In	  DS’s	  case,	  the	  PFC	  cannot	   perform	   this	   function	   and	   the	   matching	   process	   between	   perception	   and	  action	  proceeds	  orthogonally	  to	  the	  action	  context.	  
Conclusions	  The	  results	  of	  the	  present	  study	  clearly	  indicate	  that	  DS’	  data	  are	  best	  understood	  as	  reflecting	   a	   specific	   deficit	   that	   is	   caused	   by	   a	   brain	   lesion	   that	   affect	   action	  production	  and	  action	  perception	  in	  exactly	  the	  same	  way.	  When	  presented	  with	  a	  Fitts’	  like	  task,	  DS’s	  ‘doability’	  judgments	  for	  observed	  movements	  were	  found	  to	  be	  a	   direct	   function	   of	   the	   distance	   between	   targets.	   Remarkably,	   DS’s	   produced	  movements	   slowed	   down	   as	   this	   distance	   increased,	   indicating	   that	   in	   both	   cases	  patient	   DS	   exhibited	   a	   specific	   disability	   to	   integrate	   target	   size	   into	   his	   motor	  representation.	  As	  stipulated	  by	  Fitts’	   law,	  previous	  research	   in	  healthy	  adults	  has	  demonstrated	   that	   difficulty	   of	   a	  movement	   (reflected	   in	  MT)	   is	   a	   function	   of	   the	  target	   width	   and	   the	   distance	   between	   the	   target	   pair.	   In	   line	   with	   the	   dynamic	  model	  proposed	  by	  Erlhagen,	  we	  attribute	  this	  specific	  deficit	  in	  DS	  to	  his	  lesion	  of	  the	  prefrontal	  lobe	  that	  precludes	  influences	  of	  the	  task	  layout	  on	  motor	  simulation.	  Although	  DS	   still	   perceives	   others’	   action	   capabilities	   through	   the	   lens	   of	   his	   own	  motor	  repertoire,	  the	  brain	  systems	  encoding	  task	  context	  are	  dysfunctional	  and	  can	  therefore	  not	  inform	  the	  simulations.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  all	  influences	  on	  motor	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You:	  Do	  the	  motor	  specific	  
parameters	  of	  an	  observed	  action	  
engage	  the	  motor	  system?	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  A	  version	  of	  this	  chapter	  is	  published	  as:	  	  Eskenazi,	  T.,	  Rotshtein,	  P.,	  Grosjean,	  M.	  &	  Knoblich,	  G.	  (2011).	  The	  neural	  correlates	  of	   Fitts’	   law	   in	   action	  observation:	  An	   fMRI	   study.	  Social	  Neuroscience,	  7(1),	   30–41.	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Abstract	  Previous	   neuroimaging	   studies	   support	   the	   assumption	   of	   a	   strong	   link	   between	  perception	   and	   action,	   demonstrating	   that	   the	   motor	   system	   is	   involved	   when	  others’	   actions	   are	   observed.	   One	   question	   that	   is	   still	   open	   to	   debate	   is	   which	  aspects	   of	   observed	   actions	   engage	   the	   motor	   system.	   The	   present	   study	   tested	  whether	  motor	  activation	  corresponds	  to	  the	  difficulty	  of	  the	  observed	  action,	  using	  Fitts’	  law.	  This	  law	  postulates	  that	  the	  difficulty	  of	  any	  movement	  (ID)	  is	  a	  function	  of	  the	  distance	  to	  the	  target	  (A)	  and	  the	  target	  width	  (W).	  In	  an	  observation	  task,	  the	  ID	   of	   the	   observed	   action	   was	   manipulated	   orthogonally	   to	   W	   (by	   using	   five	  different	   As).	   The	   results	   revealed	   activity	   in	   the	   primary	   motor	   cortex,	   the	  supplementary	  motor	  area,	  and	  the	  basal	  ganglia	  in	  response	  to	  increasing	  ID	  levels,	  but	   not	   in	   response	   to	   different	   levels	   of	   A	   or	   W.	   Thus,	   activation	   in	   the	   motor	  system	  during	  action	  observation	  is	  not	  driven	  by	  perceptual	  parameters	  but	  by	  the	  motor	  difficulty	  of	  the	  observed	  action.	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Introduction	  Numerous	   studies	   have	   shown	   that	   the	   motor	   system	   participates	   in	   action	  observation	   (e.g.,	   Calvo-­‐Merino	   et	   al.,	   2006;	   Grèzes	   &	   Decety,	   2001;	   Hamilton	   &	  Grafton,	  2006;	  2008;	  Rizzolatti	  &	  Craighero,	  2004;	  Rizzolatti	  &	  Sinigaglia,	  2010).	  For	  instance,	  it	  is	  known	  that	  people	  can	  acquire	  new	  motor	  skills	  through	  observation	  (Cross,	   Kraemer,	   Hamilton,	   Kelley	   &	   Grafton,	   2009;	   Mattar	   &	   Gribble,	   2005)	   or	  mental	  imagery	  that	  entails	  mentally	  rehearsing	  actions	  (Olsson,	  Jonsson,	  Larsson,	  &	  Nyberg,	  2008).	  Furthermore,	  acquiring	  new	  motor	  skills	  influences	  the	  way	  people	  observe	  others’	  actions	  that	  require	  the	  same	  skills	  (Aglioti	  et	  al.,	  2008).	  Similarly,	  behavioural	   studies	   on	   motor	   laws,	   such	   as	   Fitts’	   law	   (Fitts,	   1954),	   suggest	   that	  motor	   laws	   constrain	   action	   production	   and	   action	   simulation	   in	   the	   same	   way	  (Grosjean	  et	  al.	  2007;	  Decety	  &	  Jeannerod,	  1995).	  In	  particular,	  both	  the	  speed	  with	  which	  an	  action	  can	  be	  performed	  and	  the	  speed	  at	  which	  an	  action	  is	  perceived	  as	  being	  just	  doable	  are	  governed	  by	  the	  index	  of	  difficulty	  as	  formulated	  by	  Fitts’	  law.	  Thus,	  the	  same	  speed–	  accuracy	  trade-­‐off	  observed	  in	  human	  performance	  dictates	  people’s	  judgments	  about	  what	  is	  doable	  for	  others.	  Briefly,	   Fitts’	   law	   parameterizes	   this	   trade-­‐off	   characterizing	   biological	   motion.	  Accordingly,	  the	  average	  movement	  time	  (MT)	  to	  reach	  a	  target	  is	  defined	  as	  a	  linear	  function	  of	  index	  of	  difficulty	  (ID)	  of	  the	  movement:	  MT	  =	  (a+b)×ID.	  ID	  in	  turn	  is	  a	  function	  of	  the	  distance	  to	  be	  covered,	  commonly	  referred	  to	  as	  amplitude	  (A)	  and	  the	  width	  (W)	  of	  the	  target	  to	  be	  reached:	  ID	  =	  log2(2A/W).	  The	  longer	  the	  distance	  to	   the	   target,	   the	  more	  difficult	   the	  action	  becomes.	  By	   the	  same	  token,	   increasing	  target	  width	  reduces	  the	  accuracy	  requirement	  of	   the	  action	  and	  thus	  the	   index	  of	  difficulty.	  Fitts’	  law	  holds	  for	  most	  performed	  actions	  (with	  the	  notable	  exception	  of	  saccadic	   eye	   movements—Chi	   &	   Lin,	   1997;	   see	   also	   Danion,	   Duarte,	   &	   Grosjean,	  1999),	   as	   well	   as	   imagined	   (Decety	   &	   Jeannerod,	   1995)	   and	   perceived	   actions	  (Eskenazi,	  Grosjean,	  Humphreys,	  &	  Knoblich,	  2009;	  Grosjean	  et	  al.,	  2007).	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  The	  study	  conducted	  by	  Grosjean	  and	  colleagues	  (2007)	  presented	  participants	  with	  alternating	  pictures	  of	  a	  person	  moving	  an	  arm	  between	  two	  identical	  targets,	  and	  they	  were	  asked	   to	   judge	  whether	  an	  average	  person	  could	  perform	   the	  observed	  movement	  at	  this	  speed.	  ID	  was	  systematically	  varied,	  choosing	  appropriate	  target	  widths	   and	  movement	   amplitudes.	   In	   other	  words,	  motor	   difficulty	  was	   varied	   so	  that	   it	   could	   not	   be	   derived	   from	   perceptual	   information	   about	   movement	  amplitude	  or	   target	   size	   alone.	  Rather,	   it	   reflected	   the	  difficulty	  of	  performing	   the	  observed	  movement.	  The	  results	  clearly	  showed	  that	  ID	  was	  an	  excellent	  predictor	  of	   the	  participants’	   “doability”	   judgments,	  providing	   strong	   support	   for	   the	  notion	  that	  motor	  constraints	  can	  influence	  perception	  (Grosjean	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  The	   above	   findings	   provide	   evidence	   that	   motor	   simulations	   (Jeannerod,	   2001;	  Wilson	  &	  Knoblich,	   2005)	   are	   a	   key	  mechanism	   through	  which	   the	  motor	   system	  contributes	   to	   observation	   of	   actions.	   Motor	   simulation,	   in	   the	   context	   of	   action	  perception,	   refers	   to	   applying	   internal	   models	   that	   are	   used	   in	   planning	   and	  execution	  of	  one’s	  own	  actions	  to	  perceived	  actions.	  Evidence	  for	  the	  involvement	  of	  motor-­‐related	   brain	   regions	   during	   action	   perception	   is	   further	   provided	   by	  numerous	   neuroimaging	   studies	   (for	   a	   recent	   review,	   see	   Rizzolatti	   &	   Sinigaglia,	  2010).	  Neural	  areas	  famously	  comprising	  the	  human	  mirror	  system,	  also	  known	  as	  the	   action	   observation	   network	   (AON)	   (Grafton,	   2009),	   include	   the	   bilateral	  superior	  temporal	  sulcus	  (STS),	  the	  inferior	  parietal	  lobule	  (IPL),	  the	  inferior	  frontal	  gyrus	   (IFG),	   and	   the	   premotor	   cortex	   (PM).	   Other	   neural	   regions	   outside	   this	  mirroring	   network	   contributing	   to	   motor	   production,	   such	   as	   the	   supplementary	  motor	  area	  (SMA)	  (Dayan	  et	  al.,	  2007;	  Nachev,	  Kennard	  &	  Hussain,	  2008),	  the	  basal	  ganglia	  (BG)	  and	  cerebellum	  (Blakemore,	  Frith,	  &	  Wolpert,	  2001;	  Wolpert,	  Miall,	  &	  Kawato,	  1998),	  and,	  importantly,	  the	  primary	  motor	  cortex	  (M1)	  (Caetano,	  Jouki,	  &	  Hari,	   2007;	  Kilner	  &	  Frith,	   2007;	  Kilner,	  Marchant,	  &	  Frith,	   2009),	   have	   also	  been	  implicated	  in	  action	  simulation.	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The	   mirroring	   system	   in	   humans	   is	   thought	   to	   support	   action	   understanding	   by	  recognizing	   actions	   in	   terms	   of	   their	   general	   aspects,	   particularly	   their	   object-­‐related	  goals	   (cf.	  Rizzolatti	  &	  Sinigaglia,	  2010),	  or	   the	   intentions	  delineated	  by	   the	  context	   in	  which	   the	   action	   is	   embedded	   (Iacoboni,	   2005).	   This	   has	   been	   further	  elaborated	   by	   other	   theories	   of	   action	   perception.	   For	   example,	   it	   is	   argued	   that	  recognition	   is	   realized	   at	   several	   levels	   of	   visual-­‐motor	   hierarchy	   in	   the	   human	  brain,	   each	   of	   which	   is	   encoded	   by	   a	   different	   node	   of	   the	   action	   observation	  network	  (Grafton,	  2009;	  Grafton	  &	  Hamilton,	  2007).	  These	  levels	   include	  the	  long-­‐term	   goal	   or	   the	   intention	   level,	   the	   goal	   level,	   and	   the	  muscle/kinematic	   level	   of	  action	  representation.	  The	  short-­‐term,	  object-­‐related	  goal	  of	  an	  action	  is	  encoded	  in	  the	   anterior	   IPL,	   whereas	   the	   kinematics	   of	   primarily	   grasping	   actions	   is	  represented	   in	   the	   IFG	   node,	   an	   area	   hypothesized	   to	   support	   representation	   of	  produced	  movements.	  There	  is	  also	  evidence	  that	  motor	  simulation	  taps	  into	  more	  specific	  parameters	  of	  observed	  movement	  as	  well,	  such	  as	  effort,	  speed	  (Aglioti	  et	  al.,	  2008),	  force	  (Slifkin,	  2008;	  Wolpert	   &	   Flanagan,	   2001),	   or	   internal	   states	   derived	   from	   the	   kinematics	  (Bosbach,	   Cole,	   Prinz,	   &	   Knoblich,	   2005).	   Studies	   of	   peripheral	   activity	   during	  observation	   of	   effortful	   actions	   provide	   a	   similar	   picture.	   Increase	   in	   autonomic	  responses	   such	   as	   respiration	   and	   heart	   rate	   are	   reported	   during	   simulation	   of	  (Mulder,	  de	  Vries,	  &	  Zijlstra,	  2005)	  as	  well	  as	  observation	  of	  effortful	  tasks	  (Decety,	  Jeannerod,	   Durozard,	   &	   Baverel,	   1993).	   It	   has	   also	   been	   shown	   that	   participants	  have	  an	  accurate	  judgment	  of	  task	  difficulty	  prior	  to	  execution.	  This	  finding	  clearly	  suggests	   that	   motor	   simulation	   is	   the	   mechanism	   through	   which	   a	   judgment	   is	  reached	   (Frak,	   Paulignan,	   &	   Jeannerod,	   2001).	   Witt,	   Proffitt,	   and	   Epstein	   (2005)	  demonstrated	   that	   people	   perceive	   the	   effort	   involved	   in	   an	   anticipated	   task	   in	  terms	  of	  their	  action	  capabilities.	  Of	  particular	  interest,	  perceived	  difficulty	  at	  a	  Fitts’	  task	   has	   been	   shown	   to	   correlate	   with	   the	   actual	   index	   of	   difficulty	   of	   the	   task	  (Delignières,	  1998).	  It	   is	   unknown	   whether	   or	   how	   the	   motor-­‐related	   brain	   areas	   are	   involved	   in	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simulating	   the	   specifics	   of	   an	   action,	   particularly	   the	   difficulty	   as	   formulated	   by	  Fitts’	   law	   (Fitts,	   1954).	   To	   investigate	   this	   question,	   we	   conducted	   a	   functional	  magnetic	   resonance	   imaging	   (fMRI)	   study	   of	   action	   observation,	  with	   a	   paradigm	  similar	  to	  the	  one	  described	  in	  Grosjean	  et	  al.	  (2007).	  In	  this	  paradigm,	  participants	  were	   asked	   to	   judge	   the	   “doability”	   of	   perceived	   actions.	   In	   the	   present	   study,	  participants	  viewed	  a	  pointing	  human	  hand	  alternately	  moving	  between	  two	  targets	  of	   identical	   size.	   Three	   different	   levels	   of	   ID	   were	   obtained	   with	   different	  combinations	   of	   target	   width	   (W)	   and	   distance	   (A).	   In	   accordance	   with	   the	  simulation	  account,	  we	  predicted	  increasing	  activity	  in	  motor	  areas	  with	  increasing	  levels	   of	   ID.	  We	   hypothesized	   that	   observed	   ID,	   which	   is	   a	   function	   of	   these	   two	  variables,	  but	  not	  object	   information	   (i.e.,	   target	  width)	  or	   the	   contextual	   setup	  of	  the	   observed	   movement	   (i.e.,	   distance	   between	   targets,	   movement	   amplitude),	  would	  activate	  the	  motor	  system	  of	  the	  observer.	  We	  did	  not	  expect	  to	  find	  a	  similar	  motor	  activation	   in	  a	   control	   condition,	   in	  which	  a	  pen	   instead	  of	  a	  pointing	  hand	  moved	   between	   the	   two	   targets	   (Figure	   3.1).	   We	   predicted	   that,	   despite	   the	  perceptual	  similarity	  between	  hand	  and	  object	  stimuli,	  the	  motor	  system	  would	  be	  activated	  only	  during	  human	  movement	  and	  not	  during	  object	  movement.	  
Method	  Participants	  Ten	   right-­‐handed	   participants	   (age	   range	   20–29	   years,	   six	   women)	   were	   paid	   to	  take	  part	  in	  the	  experiment.	  All	  gave	  their	  informed	  consent	  and	  were	  naive	  to	  the	  purpose	   of	   the	   experiment.	   None	   had	   a	   history	   of	   any	   neurological	   or	   psychiatric	  disorders,	   and	   their	   vision	   was	   normal	   or	   corrected-­‐to-­‐normal.	   Data	   from	   one	  participant	  were	  excluded	  from	  analysis	  due	  to	  an	  incidental	  lesion	  discovered	  in	  his	  right	   hemisphere.	   He	   was	   referred	   to	   a	   medical	   professional.	   The	   study	   was	  approved	  by	  the	  local	  ethics	  committee.	  Behavioural	  task	  
Stimuli	   and	   procedure.	   Prior	   to	   the	   scanning	   session,	   participants	   were	   asked	   to	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perform	   the	  behavioural	   task	  described	   in	  Grosjean	  et	  al.	   (2007).	   In	   this	  apparent	  motion	   paradigm,	   participants	   were	   presented	   with	   alternating	   still	   frames	   of	   a	  pointing	  finger	  that	  moved	  at	  various	  speeds	  between	  two	  rectangular	  targets.	  The	  task	  was	  to	  judge	  whether	  the	  person	  could	  perform	  the	  movement	  at	  the	  observed	  speed	   without	   missing	   the	   targets.	   Pairs	   of	   photographs	   depicted	   a	   right	   index	  finger	   touching	   one	   of	   two	   targets.	   Targets	   in	   each	   frame	  were	   of	   identical	  width	  (W)	  and	  were	  separated	  by	  a	  given	  distance	  (A).	  Three	  ID	  levels	  (2,	  3,	  and	  4)	  were	  factorially	  crossed	  with	  three	  W	  levels	  (2,	  4,	  and	  8	  cm),	  resulting	   in	   five	  As	  (Table	  3.1).	   The	   frames	   were	   alternated	   at	   varying	   rates—stimulus-­‐onset	   asynchrony	  (SOA)—that	   ranged	   from	  120	   to	   720	  ms	  with	   40	  ms	   increments.	   The	   experiment	  consisted	   of	   three	   blocks,	   with	   144	   trials	   randomly	   presented	   in	   each	   block.	   A	  MacBook	  Pro	  Macintosh	  computer	  running	  PsyScope	  (Cohen,	  MacWhinney,	  Flatt,	  &	  Provost,	  1993)	  was	  used	  for	  stimulus	  presentation	  and	  response	  collection.	  
	  
Table	  3.1:	  	  Movement	  amplitudes	  used	  in	  the	  experiment	  as	  a	  function	  of	  the	  target	  width	  (in	  cm)	  and	  index	  of	  difficulty.	  	  
	   Index	  of	  Difficulty	  Target	  Width	   2	   3	   4	  2	   4	  cm	   8	  cm	   16	  cm	  4	   8	  cm	   16	  cm	   32	  cm	  8	   16	  cm	   32	  cm	   64	  cm	  
	  
Data	   analysis.	   For	   each	   participant,	   the	   proportion	   of	   “possible”	   judgments	   was	  computed	  for	  each	  of	  144	  W	  ×	  ID	  ×	  SOA	  combinations.	  Then,	  for	  each	  of	  the	  9	  W	  ×	  ID	  combinations,	   the	  perceived	  MT	  was	  defined	  as	   the	  SOA	  at	  which	   the	  participants	  gave	   an	   equal	   proportion	   of	   possible	   and	   impossible	   judgments	   (for	   details	  concerning	   this	   analysis,	   see	   supplementary	  materials).	   To	   test	   whether	   the	   data	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obeyed	  Fitts’	  law,	  linear	  regression	  analyses	  on	  the	  perceived	  MTs	  were	  performed	  with	  either	  ID	  or	  movement	  amplitude	  as	  the	  predictor	  variable.	  The	  analyses	  were	  carried	  out	  with	  MATLAB	  (The	  Math	  Works	  Inc,	  MU	  Guide	  Inc.,	  Natick,	  MA,	  1998).	  fMRI	  task	  
Stimuli	   and	   procedure.	   A	   similar	   apparent	  motion	   paradigm	  was	   used	   in	   the	   task	  performed	   during	   fMRI	   data	   acquisition,	   albeit	   with	   a	   new	   set	   of	   stimuli.	   The	  participants	  observed	  a	  hand	  moving	  between	  two	  targets.	  In	  20%	  of	  the	  trials,	  the	  participants	   were	   asked	   to	   provide	   a	   speed	   rating	   of	   the	   movement.	   As	   in	   the	  behavioural	   task,	   each	   of	   the	   photograph	  pairs	   depicted	   a	   finger	   or	   a	   pen	   (Figure	  3.1)	   pointing	   at	   one	   of	   the	   two	   identical	   rectangular	   targets.	   Here,	   we	   included	  photographs	  of	   left	  and	  right	  hands,	   in	  order	   to	  control	   for	   laterality	  effects	   in	   the	  brain	  activity.	  The	  three	  levels	  of	  ID	  were	  set	  against	  three	  levels	  of	  W,	  yielding	  nine	  different	  combinations	  (Table	  3.1).	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  behavioural	  task,	  the	  SOA,	  that	  is,	  the	  rate	  at	  which	  the	  still	  frames	  alternated,	  was	  constant	  across	  trials.	  This	  was	  done	  to	  control	  for	  a	  potential	  SOA	  confound	  on	  the	  ID	  manipulation.	  Therefore,	  any	  differences	   in	   perceived	   speed	   would	   be	   solely	   a	   product	   of	   the	   varying	   target	  widths	  and	  the	  distance	  between	  them.	  For	  example,	  a	  sequence	  with	  a	  500-­‐ms	  SOA	  and	   a	   low	   ID	   may	   be	   perceived	   as	   a	   very	   slow	   movement,	   whereas	   the	   same	  sequence	  with	  a	  high	  ID	  may	  be	  perceived	  as	  a	  faster	  but	  still	  doable	  movement.	  As	  a	  control,	   we	   included	   an	   object-­‐movement	   condition	   in	   which	   a	   pen,	   instead	   of	   a	  human	  finger,	  appeared	  to	   jump	  between	  the	  same	  targets,	  separated	  by	  the	  same	  distances.	   In	   order	   to	   minimize	   the	   perceptual	   differences	   between	   the	   two	  conditions,	  photographs	  were	  cropped	  to	  include	  only	  the	  hand,	  without	  the	  arm,	  in	  the	  human-­‐movement	  condition.	  The	  object-­‐movement	  condition	  presented	  the	  pen	  at	   an	   angle	   to	   the	   targets	   similar	   to	   that	   of	   the	   hand	   in	   the	   human-­‐movement	  condition.	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  this	  paradigm	  is	  particularly	  suitable	  for	  studying	  Fitts’	  law	  in	  an	  fMRI	  setup,	  as	  it	  does	  not	  require	  an	  actual	  motor	  response,	  ensuring	  that	   the	   observed	   results	   cannot	   be	   due	   to	   motor	   production	   confounds	   or	  movement-­‐related	  artifacts.	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Figure	   3.1:	   Stimuli	   examples	   for	   ID2-­‐W8	   combination.	   Left	   panel:	   human	   movement	   as	  depicted	   by	   a	   hand	  moving	   between	   two	   identical	   targets.	   Right	   panel:	   object	  movement	  depicted	  by	  a	  pen	  moving	  between	  two	  identical	  targets.	  	  	  Each	   trial	   began	  with	   a	  blank	   screen	   (500	  ms)	   followed	  by	   a	   fixation	   cross	   (1000	  ms),	   after	   which	   the	   stimulus	   pair	   was	   presented	   (Figure	   3.2).	   Each	   still	   frame	  remained	  on	  the	  screen	  for	  500	  ms,	  producing	  three	  different	  sequence	  durations,	  2000,	  3000,	  or	  4000	  ms	  for	  the	  2-­‐,	  3-­‐,	  or	  4-­‐cycle	  sequences	  respectively.	  Pilot	  data	  showed	  that	  4	  cycles	  were	  sufficient	  to	  induce	  an	  apparent	  motion.	  The	  length	  of	  the	  trials	   varied	   to	   facilitate	   the	   estimation	   of	   the	  HRF	   response	   per	   trial	   and	   also	   to	  ensure	   that	   events	  did	  not	   alternate	   at	   a	   fixed	   frequency,	   as	   the	   latter	   are	  usually	  associated	  with	  noise.	  The	  participants’	   task	  was	   to	  estimate	   the	   relative	   speed	  of	  the	   movement:	   (1)	   very	   slow,	   (2)	   slow,	   (3)	   fast,	   and	   (4)	   very	   fast.	   To	   prevent	  stimulation	  of	  the	  motor	  regions	  by	  response	  requirements,	  the	  participants	  did	  not	  respond	  in	  80%	  of	  the	  trials.	  In	  the	  remaining	  20%	  of	  trials,	  a	  question	  appeared	  on	  the	  screen	  following	  the	  stimuli	  pair,	  asking	  the	  participants	  to	  rate	  the	  speed	  of	  the	  observed	  motion	  by	  using	  the	  button	  box	  placed	  inside	  the	  scanner.	  The	  participants	  could	   not	   tell	  while	  watching	   the	  movement	  whether	   the	   prompt	   question	  would	  follow.	  The	  participants	  had	  a	  maximum	  of	  4000	  ms	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  question,	  and	  as	   soon	   as	   a	   response	   was	   collected,	   the	   next	   trial	   commenced.	   These	   randomly	  presented	  “catch”	  trials	  were	  included	  to	  ascertain	  participants’	  attention	  and	  were	  modeled	  separately	  in	  the	  data	  analysis.	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Figure	  3.2:	  	  An	  example	  catch	  trial	  of	  the	  task	  presented	  in	  the	  scanner.	  Response	  collection	  is	  included	  only	  in	  catch	  trials.	  	  	  	  The	   experiment	   consisted	   of	   450	   trials	   (=	   3	   ID	   ×	   3	   W	   ×	   2	   movement	   type,	   left-­‐hand/right-­‐hand	   OR	   object,	   repeated	   25	   times),	   presented	   in	   random	   order.	   To	  provide	   opportunities	   for	   pauses,	   the	   experiment	   was	   run	   in	   six	   blocks	   with	   75	  trials.	  Each	  block	  lasted	  for	  approximately	  6	  min.	  In	  order	  to	  increase	  efficiency,	  no	  null	   events	  were	   included	   in	   this	  experiment,	   as	  our	  main	   interest	  was	   to	   identify	  neural	   modulations	   in	   response	   to	   changes	   in	   ID	   (i.e.,	   differences	   between	  conditions,	  rather	  than	  differences	  between	  a	  condition	  and	  a	  baseline).	  To	  present	  the	  stimuli	  and	  register	  event	  times,	  we	  used	  E-­‐Prime	  (Psychology	  Software	  Tools,	  Pittsburgh,	  PA,	  USA).	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fMRI	   data	   acquisition.	   We	   used	   a	   Philips	   3T	   Achieva	   system	   (Philips	   Medical	  Systems,	   Best,	   The	  Netherlands)	   to	   acquire	   blood-­‐oxygen-­‐level-­‐dependent	   (BOLD)	  contrast-­‐weighted	  echo-­‐planar	  (EPI)	  for	  the	  functional	  scans.	  We	  acquired	  38	  slices,	  2-­‐mm-­‐thick,	  with	  a	  1.25-­‐mm	  gap,	   resulting	   in	  an	   in-­‐plane	   resolution	  of	  2	  ×	  2	  mm,	  with	   an	   80◦	   flip	   angle,	   35-­‐ms	   echo	   time,	   and	   2110-­‐ms	   slice	   repetition	   time	   (TR).	  Images	  were	  acquired	  with	  an	  eight-­‐channel	  phased	  array	  coil	  with	  a	  sense	  factor	  of	  2.	  To	  minimize	  susceptibility	  artifacts,	  shimming	  was	  performed	  for	  each	  acquisition	  run,	   and	   the	   slices	   were	   tilted	   along	   the	   frontal-­‐temporal	   cortex	   (Deichmann,	  Gottfried,	  Hutton,	  &	  Turner,	  2003).	  The	  slices	  covered	  the	  entire	  brain,	  including	  the	  parietal	  cortex	  and	  the	  cerebellum.	  
fMRI	   data	   analysis.	   Whole-­‐brain,	   voxel-­‐based	   analysis	   was	   done	   with	   SPM5	  (Wellcome	   Department	   of	   Imaging	   Neuroscience,	   London,	   UK,	  www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm).	   In	   preprocessing,	   the	   EPI	   volumes	  were	   first	   spatially	  realigned	   to	   correct	   for	   movement	   artifacts	   (Ashburner	   &	   Friston,	   2003a)	   and	  motion	  by	  distortion	  interactions	  (Andersson,	  Hutton,	  Ashburner,	  Turner,	  &	  Friston,	  2001).	  The	  volumes	  were	   then	   transformed	  to	   the	  Montreal	  Neurological	   Institute	  (MNI)	   standard	   space	   (Ashburner	   &	   Friston,	   2003b)	   and	   smoothed	  with	   a	   9-­‐mm	  Gaussian	   kernel	   to	   account	   for	   residual	   intersubject	   differences	   and	   to	  accommodate	   assumptions	   of	   random	   field	   theory	   used	   for	   family-­‐wise	   error	  corrections	  (Worsley	  &	  Friston,	  1995).	  
Linear	  effects	  of	   ID	  change.	   First-­‐level	   analysis	   consisted	  of	  modeling	   singlesubject	  BOLD	  responses	  in	  a	  design	  matrix	  that	  included	  the	  onset	  and	  duration	  of	  stimulus	  pairs	   for	   18	   conditions	   (3	   IDs	  ×	   3	  Ws	  ×	  2	  movement	   conditions).	  Note	   that	   the	  A	  values	  (the	  distance	  between	  two	  targets)	  are	  determined	  by	  W	  and	  ID.	  Therefore,	  these	  were	   not	  modeled	   directly.	   In	   order	   to	   ensure	   that	  motor	   output	   could	   not	  affect	   differences	   in	   brain	   activation	   across	   conditions,	   catch	   trials	  were	  modeled	  separately	  and	  not	  included	  in	  further	  analyses.	  The	   regressors	   in	   both	   models	   were	   convolved	   with	   two	   basis	   functions:	   the	  canonical	  hemodynamic	  response	   function	   (Friston,	  Harrison,	  &	  Penny,	  2003)	  and	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its	   derivative	   that	   captures	   fluctuations	   in	   response	   onset	   (Friston,	   Fletcher,	  Josephs,	  Holmes	  &	  Rugg	  et	  al.,	  1998).	  To	  correct	  for	  signal	  changes	  due	  to	  residual	  head	   movement	   artifacts,	   the	   six	   realignment	   parameters	   were	   included	   in	   the	  design	   matrix.	   Low	   temporal	   fluctuation	   in	   the	   data	   was	   modeled	   with	   a	   set	   of	  harmonic	  vectors	  (high-­‐pass	  filtering	  1/128	  Hz)	  likely	  to	  be	  associated	  with	  scanner	  and	  physiological	  noise	  (Josephs	  &	  Henson,	  1999).	  Linear	   contrasts	   pertaining	   to	   the	   effects	   of	   ID,	   W,	   A,	   and	   motion	   type	   were	  computed.	  For	  an	  effect	  of	  increasing	  ID,	  we	  computed	  the	  following	  two	  contrasts	  per	  each	  subject:	  ID2	  <	  ID3,	  ID3	  <	  ID4.	  We	  also	  used	  the	  same	  technique	  for	  effects	  of	  increasing	  width—W2	  <	  W4,	  W4	  <	  W8—and	  for	  amplitude—A4	  <	  A8	  <	  A16	  <	  A32	  <	  A64	  (the	   linear	  effect	  size	  of	  the	  covariates)	  (Table	  3.1).	  The	  effect	  of	  movement	  type	   was	   computed	   by	   comparing	   responses	   during	   human	   movement	   to	   those	  during	  object	  movement.	  To	  allow	  for	  inferences	  at	  population	  level,	  secondlevel	  analyses	  (separate	  for	  ID,	  W,	  A,	  and	  movement	  type)	  were	  computed	  with	  the	  contrast	  images	  created	  at	  the	  first	  level.	  A	  neural	  effect	  of	  increasing	  ID	  was	  tested	  by	  the	  conjunction	  (with	  global	  null:	  Friston,	  Penny	  &	  Glaser,	  2005)	  of	  ID2	  <	  ID3	  and	  ID3	  <	  ID4.	  Note	  that	  the	  conjunction	  analyses	   used	   two	   orthogonal	   contrasts	   and	   ensured	   that	  we	   report	   only	   regions	  that	  showed	  an	  increased	  activation	  for	  ID	  at	  both	  levels	  (from	  ID2	  to	  ID3	  and	  ID3	  to	  ID4).	  A	  similar	  conjunction	  analysis	  was	  performed	  for	  W	  (target	  width).	   It	  should	  be	  noted	   that	   these	  analyses	  did	  not	  assume	  any	   linear	  change.	  We	  also	   looked	  at	  the	  linear	  effect	  size	  for	  A	  (distance	  between	  targets).	  We	  report	  clusters,	  at	  p	  <	  .001	  uncorrected,	   that	   were	   larger	   than	   30	   mm3	   ,	   unless	   otherwise	   specified	   (see	  supplementary	  materials).	  The	  entries	  represent	   the	  estimated	  response	  extracted	  from	   the	   first	   eigenvariate	   of	   a	   6-­‐mm3	   sphere	   centered	   on	   the	   maxima	   group	  response.	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Figure	  3.3:	  Mean	  perceived	  movement	  timas	  a	  function	  of	  target	  width	  (W)	  and	  (A)	  index	  of	  difficulty	  (upper	  panel)	  and	  (B)	  movement	  amplitude	  (lower	  panel).	  The	  corresponding	  linear	  regression	  lines	  and	  coefficients	  of	  determination	  are	  also	  provided.	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The	   results	   yielded	   increased	   activity	   in	   regions	   associated	  with	  motor	   execution	  and	  motor	  preparation,	  as	  ID	  of	  the	  perceived	  movement	  increased	  (Table	  3.2	  and	  Figure	  3.4):	  central	  sulcus,	  SMA,	  precentral	  sulcus,	  and	  basal	  ganglia/globus	  pallidus	  (GP).	  In	  all	  these	  regions,	  the	  correlation	  of	  BOLD	  responses	  to	  changing	  ID	  occurred	  only	  in	  the	  humanmovement	  condition,	  and	  not	  in	  the	  object-­‐movement	  condition.	  We	  note	   that	   at	   a	   cluster	   level,	   the	   effects	   for	   a	   change	  between	   ID2	  <	   ID3	   in	   the	  bilateral	  basal	  ganglia,	   left	   central	   sulcus,	  SMA,	  precentral	   sulcus,	  and	  GP	  survived	  family-­‐wise	  error	  correction	  (p	  <	   .05;	  with	  voxel	  peak	  p	  <	  .01	  and	  clusters	  extent	  >	  500	   voxels).	   Unfortunately,	   cluster-­‐level	   corrections	   cannot	   be	   reliably	   applied	   to	  conjunction	  analysis	  (Friston,	  Holmes,	  Price,	  Buechel,	  &	  Worsley,	  1999).	  No	  effect	  of	  ID	  was	  observed	  in	  these	  regions	  for	  the	  object-­‐movement	  condition	  (p	  >	   .05).	   This	   was	   tested	   by	   exclusive	   masking	   with	   the	   ID	   change	   for	   object-­‐movement	   contrast.	   Furthermore,	   the	   activation	   in	   the	   CS,	   SMA,	   left	   precentral	  sulcus,	   and	   GP	   overlapped	   with	   regions	   that	   responded	  more	   strongly	   to	   human	  movement	   than	   to	   object	   movement,	   (tested	   by	   inclusive	   masking,	   p	  <	   .05).	   This	  provided	  further	  evidence	  that	  the	  neural	  structures	  involved	  in	  computing	  ID	  were	  also	  more	   likely	   to	   respond	   to	  human	  movements	   than	  object	  movements	   (Figure	  3.5,	   also	   see	   supplementary	  materials).	   Importantly,	   activity	   in	  motor	   regions	  was	  observed	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  participants	  were	  not	  executing	  any	  motor	  responses	  in	   these	   trials.	   There	   were	   no	   above-­‐threshold	   activations	   that	   varied	   with	   ID	   in	  object-­‐movement	  trials.	  Further	   analyses	   showed	   that	   brain	   activation	   did	   not	   significantly	   increase	   in	  response	  to	  different	  amplitudes	  (A,	  p	  >	   .01,	  uncorrected)	  and	  different	  target	  size	  (W,	  p	  >	   .01,	   uncorrected).	  We	   also	   looked	   at	   the	   possible	   effects	   of	   decreasing	   ID	  (Winstein,	  Grafton,	  &	  Pohl,	  1997).	  A	  similar	  conjunction	  analysis	  to	  that	  above	  was	  performed.	   However,	   this	   time,	   the	   contrast	   images	   were	   set	   up	   in	   the	   opposite	  direction	   (i.e.,	   ID4	   <	   ID3,	   ID3	   <	   ID2).	   This	   analysis	   did	   not	   reveal	   any	   significant	  clusters	  at	  a	  threshold	  of	  p	  >	  .01,	  uncorrected.	  A	  weak	  effect	  of	  decreasing	  amplitude	  was	  observed,	  suggesting	  an	  increase	  in	  responses	  as	  the	  two	  targets	  were	  located	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closer	  to	  each	  other.	  This	  was	  observed	  in	  the	  left	  extrastriate	  cortex	  (BA	  18,	  MNI:	  –18,	  –72,	  –2,	  z	  =	  3.43,	  p	  <	  .001,	  cluster	  =	  30	  mm3),	  the	  left	  lateral	  orbitofrontal	  cortex	  (BA	   47,	  MNI:	   –40,	   50,	   –8,	  Z	  =	   3.77,	  p	  <	   .001,	   cluster	   =	   76	  mm3),	   and	   the	  medulla	  (MNI:	  –4,	  –18,	  –32,	  z	  =	  3.89,	  p	  <	  .001,	  cluster	  =	  98	  mm3).	  This	  effect	  may	  potentially	  relate	   to	   visual	   crowding.	   Finally,	   there	   was	   no	   above-­‐threshold	   response	   for	  decrease	  in	  target	  width	  (W,	  p	  >	  .01).	  
	  
Discussion	  This	  study	  aimed	  to	   identify	   the	  neural	  structures	  sensitive	  to	   increasing	  difficulty	  (ID)	   of	   an	   observed	   action,	   as	   expressed	   by	   Fitts’	   law.	   The	  main	   finding	  was	   that	  activity	  in	  motor	  areas	  varied	  in	  response	  to	  increasing	  ID.	  These	  areas	  included	  the	  primary	  motor	  cortex,	  the	  right	  supplementary	  motor	  area,	  and	  the	  GP.	  This	  finding	  is	  further	  supported	  by	  a	  repetition-­‐suppression	  analysis:	  Activation	  in	  these	  areas	  was	  suppressed	  as	  the	  same	  ID	  was	  repeated	  in	  the	  subsequent	  trial.	  As	  predicted,	  this	  pattern	  of	  activity	   in	  the	  motor	  system	  was	  observed	  only	   in	  the	  human-­‐hand	  condition	   and	   not	   in	   a	  moving-­‐object	   condition	   (Figure	   3.5),	   showing	   that	   it	   was	  essentially	  biological	  action	  that	  engaged	  the	  motor	  system	  (Urgesi,	  Moro,	  Candidi,	  &	  Aglioti,	  2006;	  but	  cf.	  Grosjean	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  We	  also	  found	  that	  neurons	  in	  the	  SMA,	  M1,	   and	   GP	   were	   sensitive	   to	   the	   repeated	   levels	   of	   ID,	   showing	   a	   diminished	  response	   when	   ID	   level	   was	   repeated	   compared	   to	   when	   it	   changed.	   Again,	   this	  effect	  was	  specific	  to	  the	  human-­‐movement	  condition.	  Finally,	  the	  W	  (target	  width)	  or	  the	  A	  (movement	  amplitude)	  variables	  did	  not	  reveal	  any	  differential	  activations.	  It	   should	   be	   stressed	   that	   the	   task	   used	   here	  manipulates	   ID	   orthogonally	   to	   the	  perceptual	  differences	  across	  conditions.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  same	  ID	  level	  could	  be	  achieved	  through	  different	  W	  and	  A	  combinations.	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Figure	   3.4:	   Display	   of	   the	   conjunction	   SPM	   maps	   on	   a	   single-­‐subject	   template	   T1:	   for	  human	  movement	  conditions,	  ID2	  <	  ID3	  and	  ID3	  <	  ID4,	  at	  a	  combined	  threshold	  of	  maxima	  (z	  >	  3)	  and	  cluster	  (p	  <	  .001)	  larger	  than	  30	  mm3.	  Areas	  that	  are	  sensitive	  to	  increasing	  ID	  are	  1.	   left	   central	   sulcus	   (–48,	   –8,	  54),	  2.	  Right	   SMA	   (18,	  4,	  50),	   and	  3.	   right	  basal	   ganglia	  (globus	  pallidus;	  20,	  –2,	  12).	  The	  scatter	  plots	  on	  the	  y-­‐axis	  the	  relative	  effect	  size	  for	  that	  region	  per	  each	  condition	  (arbitrary	  units)	  and	  on	  the	  x-­‐axis	  the	  index	  of	  difficulty	  (ID).	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Table	  3.2:	  Conjunction	  analysis,	  human	  movement	  ID2<ID3	  and	  ID3<ID4.	  	  Min-­‐t(8)	  is	  size	  of	  the	  smallest	  of	  the	  effects	  from	  the	  two	  comparisons.	  We	  report	  clusters	  at	  p	  <	   .001,	  uncorrected,	   that	  were	   larger	   than	  30	  mm3.	   Index:	  SMA,	   supplementary	  motor	  area;	  pCS,	  precentral	   sulcus;	  CS:	   central	   sulcus;	  aCG:	  anterior	   cingulate	  gyrus,	   globus	  pallidus;	  SN:	  substantia	   nigra;	   MTC:	   middle	   temporal	   cortex;	   aTP:	   anterior	   temporal	   pole;	   L:	   left	  hemisphere;	  R:	  right	  hemisphere.	  	  	  	  
Anatomical	  region	   	  	   MNI	  coordinates	  
x	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  y	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  z	  
Cluster	  size	   Min-­‐t(8)	   Z	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  [ID2<ID3]	  &	  [ID3<ID4]	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Frontal	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  SMA	   R	   18	   4	   50	   421	   2.73	   4.11	  pCS	   L	   -­‐40	   8	   42	   2076	   2.64	   4.01	  CS	   L	   -­‐48	   -­‐8	   54	   2076	   2.56	   3.91	  aCG	   L	   -­‐10	   44	   10	   86	   2.19	   3.45	  Superior	  orbital	  gyrus	   L	   -­‐16	   20	   -­‐8	   339	   2.49	   3.82	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Sub-­‐Cortical	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Globus	  pallidus	   R	   20	   -­‐2	   12	   184	   2.62	   3.98	  Pons	   L	   -­‐6	   -­‐42	   -­‐28	   147	   2.35	   3.65	  SN	   R	   10	   -­‐18	   -­‐24	   223	   2.33	   3.62	  Amygdala	   R	   24	   8	   -­‐22	   366	   2.6	   3.96	  Hippocampus	   L	   -­‐24	   -­‐14	   -­‐16	   473	   2.4	   3.71	  
	  
Occipital	  and	  Temporal	   	   	   	   	   	   	  4th	  occipital	   L	   -­‐12	   -­‐82	   -­‐8	   165	   2.49	   3.82	  Calcarine	   R	   10	   -­‐88	   12	   807	   2.38	   3.69	  	   L	   -­‐18	   -­‐96	   12	   196	   2.34	   3.64	  MTC	   R	   50	   -­‐24	   -­‐14	   81	   2.26	   3.54	  aTP	   L	   -­‐40	   -­‐2	   -­‐26	   473	   2.4	   3.71	  	   R	   50	   0	   -­‐18	   366	   2.31	   3.6	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Figure	   3.5:	   SPM	   maps	   for	   (human	   movement	   condition	   >	   object	   movement	   condition)	  displayed	  on	  a	  rendered	  brain	  and	  on	  a	  single	  subject	  template	  T1,	  at	  a	  combined	  threshold	  of	  maxima	  (z	  >	  2.5)	  and	  cluster	  (p	  <	  0.05)	  larger	  than	  200mm3.	  	  The	  brain	  areas	  that	  showed	  differential	  activation	  as	  a	  function	  of	  ID	  have	  also	  been	  shown	   to	   be	   involved	   in	   different	   types	   of	   action	   simulation,	   including	   motor	  imagery.	  Chiefly,	  the	  M1	  is	  well	  known	  for	  its	  contribution	  to	  observation	  of	  actions	  (Grèzes	  &	  Decety,	  2001;	  Munzert,	  Zentgraf,	  Stark,	  &	  Vaitl,	  2008;	  Porro,	  Francescato,	  Cetollo,	  Diamond	  &	  Baraldi	  et	  al.,	  1996;	  Roth,	  Decety,	  Rayboudi,	  Massarelli	  &	  Delon-­‐Martin	   et	   al.,	   1996).	   The	   SMA,	   an	   area	   involved	   in	   simulation	   of	  motor	   sequences	  (Grafton,	   Arbib,	   Fadiga,	   &	   Rizzolatti,	   1996),	   is	   a	   part	   of	   an	   overlapping	   network	  between	  motor	   imagery	   and	   action	   observation	   (Lotze,	   Laubis-­‐Herrmann,	   Topka,	  Erb,	  &	  Grodd,	  1999;	  Munzert	  et	  al.,	  2008;	  Zentgraf,	  Stark,	  Riser,	  Kuenzell	  &	  Schienle	  et	  al.,	  2005).	  The	  GP,	  a	  structure	  within	  the	  basal	  ganglia,	  has	  also	  been	  shown	  to	  be	  active	  during	  imagination	  and	  observation	  of	  movements	  (Gerardin,	  Sirigu,	  Lehricy,	  Poline	  &	  Gaimard	  et	  al.,	  2000;	  Munzert	  et	  al.,	  2008).	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Surprisingly,	  we	  found	  no	  differences	  in	  cerebellar	  activity.	  The	  cerebellum	  has	  been	  implicated	   in	   internal	   models,	   specifically	   with	   respect	   to	   predictive	   timing	   in	  executed	  as	  well	  as	  simulated	  actions	  (Imamizu,	  Miauchi,	  Tamada,	  Sasaki	  &	  Takino	  et	   al.,	   2000;	   Wolpert	   et	   al.,	   1998).	   This	   could	   perhaps	   be	   due	   to	   lack	   of	   speed	  differences	  in	  the	  observed	  movements.	  In	  order	  to	  avoid	  the	  confound	  of	  perceived	  speed,	   it	   was	   kept	   constant	   across	   different	   levels	   of	   IDs.	   Therefore,	   speed	   was	  always	  perfectly	  predictable,	  and	  this	  may	  explain	  why	  there	  were	  no	  differences	  in	  activation	   in	   the	   cerebellum.	  Thus,	   it	   is	   likely	   that	   the	  modulation	  of	  basal	  ganglia	  activation	  that	  was	  observed	  as	  a	   function	  of	   ID	  was	  also	  not	  due	  to	  differences	   in	  timing,	   although	   it	   is	   known	   that	   the	   basal	   ganglia	   play	   an	   important	   role	   in	   the	  timing	   of	   movements	   (Ivry	   &	   Spencer,	   2004;	   Lewis	   &	   Miall,	   2003).	   We	   have	  recorded	   an	   activation	   increase	   in	   response	   to	   increasing	   levels	   of	   difficulty	  occurring	  in	  the	  right	  GP,	  a	  locus	  encompassing	  both	  internal	  and	  external	  GP	  (right	  GPi	   and	   GPe).	   Numerous	   neuroimaging	   studies,	   as	   well	   as	   lesion	   studies	   on	  neuropsychological	  patients	  (e.g.,	  Parkinson’s,	  Huntington’s,	  and	  dystonic	  patients)	  show	  that	  these	  two	  nuclei	  of	  basal	  ganglia	  are	  important	  in	  regulating	  force	  control	  in	   produced	   actions	   (Aparicio,	   Diedrichsen,	   &	   Ivry,	   2005;	   Prodoehl,	   Corcos,	   &	  Vaillancourt,	  2009).	  More	  specifically,	  GPi	  activity	  has	  been	  found	  to	  parametrically	  scale	  with	  the	  rate	  of	  change	  in	  force	  production,	  and	  it	  has	  been	  suggested	  that	  the	  basal	  ganglia	  have	  a	  direct	  influence	  on	  hand	  representations	  of	  M1	  (Prodoeh	  et	  al.,	  2009).	   Accordingly,	   the	   present	   results	   suggest	   that	   the	   observation	   of	   hand	  movements	  of	  varying	  difficulty	  scaled	  activation	  in	  a	  motor	  area	  that	  is	  specifically	  involved	  in	  hand	  force	  production.	  It	  may	  seem	  surprising	  that	  the	  ID	  manipulation	  did	  not	  affect	  brain	  areas	  that	  have	  been	  described	  as	  the	  human	  mirror	  system	  (Rizzolatti	  &	  Sinigaglia,	  2010).	  Whereas	  studies	   on	  mirroring	   in	   humans	   have	   demonstrated	   overlaps	   in	   neural	   activation	  between	   observed	   actions	   and	   corresponding	   motor	   representations	   in	   the	  observer,	  the	  present	  study	  manipulated	  a	  specific	  parameter	  of	  this	  match:	  the	  ID	  of	  the	  observed	  action.	  Thus,	  the	  differences	  in	  activity	  reflect	  how	  the	  motor	  system	  is	   modulated	   once	   a	   perception	   action	   match	   is	   established.	   Consistent	   with	   this	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reasoning,	  an	  early	  PET	  study	  that	  addressed	  the	  influence	  of	  ID	  on	  brain	  activation	  during	   task	   execution	   (Winstein	   et	   al.,	   1997)	   found	   a	   similar	   pattern	   of	   neural	  activity	  as	  the	  present	  study	  and	  no	  activation	  in	  the	  human	  mirror	  system.	  The	  present	  results	  support	  the	  assumption	  that	  motor	  simulations	  are	  sensitive	  to	  motor	  parameters	  (ID)	  rather	  than	  perceptual	  parameters.	  The	  simulated	  difficulty	  of	   performing	   the	   action	   oneself	   (ID)	   rather	   than	   the	   perceptible	   differences	   in	  target	   size	   (W)	   or	   distance	   (A)	   drive	   motor	   system	   activation.	   Combining	   these	  results	   together	  with	   the	   lack	  of	  mirroring	   activity,	   one	   can	   speculate	   that	  human	  mirror	   circuitry	   was	   active	   throughout	   the	   experiment,	   thus	   allowing	   the	   motor	  system	  to	  run	  predictive	   forward	  models	   (Wilson	  &	  Knoblich,	  2005)	   to	  simulate	  a	  particular	   motor	   parameter.	   The	   present	   findings	   might	   indicate	   that	   action	  perception	  is	  a	  complex	  process	  going	  beyond	  mere	  recognition	  of	  an	  action.	  Action	  perception	   seems	   to	   involve	   simulation	   of	   specific	   motor	   aspects	   of	   an	   observed	  action,	  and	  is	  supported	  by	  regions	  that	  extend	  beyond	  the	  human	  mirror	  circuitry.	  In	  sum,	   the	  present	  study	  provides	  a	  neural	  basis	   for	  explaining	  previous	   findings	  where	   effort	   scales	   the	   perceived	   difficulty	   of	   observed	   or	   imagined	   actions	  (Delignières,	  1998;	  Gopher	  &	  Braune,	  1984)	   in	  different	  environmental	  conditions	  (Witt	   et	   al.,	   2005).	  To	  conclude,	   the	  present	   study	  adds	   to	   the	  body	  of	   converging	  evidence	   supporting	   tight	   links	   between	   perception	   and	   action.	   It	   provides	   clear	  evidence	   that	   the	   same	   constraints	   that	   govern	  motor	   performance	   during	   action	  execution	  also	   govern	   simulations	   in	   the	  motor	   system	  during	   action	  observation.	  Thus,	   when	   people	   observe	   others	   acting,	   they	   simulate	   the	   difficulty	   of	   the	  perceived	   actions	   by	  matching	   them	   to	   their	   own	   action	   repertoire.	  Whether	   this	  implies	  that	  we	  become	  exhausted	  when	  we	  observe	  others	  work	  hard	  remains	  to	  be	  explored.	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Supplementary	  Materials	  The	   analysis	   of	   the	   behavioural-­‐task	   data	   was	   identical	   to	   that	   employed	   by	  Grosjean	  et	  al.	  (2007).	  Using	  maximum-­‐likelihood	  estimation,	  a	  logistic	  function	  (y	  =	  1/[1	  +	  e[a-­‐x]/b])	  was	  fit	   the	  proportion	  of	  “possible”	   judgments	  as	  a	   function	  of	  SOA	  for	   each	   W	   x	   ID	   combination	   and	   participant.	   The	   SOA	   that	   corresponded	   to	   a	  proportion	  of	  0.5	  of	  “possible”	  judgments	  was	  then	  defined	  as	  the	  perceived	  MT	  for	  that	   combination	   and	  participant.	   For	   two	  participants,	   the	   logistic	   function	   could	  not	  be	  fit	  for	  some	  of	  the	  W	  x	  ID	  combinations	  (M	  =	  2.50)	  because	  the	  movements	  were	  almost	  always	  judged	  as	  “possible”,	  independent	  of	  SOA.	  These	  missing	  values	  were	  replaced	  with	  the	  overall	  mean	  perceived	  MT	  for	   that	  participant,	  which	   is	  a	  conservative	  replacement	  method	  (Grosjean	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  For	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  fMRI	  data,	  we	  tested	  whether	  observing	  human	  movements	  elicited	   differential	   responses	   than	   observing	   an	   object	   move.	   	   A	   combination	   of	  maxima	  size	   (z	  >	  2.4)	  and	  cluster	   size	   (cluster	   (p<0.05)	  >	  200	  mm3)	  was	   taken	  as	  threshold.	  As	   expected	   larger	   responses	  were	  observed	   in	  bilateral	   central	   sulcus,	  supplementary	   motor	   cortex	   (SMA),	   right	   lateral	   middle	   frontal	   cortex	   and	   left	  thalamus	   and	   basal	   ganglia	   (Supplementary	   Table	   3.1,	   Figure	   3.5).	   Note	   that	   the	  responses	  in	  motor	  associated	  regions	  were	  observed	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  observer	  did	   not	   execute	   any	   overt	   motor	   response.	   There	   were	   no	   above	   threshold	  responses	   for	   the	  opposite	   comparisons.	  This	  accords	  with	  many	  previous	  studies	  (Buccino,	   Binkofski,	   Fink,	   Fadiga	   &	   Fogassi	   et	   al.	   2001;	   Ehrsson,	   Spence	   &	  Passingham,	  2004)	  showing	  an	  increased	  response	  in	  motor	  regions	  when	  watching	  human	  hand	  movements.	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Supplementary	  table	  3.1.	  Human	  movement	  >	  Object	  movement.	  	  Index:	  MFG,	  middle	  frontal	   gyrus,	   SMA,	   supplementary	  motor	  area,	  CS,	   central	   sulcus,	  BG,	  basal	   ganglia,	  R,	  right,	  L	  left.	  	  	   	  
Anatomical	  region	   	  	   MNI	  coordinates	   Cluster	  size	   p	   Z	  
Human	  Movement	  >	  Object	  Movement	   	   	   	  MFG	   R	   36	   10	   	  	  	  	  	  60	   53	   .003	   2.8	  SMA	   R	   4	   -­‐18	   68	   78	   .003	   2.7	  CS	   R	   54	   -­‐20	   42	   5	   .006	   2.52	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Abstract	  Social	   influences	   on	   action	   and	   memory	   are	   well	   established.	   However,	   it	   is	  unknown	   how	   acting	   together	   affects	   the	   incidental	   encoding	   of	   information.	   The	  present	   study	   asked	   whether	   co-­‐actors	   encode	   information	   that	   is	   relevant	   to	   a	  partner’s	   task,	   but	   irrelevant	   to	   their	   own	   task.	   In	   Experiment	   1,	   participants	  performed	   a	   categorization	   task	   alone	   and	   together,	   followed	   by	   a	   surprise	   free	  recall	  test	  where	  they	  were	  asked	  to	  recall	  items	  from	  the	  categorization	  task.	  Recall	  was	  not	  only	  better	  for	  items	  participants	  had	  responded	  to	  themselves,	  but	  also	  for	  items	   their	  co-­‐actor	  had	  responded	   to,	   compared	   to	   items	   that	  had	  not	   required	  a	  response.	   The	   same	   results	   were	   found	   in	   Experiment	   2,	   even	   though	   financial	  incentives	   motivated	   participants	   to	   only	   encode	   words	   they	   had	   responded	   to	  themselves.	   Together,	   the	   findings	   suggest	   that	   performing	   tasks	   together	   can	  modulate	   how	   information	   relevant	   to	   co-­‐actors	   is	   processed.	   Shared	   task	  representations	  may	  act	  as	  a	  vehicle	  for	  establishing	  shared	  memories.	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Introduction	  Studies	  on	  action	  and	  studies	  on	  memory	  suggest	  that	  the	  human	  mind	  is	  attuned	  to	  others.	  Previous	   research	   on	   action	   has	   shown	   that	   individuals	   take	   into	   account	  each	   other’s	   tasks	   even	   when	   they	   perform	   independent	   reaction	   time	   tasks	  alongside	   each	   other	   (e.g.,	   Atmaca,	   Sebanz,	   &	   Knoblich,	   2011;	   Milanese,	   Iani,	   &	  Rubichi,	  2010;	  Sebanz,	  Knoblich	  &	  Prinz,	  2003;	  2005;	  Welsh,	  Elliott,	  Anson,	  Dhillon	  &	  Weeks	  et	  al.,	  2005).	  For	  instance,	  a	  response	  selection	  conflict	  between	  a	  left	  and	  a	  right	   response	  was	  observed	   in	  participants	  who	  only	   controlled	   a	   right	   response	  option	   when	   they	   were	   sitting	   next	   to	   a	   person	   taking	   care	   of	   the	   left	   response	  (Sebanz	   et	   al.,	   2003).	   Such	   effects	   of	   ‘task	   sharing’	   have	   been	   found	   regardless	   of	  whether	   or	   not	   the	   other’s	   actions	   can	   be	   observed.	   The	  mere	   belief	   to	   be	   acting	  together	  with	   an	   intentional	   agent	   can	   be	   sufficient	   (Atmaca,	   et	   al.,	   2011;	   Ruys	  &	  Aarts,	  2010;	  Stenzel,	  Chinellato,	  Tirado,	  Bou	  &	  del	  Pobil	  et	  al.,	  2012;	  Tsai,	  Kuo,	  Hung	  &	  Tzeng,	  2008).	  	  It	  has	  been	  suggested	  that	  people	  form	  a	  representation	  of	  their	  co-­‐actor’s	  task	  that	  specifies	  which	  events	  require	  the	  other	  to	  act	  (Wenke,	  Atmaca,	  Hollaender,	  Liepelt	  &	  Baess	  et	  al.,	  2011;	  so	  that	  seeing	  stimuli	  that	  are	  potentially	  task-­‐relevant	  for	  the	  other	  activates	  a	  representation	  of	  the	  other’s	  task	  and	  thereby	  induces	  a	  response	  selection	  conflict	  (Kiernan,	  Ray	  &	  Welsh,	  2012;	  Milanese	  et	  al.,	  2010;	  Welsh,	  2009;	  but	  see	  Guagnano,	  Rusconi	  &	  Umilta,	  2010	  for	  an	  alternative	  spatial	  coding	  account,	  and	   Liepelt,	   Wenke	   &	   Fischer,	   2012;	   Liepelt,	   Wenke,	   Fischer	   &	   Prinz,	   2011	   for	   a	  feature	  binding	  account).	  Recent	  findings	  show	  that	  a	  co-­‐actor’s	  task	  can	  also	  change	  stimulus	  processing	  even	  when	  there	  is	  no	  response	  conflict	  (Boeckler,	  Knoblich,	  &	  Sebanz,	  2012).	  Studies	  on	  social	  influences	  on	  memory	  suggest	  that	  people	  cannot	  help	  taking	  into	  account	  others’	  memories	  when	  recalling	  information	  together.	  For	  example,	  when	  collectively	   retrieving	  material	   that	   had	   been	   learned	   individually,	   people	   tend	   to	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forget	   information	   that	   their	   partner	   has	   omitted	   (Cuc,	   Koppel	   &	   Hirst,	   2007;	  Coman,	  Manier	  &	  Hirst,	   2009).	  By	   the	   same	   token,	  people	   report	   information	   that	  their	  retrieval	  partners	  produced,	  as	  if	  it	  were	  part	  of	  what	  they	  had	  learned	  alone	  (for	   a	   review,	   see	   Loftus,	   2005).	   For	   instance,	   when	   participants	   were	   asked	   to	  watch	   different	   versions	   of	   a	   story,	   and	   then	   tested	   individually	   following	   a	  collective	   recall	   protocol,	   they	   remembered	   items	   from	   both	   versions	   (Gabbert,	  Memon	  &	  Allan,	  2003).	  This	  effect	  of	  sharing	  of	  memory	  persists	  even	  when	  people	  are	   warned	   against	   it	   (ibid.).	   The	   effect	   is	   more	   pronounced	   when	   the	   novel	  information	   is	   injected	   by	   another	   person,	   compared	   to	   when	   it	   is	   presented	   as	  written	   text	   (Meade	   &	   Roediger,	   2002),	   together	   suggesting	   that	   there	   are	  mechanisms	  of	  social	  interaction	  that	  foster	  the	  involuntary	  sharing	  of	  memories.	  The	  above	  studies	  demonstrate	  social	  effects	  on	  retrieval	  by	  showing	  that	  collective	  retrieval	  affects	  subsequent	  recall	  of	  information	  that	  has	  previously	  been	  encoded	  individually	   (Roediger,	   Meade	   &	   Bergman,	   2001).	   Studies	   on	   transactive	  memory	  have	   investigated	  how	  pairs	   of	   people	  memorize	   information	  when	  asked	   to	   later	  recall	   it	   together	   (Wegner,	  1986;	  Wegner,	  Erber	  &	  Raymond,	  1991).	  However	   it	   is	  largely	   unknown	   how	   acting	   together	   affects	   the	   way	   information	   is	   incidentally	  encoded	   when	   there	   is	   no	   intention	   to	   perform	   a	   joint	   memory	   task.	   When	  performing	  a	  task	  together	  with	  another,	  does	  representing	  the	  co-­‐actor’s	  task	  affect	  the	  way	  information	  relevant	  to	  the	  co-­‐actor	  is	  processed	  and	  consequently	  how	  it	  is	  later	  recalled?	  Do	  people	  encode	  information	  that	  requires	  their	  partner	  to	  act,	  but	  not	   themselves?	   If	   co-­‐actors	   take	   each	   other’s	   tasks	   into	   account,	   representing	  which	  stimuli	  call	  for	  an	  action	  by	  the	  other	  (cf.	  Knoblich,	  Butterfill,	  &	  Sebanz,	  2011	  for	  a	  review	  of	  the	  evidence),	  then	  memory	  should	  not	  only	  be	  improved	  for	  items	  that	  require	  oneself	  to	  act	  (Nilsson,	  2000;	  Noice	  &	  Noice,	  2001),	  but	  also	  for	   items	  that	  require	  the	  other	  to	  act.	  Accordingly,	  information	  that	  is	  task-­‐relevant	  for	  one’s	  partner	   should	  be	  better	   recalled	   than	   information	   irrelevant	   to	   one’s	   own	  or	   the	  other’s	  task.	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The	  present	  study	  examined	  how	  well	  individuals	  are	  able	  to	  recall	  information	  that	  required	   their	   own	   action,	   a	   co-­‐actor’s	   action,	   or	   no	   action	   during	   an	   earlier	  performed	   categorization	   task.	   In	   Experiment	   1,	   participants	   performed	   the	  categorization	   task	  alone	  and	   together	  without	  knowing	   that	   their	  memory	  would	  later	  be	  tested.	  In	  Experiment	  2,	  participants	  believed	  that	  they	  would	  be	  rewarded	  for	   recalling	   items	   they	   had	   responded	   to	   themselves,	   thus	   creating	   a	   strong	  incentive	  to	  focus	  on	  their	  own	  items	  and	  to	  ignore	  the	  other’s	  items.	  	  
Experiment	  1	  This	   experiment	   tested	   whether	   people	   performing	   independent	   categorization	  tasks	   show	   improved	  memory	  performance	   for	   items	   that	   require	   their	   co-­‐actor’s	  response.	  Participants	   first	  performed	  a	  categorization	   task	  alone	  and	   together.	   In	  the	   joint	   condition,	  each	  participant	   in	  a	  pair	   responded	   to	  words	  of	  one	  category	  (e.g.,	  one	  person	  responding	  to	  animals,	  the	  other	  to	  household	  items).	  Words	  of	  a	  third	  category	  (e.g.,	  fruit	  and	  vegetables)	  did	  not	  require	  a	  response	  and	  served	  as	  a	  control.	  In	  the	  individual	  condition,	  participants	  responded	  to	  words	  from	  their	  own	  category	   and	   not	   to	   words	   from	   the	   other	   two	   categories	   (e.g.,	   responding	   to	  animals,	   but	   neither	   to	   household	   items	   nor	   to	   fruit/vegetables).	   Following	   the	  individual	   and	   joint	   categorization	   tasks,	   participants	  were	   asked	   in	   a	   subsequent	  individual	   surprise	   test	   to	   recall	   as	  many	   items	  as	  possible,	   regardless	  of	  whether	  they	  had	  encountered	  them	  alone	  or	  together,	  and	  regardless	  of	  whether	  they,	  their	  co-­‐actor,	  or	  nobody	  had	  responded	  to	  them.	  In	   line	  with	   previous	   findings,	   we	   expected	   recall	   to	   be	   best	   for	   those	   items	   that	  required	   the	   participants	   to	   act	   themselves	   (Nilsson,	   2000;	  Noice	  &	  Noice,	   2001).	  The	  main	  question,	  however,	  was	  whether	  acting	  together	  would	  improve	  recall	  for	  items	   that	   did	   not	   require	   participants’	   own	   action,	   but	   required	   their	   partner’s	  action.	  This	  can	  be	  tested	  in	  two	  ways.	  Firstly,	  words	  that	  required	  the	  partner	  to	  act	  (joint	  condition,	  ‘other’)	  should	  be	  better	  recalled	  than	  words	  of	  the	  same	  category	  that	   were	   encountered	   alone	   (individual	   condition,	   ‘other’).	   Secondly,	   words	   that	  required	   the	   partner	   to	   act	   (joint	   condition,	   ‘other’)	   should	   also	   be	   remembered	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better	  than	  words	  from	  a	  different	  category	  that	  did	  not	  require	  anyone	  to	  act	  (joint	  condition,	  ‘no	  one’).	  If	  participants	  generally	  recalled	  more	  (or	  less)	  items	  from	  the	  joint	   task	   than	   from	   the	   individual	   task,	   regardless	   of	   whether	   an	   item	   required	  their	   own	   response,	   the	   co-­‐actor’s	   response,	   or	  no	   response,	   this	  would	   suggest	   a	  more	  general	  effect	  of	  acting	  together,	  known	  as	  social	  facilitation	  (Aiello	  &	  Douthitt,	  2001).	  Method	  
Participants.	   48	   participants	   from	   Rutgers	   University,	   USA,	   took	   part	   in	   this	  experiment	  in	  exchange	  for	  course	  credit	  or	  monetary	  compensation.	  	  	  
Materials	   and	   Procedure.	   Participants	   were	   recruited	   as	   pairs,	   and	   received	  instructions	  together.	  In	  the	  first	  part,	  participants	  performed	  a	  categorization	  task	  alone	   (individual	   condition)	   and	   together	   in	   a	   pair	   (joint	   condition).	   Each	  participant	  was	   assigned	   one	   of	   three	  word	   categories	   (animals,	   fruit/vegetables,	  household	   items),	   and	  was	   instructed	   to	   respond	  only	   to	   items	  belonging	   to	   their	  assigned	   category	   by	   pressing	   the	   indicated	   key	   (e.g.,	   participant	   A	   responded	   to	  animals,	   participant	   B	   to	   household	   items).	   The	   order	   of	   conditions	   was	  counterbalanced,	  so	  that	  half	  of	  the	  participants	  performed	  the	  individual	  condition	  first,	   and	   half	   performed	   the	   joint	   condition	   first.	   Participants	   were	   told	   to	   do	  nothing	  in	  response	  to	  items	  of	  the	  other,	  unassigned	  categories.	  All	  categories	  were	  mentioned	  equally	  often	  in	  the	  individual	  and	  in	  the	  joint	  condition.	  	  The	  stimulus	  materials	  comprised	  a	  total	  of	  192	  word	  items	  that	  were	  divided	  into	  two	   sets.	   Half	   of	   the	   experimental	   sessions	   used	   one	   set,	   the	   other	   half	   used	   the	  second	   set.	   In	   each	   experimental	   session	   96	   stimuli	   were	   shown.	   The	   stimuli	   for	  each	   of	   the	   three	   word	   categories	   consisted	   of	   32	   items	   that	   were	   matched	   for	  frequency	   (Kucera	   &	   Francis,	   1967).	   Half	   of	   the	   items	   of	   each	   category	   were	  presented	  in	  the	  individual	  condition	  and	  half	  were	  presented	  in	  the	  joint	  condition.	  Throughout	   the	   experiment,	   the	   item	   category	   and	   the	   response	   key	   assigned	   to	  each	  participant	  remained	  the	  same	  (e.g.,	  participant	  A	  responded	  to	  animals	  with	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key	  ‘z’	  in	  both	  conditions).	  An	  equal	  number	  of	  participants	  was	  assigned	  to	  each	  of	  the	  three	  categories,	  and	  all	  combinations	  of	  categories	  across	  participant	  pairs	  (e.g.,	  Participant	  A	  responding	  to	  Animals,	  Participant	  B	  responding	  to	  household	  items)	  occurred	  equally	  often.	  For	  instance,	  for	  Pair	  1,	  participant	  A	  and	  participant	  B	  were	  assigned	   to	   animal	   and	   fruit/vegetable	   items,	   respectively,	   and	   household	   items	  were	  not	  assigned,	  whereas	  for	  Pair	  2,	  participant	  A	  and	  participant	  B	  were	  assigned	  to	   fruit/vegetable	  and	  household	   items,	   and	  animal	   items	  were	  not	  assigned.	  Two	  keys	   on	   the	   computer	   keyboard	  were	   assigned	   for	  making	   the	   responses,	   one	   for	  each	  participant.	  The	  response	  key-­‐category	  pairings	  were	  counterbalanced	  across	  participant	  pairs	  so	  that	  for	  instance	  half	  of	  the	  participants	  responding	  to	  animals	  used	   the	   key	   ‘z’,	   and	   half	   used	   the	   key	   ‘m’.	   The	   experiment	  was	   run	   on	   an	   Apple	  Power	  PC	  using	  PsyScope	  (Cohen,	  MacWhinney,	  Flatt	  &	  Provost,	  1993).	  Participants	  in	  the	  joint	  condition	  sat	  next	  to	  each	  other	  on	  chairs	  that	  were	  at	  fixed	  positions	  to	  the	  left	  and	  right	  of	  the	  computer	  screen	  and	  used	  the	  same	  keyboard	  to	  respond.	   In	   the	   individual	   condition	   one	   of	   the	   chairs	   remained	   empty.	   Each	   trial	  commenced	  with	   a	   500	  ms	   fixation	   cross,	   followed	   by	   the	   stimulus	   presented	   for	  1500	   ms.	   Participants	   pressed	   a	   key	   as	   quickly	   as	   possible	   if	   an	   item	   of	   their	  assigned	   category	   was	   displayed	   and	   did	   not	   press	   a	   key	   for	   any	   other	   items	  (performing	  a	  go/no-­‐go	  task).	  From	  the	  perspective	  of	  each	  participant	  one	  third	  of	  the	   trials	   required	   a	   response	   (‘self’),	   one	   third	   of	   the	   trials	   never	   required	   a	  response	   (‘no	  one’),	   and	  one	   third	  required	  a	   response	   from	  the	  other	   in	   the	   joint	  condition	  and	  no	  response	  in	  the	  individual	  condition	  (‘other’).	  In	  the	  second	  part	  of	  the	  experiment,	  participants	  performed	  a	  surprise	  free	  recall	  test.	  They	  were	  tested	  alone	  and	  were	  asked	  to	  write	  down	  as	  many	  of	  the	  previously	  encountered	  items	  as	  possible	  (regardless	  of	  category)	  within	  2	  minutes.	  A	  pilot	  study	  had	  shown	  that	  this	  provided	  ample	  time.	  	  Results	  and	  Discussion	  We	   analyzed	   the	   number	   of	   items	   that	   were	   recalled	   (see	   Figure	   4.1,	   Table	   4.1).	  Firstly,	  to	  analyze	  recall	  for	  items	  that	  had	  required	  the	  participant	  to	  respond,	  a	  2	  x	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2	   ANOVA	   with	   the	   within-­‐subjects	   factors	   Condition	   (individual	   vs.	   joint)	   and	  Category	  (‘self’	  vs.	   ‘no	  one’)	  was	  conducted.	  There	  was	  no	  main	  effect	  of	  Condition,	  but	  the	  main	  effect	  of	  Category	  was	  significant	  (F(1,	  47)	  =	  88.0,	  p	  <	  .001,	  ηp2=	   .65).	  The	   interaction	  was	  not	  significant	  (F(1,	  47)	  =	   .24,	  p	  =	   .63,	  ηp2=	   .005).	  Participants	  recalled	  more	  of	   the	   items	   they	  had	   responded	   to,	   compared	   to	   items	  no	  one	  had	  responded	  to,	  regardless	  of	  whether	  these	  items	  had	  been	  encountered	  individually	  or	  jointly.	  Our	   main	   prediction	   was	   that	   words	   that	   required	   a	   co-­‐actor	   to	   respond	   (joint,	  ‘other’)	   should	  be	   recalled	  better	   than	   the	  words	   that	   required	  no	  one	   to	   respond	  (individual,	   ‘other’;	   individual,	   ‘no	  one’;	   joint,	   ‘no	  one’).	  To	  test	  this	  a	  2	  x	  2	  ANOVA	  with	   the	   within-­‐subjects	   factors	   Condition	   (individual	   vs.	   joint)	   and	   Category	  (‘other’	   vs.	   ‘no	   one’)	   was	   performed.	   Both	   main	   effects	   and	   the	   interaction	   were	  significant	  (Condition:	  F(1,	  47)	  =	  4.1,	  p	  <	  .05,	  ηp2=	  .8);	  Category:	  F(1,	  47)	  =	  16.6,	  p	  <	  .001,	   ηp2=	   .26;	   interaction:	   F(1,	   47)	   =	   11.2,	   p	   <	   .01,	   ηp2=	   .19).	   Two-­‐sided	   t-­‐tests	  confirmed	   that	   participants	   recalled	   significantly	   more	   items	   from	   the	   category	  assigned	   to	   the	   co-­‐actor	   when	   the	   co-­‐actor	   had	   responded	   to	   these	   items	   (joint	  condition,	   ‘other’)	   than	   when	   the	   co-­‐actor	   was	   absent	   and	   had	   not	   responded	   to	  them	  (individual	  condition,	  ‘other’,	  t(47)	  =	  3.07,	  p	  <	  .01).	  Recall	  for	  items	  the	  other	  had	  responded	   to	   (joint	  condition,	   ‘other’)	  was	  also	  significantly	  better	   than	  recall	  for	  ‘no	  one’	  items	  in	  the	  joint	  condition,	  (t(47)	  =	  4.58,	  p	  <	  .001),	  and	  in	  the	  individual	  condition	  (t(47)	  =	  3.59,	  p	  <	   .001).	   	  The	  order	   in	  which	  the	   individual	  and	  the	   joint	  condition	  had	  been	  performed	  did	  not	  affect	  the	  results	  (no	  significant	  main	  effect	  of	  order	  and	  no	  significant	  interactions	  involving	  order).	  Taken	  together,	  the	  results	  of	  Experiment	  1	  show	  that	  surprise	  free	  recall	  of	  a	  co-­‐actor’s	  items	  was	  improved.	  	  	  	  	  
•	  	  	  	  CHAPTER	  	  4	  	  	  	  •	  	  	  	  TASK	  SHARING	  &	  MEMORY	  ENCODING	  	  	  	  •	  
	   77	  
	  
Table	  4.1:	  Mean	  percentages	  for	  recalled	  items	  for	  Experiments	  1&2.	  
	   Experiment	  1	   Experiment	  2	  Items	   Individual	  (%)	   Joint	  (%)	  	   Individual	  (%)	   Joint	  (%)	  Self	   21.8	  	   20.2	  	   37.5	  	   37.8	  	  No	  one	   8.0	  	   7.8	  	   7.0	  	   8.9	  	  Other	   8.9	  	   15.5	  	   7.6	  	   16.4	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Experiment	  2	  Experiment	  2	  tested	  whether	  better	  recall	  for	  items	  requiring	  a	  co-­‐actor’s	  response	  would	   still	   occur	  when	   it	   pays	   off	   to	   focus	   on	   one’s	   own	   task.	   To	   create	   a	   strong	  motivation	   for	  participants	   to	  encode	  only	   items	  of	   their	  own	  category,	   they	  were	  led	   to	   believe	   that	   they	   would	   be	   paid	   for	   each	   word	   recalled	   from	   their	   own	  category.	  However,	  after	  the	  categorization	  part	  of	  the	  experiment	  they	  were	  asked	  to	  recall	  any	  item	  previously	  encountered,	  just	  like	  in	  Experiment	  1.	  Method	  
Participants.	  24	  participants	  were	   recruited	   from	   the	  University	  of	  Birmingham	   in	  exchange	  for	  course	  credit	  or	  monetary	  compensation.	  
Materials	  and	  Procedure.	  This	  experiment	  differed	  from	  Experiment	  1	  only	  in	  terms	  of	  instructions.	  Participants	  were	  told	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  experiment	  that	  there	  would	   be	   a	   free	   recall	   test	   after	   the	   categorization	   tasks	   and	   that	   they	   would	   be	  tested	  only	  on	  the	  items	  they	  had	  responded	  to,	  i.e.,	  items	  from	  their	  own	  category.	  They	  were	  explicitly	  instructed	  to	  focus	  on	  these	  items	  and	  they	  were	  told	  that	  they	  would	  receive	  10p	  for	  each	  correctly	  recalled	  word.	  However,	  after	  participants	  had	  completed	   the	   categorization	   task	   (individually	   and	   jointly),	   they	   were	   asked	   to	  recall	  as	  many	   items	  as	  possible	   from	  any	  of	   the	   three	  categories.	  They	  were	  paid	  10p	   for	   each	   word	   they	   could	   recall	   from	   any	   category,	   in	   addition	   to	   the	   fixed	  compensation	   rate.	   Finally,	   participants	   were	   debriefed.	   All	   participants	   reported	  that	  they	  had	  initially	  believed	  that	  they	  would	  only	  be	  paid	  for	  recalling	  items	  from	  their	  own	  category.	  Results	  and	  Discussion	  The	  analyses	  were	  the	  same	  as	  in	  Experiment	  1.	  To	  analyze	  recall	  for	  items	  that	  had	  required	  participants’	  own	  response,	  a	  2	  x	  2	  ANOVA	  with	  the	  within-­‐subjects	  factors	  Condition	  (individual	  vs.	  joint)	  and	  Category	  (‘self’	  vs.	  ‘no	  one’)	  was	  performed	  (see	  Figure	   4.2,	   Table	   4.1).	   It	   showed	   a	   significant	  main	   effect	   of	   category	   (F(1,	   23)	   =	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126.4,	  p	  <	  .001,	  ηp2=.85).	  As	  in	  Experiment	  1,	  participants	  recalled	  more	  of	  the	  items	  they	   had	   responded	   to,	   compared	   to	   words	   no	   one	   had	   responded	   to.	   The	  interaction	  was	  not	  significant	  (F(1,	  23)	  =	  .06,	  p	  =	  .81,	  ηp2=	  .002).	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To	   analyze	   recall	   for	   items	   the	   co-­‐actor	   had	   responded	   to	   a	   further	   2	   x	   2	  within-­‐subjects	   ANOVA	   with	   the	   factors	   Condition	   (individual	   vs.	   joint),	   and	   Category	  (‘other’	  vs.	  ‘no	  one’)	  was	  conducted.	  It	  revealed	  a	  significant	  main	  effect	  of	  Condition	  (F(1,	  23)	  =	  10.5,	  p	  <	  .005,	  ηp2=	  .31),	  and	  Category	  (F(1,	  23)	  =	  6.3,	  p	  <	  .05,	  ηp2=	  .21),	  as	  well	   as	   a	   significant	   interaction	   	   (F(1,	   23)	  =	  4.8,	  p	  <	   .05,	   ηp2=	   .17).	  Replicating	   the	  results	   of	   Experiment	   1,	   participants	   recalled	   more	   items	   when	   the	   other	   had	  responded	  to	  these	  items	  compared	  to	  items	  no	  one	  had	  responded	  to.	  Two-­‐sided	  t-­‐tests	  confirmed	  that	  participants	  recalled	  more	  items	  of	  the	  other’s	  category	  when	  they	   had	   appeared	   in	   the	   joint	   condition	   than	   when	   they	   had	   appeared	   in	   the	  individual	   condition	   (t(23)	   =	   3.77,	   p	   <	   .001).	   Recall	   for	   items	   the	   other	   had	  responded	   to	   was	   also	   significantly	   better	   than	   recall	   for	   ‘no	   one’	   items	   in	   the	  individual	  condition	  (t(23)	  =	  3.65,	  p	  <	  .001)	  as	  well	  as	  in	  the	  joint	  condition	  (t(23)	  =	  2.9,	   p	   <	   .01).	   	   There	   was	   no	   significant	   main	   effect	   of	   order	   and	   none	   of	   the	  interactions	  involving	  order	  reached	  significance.	  
General	  Discussion	  Two	  experiments	   confirmed	   the	  prediction	   that	   joint	   task	  performance	  modulates	  the	   encoding	   of	   information	   that	   is	   task	   relevant	   to	   a	   co-­‐actor.	   Participants	  were	  better	   at	   recalling	   items	   that	   their	   partner	   had	   responded	   to,	   compared	   to	  information	   their	  partner	  had	  not	   responded	   to.	  Recall	   of	   the	  partner’s	   items	  was	  improved	  even	  though	  participants	  were	  unaware	  that	  their	  memory	  of	  the	  other’s	  items	   would	   be	   tested.	   Improved	   recall	   for	   the	   co-­‐actor’s	   items	   was	   not	   only	  observed	  when	  participants	  did	  not	  expect	  a	  memory	  test	  at	  all	  (Experiment	  1)	  but	  also	  when	  they	  expected	  to	  be	  tested	  on	  and	  rewarded	  for	  recalling	  their	  own	  items	  (Experiment	   2).	   Interestingly,	   in	   both	   experiments,	   improved	   recall	   for	   the	   co-­‐actor’s	  items	  did	  not	  seem	  to	  come	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  reduced	  recall	  for	  items	  relevant	  to	  oneself.	  Although	  the	  joint	  categorization	  task	  resulted	  in	  improved	  recall	  of	  the	  co-­‐actor’s	  items,	  participants	  recalled	  an	  equal	  number	  of	  their	  own	  items	  regardless	  of	  whether	  they	  had	  responded	  to	  these	  items	  alone	  or	  in	  the	  co-­‐actor’s	  presence.	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The	  finding	  of	  improved	  recall	  for	  items	  participants	  had	  responded	  to	  themselves	  generalizes	  previous	  findings	  on	  the	  role	  of	  enactment,	  suggesting	  that	  performing	  a	  task	  involving	  particular	  items	  enhances	  recall	  of	  these	  items	  even	  when	  the	  link	  between	   items	   and	   actions	   is	   arbitrary	   (Noice	   &	   Noice,	   2001;	   Noice,	   Noice	   &	  Kennedy,	   2000).	   Generating	   an	   action	   plan	   in	   relation	   to	   a	   particular	   item,	   and	  monitoring	  whether	  the	  planned	  action	  has	  been	  correctly	  executed,	  may	  serve	  to	  process	   task-­‐relevant	   information	   more	   deeply	   and	   to	   contribute	   to	   episodic	  memories	  that	  later	  facilitate	  free	  recall.	  We	  think	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  improved	  recall	  for	  items	  that	  were	  relevant	  to	  the	  co-­‐actor	  is	  due	  to	  similar	  mechanisms.	  Previous	  research	  on	  task	  co-­‐representation	  suggests	  that	   people	   form	   representations	   of	   their	   co-­‐actor’s	   task	   that	   specify	  which	   items	  require	   the	   other’s	   response	   (Knoblich	   et	   al.,	   2011;	   Wenke	   et	   al.,	   2011).	   When	  participants	  perceive	  a	  stimulus	  that	  requires	  the	  co-­‐actor’s	  response	  (Sebanz	  et	  al.,	  2006a;	  Tsai	  et	  al.,	  2008)	  or	  a	  stimulus	  that	  shares	  features	  with	  the	  stimuli	  requiring	  the	   co-­‐actor’s	   response	   (Atmaca	   et	   al.,	   2011;	   Sebanz	   et	   al.,	   2003,	   2005;	   Vlainic,	  Liepelt,	  Colzato,	  Prinz	  &	  Hommel,	  2010),	  an	  action	  plan	  relating	  to	  the	  other’s	  task	  is	  activated.	   Accordingly,	   when	   participants	   saw	   stimuli	   requiring	   the	   co-­‐actor	   to	  respond	   in	   the	   joint	   categorization	   task,	   this	   likely	   triggered	   the	   activation	   of	   an	  action	   plan	   and	   possibly	   ensuing	   monitoring	   processes	   (de	   Bruijn,	   Schubotz	   &	  Ullsperger,	  2007).	  	  An	  open	  question	  is	  whether	  participants	  actually	  engaged	  in	  a	  motor	  simulation	  of	  the	  actions	  to	  be	  performed	  by	  the	  co-­‐actor.	  It	  has	  recently	  been	  shown	  that	  seeing	  someone	  performing	  an	  action	  can	  lead	  to	  false	  memories	  of	  having	  performed	  this	  action,	   both	   in	   children	   (Sommerville	  &	  Hammond,	   2007)	   and	   in	   adults	   (Lindner,	  Echterhoff,	   Davidson,	   &	   Brand,	   2010).	   This	   phenomenon,	   known	   as	   ‘observation	  inflation’	   is	   thought	   to	   be	   due	   to	   motor	   simulation,	   where	   seeing	   someone	   else	  performing	   an	   action	   activates	   corresponding	   motor	   programs	   in	   the	   observer	  (Grezes	   &	   Decety,	   2001;	   Jeannerod,	   2001).	   If	   participants	   in	   our	   study	   simulated	  performing	  the	  co-­‐actor’s	  actions	  this	  may	  have	  increased	  the	  accessibility	  of	  items	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for	  recall	  in	  a	  similar	  way	  as	  items	  they	  responded	  to	  themselves.	  Given	  that	  task	  co-­‐representation	  effects	  tend	  to	  occur	  even	  when	  the	  co-­‐actor	  cannot	  be	  seen	  (Atmaca	  et	   al.,	   2011;	   Tsai	   et	   al.,	   2008;	   Ruys	   &	   Aarts,	   2010;	   Vlainic	   et	   al.,	   2010),	   it	   will	   be	  interesting	   to	  explore	   in	   future	  studies	  whether	   the	  present	  effect	  depends	  on	   the	  observation	  of	  the	  partner’s	  actions	  or	  occurs	  even	  when	  people	  merely	  believe	  that	  they	   are	   performing	   the	   categorization	   task	   together	   (Shteynberg,	   2010).	   In	   the	  latter	  case,	   imagining	  the	  other’s	  actions	  might	   lead	  to	  similar	  effects	  as	  observing	  them.	  We	   cannot	   fully	   rule	   out	   the	   possibility	   that	   the	   co-­‐actor’s	   response	   provided	  additional	   retrieval	   cues	   that	   enhanced	   recall	   for	   the	   co-­‐actor’s	   items	   (Craik	   &	  Tulving,	   1975).	   Although,	   to	   eliminate	   response	   feedback	   all	   stimuli	   remained	   on	  screen	  even	  after	  a	  response	  by	  either	  actor	  was	  recorded,	  key	  presses	  could	  still	  be	  seen	  and	  heard.	  These	  perceptual	  effects	  could	  have	  potentially	   increased	  saliency	  and/or	  modulated	  participants’	  attention,	  thus	  enhancing	  encoding	  for	  a	  co-­‐actor’s	  items.	  However,	  previous	  studies	  found	  preserved	  task	  co-­‐representation	  effects	  in	  conditions	  where	  participants	  did	  not	  see	  or	  hear	  their	  co-­‐actor’s	  response	  (Sebanz	  et	  al.,	  2005:	  Vlainic,	  et	  al.,	  2010)	  and	  even	  when	  participants	  just	  believed	  that	  there	  was	  a	  co-­‐actor	  (Atmaca,	  et	  al.,	  2011;	  Ruys	  &	  Aarts,	  2010;	  Tsai	  et	  al.,	  2008).	  Findings	  from	  other	  studies	  have	  also	  demonstrated	  that	  neither	  the	  mere	  presence	  of	  a	  co-­‐actor	   (Sebanz	   et	   al.,	   2003:	   Tsai	   et	   al.,	   2008)	   nor	   receiving	   the	   instructions	   for	   a	  potential	   co-­‐actor’s	   task	   (Boeckler,	   Knoblich	   &	   Sebanz,	   2012)	   is	   sufficient	   for	  inducing	   effects	   of	   task	   co-­‐representation.	   Future	   studies	   will	   be	   needed	   to	  determine	   the	   role	   of	   online	   feedback	   about	   the	   other’s	   actions	   in	   the	   present	  paradigm.	  It	   is	   unlikely	   that	   encoding	   for	   the	   co-­‐actor’s	   items	   was	   enhanced	   because	  participants	   suspected	   that	   they	   would	   have	   to	   recall	   these	   items.	   The	   effect	  occurred	   when	   participants	   were	   oblivious	   to	   the	   upcoming	   free	   recall	   test	  (Experiment	  1).	  One	  could	  argue	  that	  in	  Experiment	  2,	  paradoxical	  effects	  (Wegner,	  Ansfield	  &	  Piloff,	  1998)	  may	  have	  occurred,	  such	  that	  participants	  focused	  on	  non-­‐
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self	  words	  because	   they	  were	   instructed	  to	   focus	  on	  their	  own	  words.	  However,	   if	  that	  were	   the	   case	  we	   should	   also	   have	   found	   improved	   recall	   for	   ‘no	   one’	   items	  which	  was	  not	  observed.	  Our	   findings	   contribute	   to	   the	   understanding	   of	   social	   influences	   on	   memory,	  providing	  a	  new	  link	  between	  collaborative	  memory	  research	  (e.g.,	  Barnier,	  Sutton,	  Harris	   &	   Wilson,	   2008)	   and	   joint	   action	   research	   (Knoblich	   et	   al.,	   2011;	   Sebanz,	  Bekkering,	   &	   Knoblich,	   2006b).	   Previous	   studies	   on	   collective	   recall	   (e.g.	   Basden,	  Basden	  &	  Henry,	  2000)	  demonstrated	  how	  remembering	  information	  together	  with	  others	   reshapes	  memories.	   The	   present	   study,	   by	  manipulating	   the	   social	   context	  during	   encoding	   of	   information,	   demonstrates	   that	   effects	   of	   social	   interaction	   on	  memory	   are	   not	   restricted	   to	   retrieval,	   but	   also	   affect	   encoding.	   The	   fact	   that	  participants’	  memory	  changed	  as	  a	   function	  of	  the	  co-­‐actor’s	  task	   in	  a	  context	  that	  did	   not	   involve	   verbal	   communication	   (Shteynberg,	   2010)	   and	   did	   not	   require	  collaboration	   indicates	   that	   social	   effects	   on	  memory	   occur	   even	  when	   people	   do	  not	   intend	   to	   encode	   information	   together	   (as	   in	   transactive	  memory	   paradigms,	  Wegner	   1986;	   Wegner	   et	   al.,	   1991)	   or	   retrieve	   information	   together	   (as	   in	  collaborative	  recall;	  Basden	  et	  al.,	  2000;	  Rajaram	  &	  Pereira-­‐Passarin,	  2007;	  Weldon	  &	  Belringer,	  1997;	  or	  memory	  conformity	  studies;	  Wright	  &	  Schwartz,	  2010).	  In	  line	  with	   findings	   in	   the	  domain	  of	   retrieval	   (Cuc	  et	  al.,	  2007;	  Coman	  et	  al.,	  2009),	  our	  results	   suggest	   that	   processes	   occurring	  within	   individuals	  may	   also	   occur	   across	  people,	  whether	   this	  be	  retrieval-­‐induced	   forgetting	  as	   in	   the	  studies	  by	  Hirst	  and	  colleagues,	  or	  improved	  recall	  following	  categorization	  as	  in	  the	  present	  case.	  Most	  importantly	  we	  show	  that	  even	  when	  the	  participant’s	  task	  does	  not	  require	  paying	  attention	   to	   the	   co-­‐actor,	   a	   co-­‐actor’s	   task	   can	   affect	  memory	   performance.	   It	   has	  been	  suggested	  that	  information	  experienced	  by	  those	  who	  are	  socially	  relevant	  to	  us	   earns	   prominence	   and	   is	   thus	   better	   remembered;	   this	   in	   turn	  may	   affect	   the	  formation	   of	   shared	   knowledge	   systems	   (Shteynberg,	   2010).	   The	  present	   findings	  indicate	  that	  people’s	  proneness	  to	  represent	  others’	  tasks	  may	  constitute	  a	  possible	  mechanism	  for	  the	  formation	  of	  such	  shared	  knowledge	  systems.	  …………………………
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Abstract	  Studies	   on	   the	   neural	   basis	   of	   action	   perception	   have	   so	   far	   investigated	   the	  perception	  of	   individual	   actions.	   It	   is	   still	   largely	   unknown	  how	  we	  perceive	   joint	  actions	  where	  two	  or	  more	   individuals	  coordinate	   their	  actions	  based	  on	  a	  shared	  intention.	   In	   this	   fMRI	   study	   we	   asked	   whether	   observing	   situations	   where	   two	  individuals	   act	   on	   a	   shared	   intention	   engages	   different	   processes	   than	   observing	  situations	  where	   individuals	   act	   on	   their	   independent	   parallel	   intentions.	   To	   that	  end	   we	   compared	   the	   neural	   response	   to	   perceptually	   identical	   yet	   intentionally	  ambiguous	   actions	   observed	   in	   varying	   contexts.	   A	   dialogue	   between	   two	  individuals	   that	   conveyed	   either	   a	   shared	   intention	   or	   two	   independent	   parallel	  intentions	   established	   the	   contexts.	   The	   dialogues	   were	   followed	   by	   an	   identical	  video	   clip	   where	   the	   two	   individuals	   performed	   certain	   actions.	   We	   found	   that	  compared	   to	   observing	   interactions	   based	   on	   parallel	   intentions,	   observing	   joint	  actions	  based	  on	  shared	  intentions	  activated	  the	  temporal	  poles,	  precuneus,	  and	  the	  ventral	  striatum.	  Precuneus	  and	  the	  temporal	  poles	  are	  thought	  to	  support	  mental	  state	   reasoning,	   the	   latter	   with	   a	   more	   specific	   role	   in	   retrieving	   memories	  associated	   with	   social	   scripts.	   We	   speculate	   that	   retrieving	   social	   scripts	   is	  important	   for	   processing	   joint	   actions.	   Activation	   in	   the	   ventral	   striatum,	   an	   area	  involved	   in	  reward	  processing,	  suggest	   that	  observing	  shared	   intentional	  relations	  might	   induce	   a	   hedonistic	   response	   in	   the	   observer	   similarly	   to	   that	   experienced	  when	  personally	  sharing	  mental	  states	  with	  others.	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Introduction	  To	  navigate	  the	  social	  world	  we	  need	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  others’	  individual	  actions	  as	  well	   as	   actions	   performed	   jointly	   by	   others.	   To	   date,	   research	   has	   focused	   on	   the	  processes	  underlying	  the	  perception	  of	  others’	   individual	  actions.	  However,	  from	  a	  couple	   taking	   a	   simple	   walk	   to	   a	   chamber	   orchestra	   performing	   a	   musical	   piece,	  social	   life	   abounds	   with	   examples	   of	   joint	   actions.	   Yet	   little	   is	   known	   about	   the	  neural	  processes	  underlying	  the	  perception	  of	  actions	  performed	  by	  multiple	  people	  based	  on	  a	  shared	  intention.	  	  Recent	  evidence	  suggests	  that	  we	  are	  attentionally	  and	  perceptually	  tuned	  into	  the	  joint	   actions	   we	   encounter.	   For	   example,	   even	   in	   perceptually	   impoverished	  contexts	   we	   are	   readily	   able	   to	   distinguish	   joint	   actions	   from	   situations	   where	  multiple	   people	   act	   on	   their	   own	   (Centelles,	   Assaiante,	   Nazarian,	   Anton	   &	   Schmitz,	  201;	   Manera,	   Becchio,	   Schouten,	   Bara	   &	   Verfaille,	   2011).	   Observing	   two	   interacting	  people	   engages	   our	   attention	  more	   so	   than	  when	   people	   are	   not	   in	   any	   apparent	  interaction	  (Boeckler,	  Knoblich	  &	  Sebanz,	  2011).	  This	  enhanced	  level	  of	  attention	  in	  turn	   facilitates	   learning,	   for	   example,	   of	   new	   words	   (Akhtar,	   2005;	   O’Doherty,	  Troseth,	   Shimpi,	   Goldenberg,	   &	   Akhtar	   et	   al.,	   2011)	   or	   actions	   (Herold	   &	   Akhtar,	  2008;	  Nielsen,	  Moore	  &	  Mohammedaly,	  2012).	  	  It	  has	  also	  been	  shown	  that	  people	  draw	  inferences	  concerning	  intentional	  relations	  between	  people	  they	  observe.	  Just	  as	  acting	  in	  synchrony	  with	  others	  elicits	  feelings	  of	   connectedness	   and	   rapport	   between	   people	   (for	   a	   brief	   review,	   Marsh,	  Richardson	   &	   Schmidt,	   2009),	   we	   attribute	   more	   rapport	   (Miles,	   Nind,	   Macrae,	  2009)	  and	  a	  sense	  of	  unity	  (‘entitativity’,	  Lakens	  &	  Stel,	  2011)	   to	   those	  who	  act	   in	  synchrony.	  We	   also	   tend	   to	   believe	   that	  when	  others	   act	   in	   synchrony	   they	  do	   so	  intentionally	  (Ip,	  Chiu	  &	  Wan,	  2006;	  Lakens,	  2010).	  As	  early	  as	  at	  14	  months,	  infants	  seem	   to	   be	   able	   to	   recognize	   when	   individuals	   engage	   in	   a	   complex	   intentional	  interaction	  and	  work	   together	   to	  achieve	  a	   shared	  goal	   (Henderson	  &	  Woodward,	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2011).	   These	   studies	   suggest	   that	  we	   are	  not	   only	  perceptually	   sensitive	   to	   social	  interactions	  we	  observe,	  but	  we	  also	  have	  a	  particular	  way	  of	  reasoning	  about	  the	  mental	  states	  of	  those	  we	  observe	  interacting.	  	  What	   exactly	   is	   the	  difference	  between	  keeping	   track	  of	   jointly	  performed	  actions	  and	  actions	  performed	  by	  multiple	  agents	  acting	  independently?	  By	  definition,	  joint	  actions	  are	  social	  instances	  where	  two	  or	  more	  individuals	  spatially	  and	  temporally	  coordinate	   their	   actions	   to	   bring	   about	   a	   change	   in	   the	   environment	   (Sebanz,	  Bekkering	   &	   Knoblich,	   2006b).	   In	  most	   cases	   of	   joint	   action	   individuals	   share	   an	  intention	  to	  pursue	  a	  common	  goal,	  which	  organizes	  and	  interlocks	  their	  individual	  intentional	   actions	   (Bratman,	   1992).	   In	   fact	   some	   philosophers,	   although	  disagreeing	   on	   the	   precise	   nature	   of	   shared	   intentions,	   believe	   that	   shared	  intentionality	  is	  what	  characterizes	  joint	  actions	  (Bratman,	  1992;	  Searle,	  1990).	  	  Accordingly,	  when	  individuals	  act	  together	  with	  a	  shared	  intention	  this	  constitutes	  a	  different	  instance	  than	  when	  individuals	  act	  in	  parallel	  with	  independent	  individual	  intentions.	   To	   illustrate	   the	   distinction	   Searle	   offers	   the	   following	   paradigm	   case	  (1990).	   Imagine	   a	   scenario	  where	   people	   are	   scattered	   across	   a	   park	   sunbathing.	  Suddenly	  rain	  starts	  pouring	  down	  and	  people	  run	  towards	  the	  nearest	  shelter.	  Here	  each	   individual	   acts	   on	   an	   intention	   that	   is	   independent	   from	   the	   intentions	   of	  others.	  Imagine	  a	  second	  scenario	  where	  the	  same	  park	  is	  used	  as	  a	  film	  set	  and	  the	  same	  people	  are	  actually	  actors.	  Fake	  rain	  starts	  pouring	  down	  and	  the	  actors	  run	  for	  the	  nearest	  shelter,	   in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  in	  the	  first	  scenario.	  However,	  here	  the	  individuals	  have	  a	  common	  goal	   (i.e.	   to	  get	   the	  scene	  shot),	  which	   interlocks	   their	  individual	   intentions	   (Bratman,	   1992).	   The	   actions	   performed	   in	   these	   two	  scenarios	   are	   ostensibly	   identical,	   however,	   the	   context	   in	   which	   they	   occur	  distinguishes	  them	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  intentional	  relations	  between	  those	  involved.	  	  In	   the	   present	   study	   we	   asked	   which	   processes	   are	   involved	   when	   observing	  individuals	   acting	   on	   shared	   intentions	   and	  when	   observing	   individuals	   acting	   on	  independent	   intentions	   that	   run	   in	   parallel.	   To	   that	   end	   we	   showed	   participants	  perceptually	   identical	   video	   clips	   depicting	   two	   people	   engaged	   in	   action.	   These	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clips	   were	   ambiguous	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   intentionality	   of	   the	   people	   observed.	   We	  embedded	   the	   clips	   in	   varying	   contexts	   that	   were	   established	   by	   dialogues	  presented	   prior	   to	   the	   action	   videos.	   In	   one	   case	   the	   dialogue	   conveyed	   a	   shared	  intention	   where	   the	   actors	   agreed	   on	   doing	   something	   together	   (i.e.	   shared	  intention).	  In	  the	  other	  case,	  actors	  expressed	  independent	  individual	  intentions	  (i.e.	  parallel	   intentions).	  We	   compared	   the	  neural	   response	   to	   the	   action	  videos	   in	   the	  Shared	   Intention	   condition	   to	   the	   neural	   response	   to	   the	   Parallel	   Intentions	  condition.	  In	  the	  following	  we	  outline	  three	  specific	  aims.	  	  Our	   first	   aim	   was	   to	   test	   whether	   observing	   actions	   performed	   with	   a	   shared	  intention	  engages	  different	  parts	  of	  the	  mentalizing	  network	  compared	  to	  observing	  the	   same	   actions	   performed	  without	   a	   shared	   intention.	  Mentalizing	   refers	   to	   the	  ability	   to	   reason	   about	   what	   others	   think,	   believe,	   wish	   or	   intend	   (Frith	   &	   Frith,	  2010).	   Neuroimaging	   studies	   have	   isolated	   a	   neural	   network	   underpinning	   this	  ability.	  This	  network	  comprises	   the	  medial	  prefrontal	   cortex	   (MPFC),	   the	   superior	  temporal	  sulci	  and/or	  the	  temporo-­‐parietal	   junction	  (STS/TPJ),	  the	  temporal	  poles	  and	   the	  posterior	   cingulate	   (PCC)	   and/or	   the	  precuneus	   (Gallagher	  &	  Frith,	   2003;	  Schilbach,	   Wohlschlaeger,	   Kraemer,	   Newn	   &	   Shah	   et	   al.,	   2006).	   The	   MPFC	   is	  associated	  with	  representing	  mental	  states	  and	  with	  decoupling	  others’	  reality	  from	  one’s	   own	   (Leslie,	   German	   &	   Polizzi,	   2005).	   The	   STS/TPJ	   is	   thought	   to	   aid	  mentalizing	   by	   detecting	   agency	   in	   observed	  motions	   and	   also	   by	   supporting	   the	  holding	   of	   different	   perspectives	   (Gallagher	   &	   Frith,	   2003;	   Frith	   &	   Frith,	   2006).	  Temporal	  poles	  are	  associated	  with	  retrieval	  of	  semantic	  and	  episodic	   information	  that	  becomes	  useful	  in	  understanding	  others’	  mental	  states,	  particularly	  when	  they	  are	   socially	   engaged.	   The	   precuneus	   and	   the	   PCC	   have	   been	   attributed	   a	   more	  general	  role	  in	  relating	  to	  others’	  emotions	  (Ochsner,	  Knierim,	  Ludloow,	  Hanelin	  &	  Ramachandran	   et	   al,	   2004)	   and	   mental	   states	   (Abraham,	   Werning,	   Rakoczy,	   von	  Cramon	  &	   Schubotz,	   2008),	   as	  well	   as	   in	   self-­‐referential	   processing	   (Saxe,	  Moran,	  Scholz	  &	  Gabrieli,	  2006).	  	  We	   know	   from	   previous	   research	   that	   the	   mentalizing	   network	   is	   at	   play	   when	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people	   are	   immersed	   in	   online	   joint	   actions.	   Although	   some	   accounts	   (Saxe	   &	  Powell,	   2006)	   argue	   that	   the	   TPJ,	   rather	   than	   the	   MPFC,	   is	   more	   specific	   to	  representing	  mental	  states,	  MPFC	  is	  more	  commonly	  found	  in	  mentalizing	  tasks	  that	  involve	   online	   interactions.	   In	   particular,	   MPFC	   activation	   is	   noted	   when	  participants	  play	  online	  interactive	  games	  with	  others,	  as	  long	  as	  they	  believe	  to	  be	  playing	   against	   another	   human	   and	   not	   a	   computer	   (Gallagher,	   Jack,	   Roepstorff	   &	  Frith,	   2002;	   McCabe,	   Houser,	   Ryan	   &	   Trouard,	   2011;	   Rilling,	   Sanfey,	   Aronson,	  Nystrom	  &	  Cohen,	  2004;	  Rilling,	  Gutman,	  Zeh,	  Pagnoni,	  Berns	  et	  al.,	  2002).	  MPFC	  is	  also	   engaged	   when	   participants	   try	   to	   detect	   if	   someone	   is	   deceiving	   them,	  compared	  to	  when	  judging	  their	  beliefs	  (Grezes,	  Frith	  &	  Passingham,	  2004).	  There	  is	  evidence	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  mentalizing	  network	  also	  participates	  in	  observation	  of	  joint	   actions,	   for	   example	   when	   one	   needs	   to	   distinguish	   point-­‐light	   displays	   of	  social	  interactions	  from	  two	  people	  acting	  independently	  (Centelles	  et	  al.,	  2011),	  or	  when	   inferring	   communicative	   intentions	   of	   the	   characters	   in	   static	   non-­‐verbal	  cartoon	   stories	   (seen	   gesturing	   towards	   another	   character)	   compared	   to	   thinking	  about	  depictions	  of	  physical	  events	  (Walter,	  Adenzato,	  Ciaramidaro,	  Enrici,	  Pia	  et	  al.,	  2004;	  Ciaramidaro,	  Adenzato,	  Enrici,	  Erk	  &	  Pia	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  Together	  these	  findings	  suggest	   that	   this	   network,	   particularly	   the	   MPFC,	   is	   sensitive	   to	   others’	   social	  intentions,	   that	   is,	   when	   an	   individual’s	   intention	   references	   the	   intention	   of	  another.	  	  Accordingly,	   the	   first	   aim	  of	   the	   study	  was	   specifically	   to	   investigate	   if	   processing	  intentional	   relations,	   where	   the	   observed	   individuals’	   intentions	   are	   ‘interlocked’	  (Bratman,	   1992),	   involves	   mentalizing	   related	   computations.	   This	   should	   be	  manifest	   in	   differential	   activity	   in	   the	   mentalizing	   network	   when	   the	   observed	  individuals	   have	   a	   shared	   intention	   compared	   to	   when	   they	   act	   independently.	  Increased	  activation	   in	   the	  mentalizing	  network	  would	   imply	   that	   it	  does	  not	  only	  support	   attributing	   social	   intentions	   to	   single	   individuals	   but	   also	   supports	   the	  representation	  of	  interlocking	  intentions.	  Our	   second	   aim	   was	   to	   determine	   whether	   similar	   processes	   are	   involved	   when	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observers	   explicitly	   and	   implicitly	   keep	   track	   of	   intentional	   relations	   behind	  observed	   actions.	   There	   is	   behavioural	   evidence	   to	   suggest	   that	   mental	   or	  perceptual	  states	  of	  others	  are	  represented	  implicitly	  even	  when	  it	   is	  not	  required	  by	   the	   task	   (Kovacs,	   Teglas	   &	   Endress,	   2010;	   Samson,	   Apperly,	   Braithwaite,	  Andrews	  &	  Bodley-­‐Scott,	  2010).	  We	  asked	   if	   intentional	  relations	   in	   the	  context	  of	  joint	  action	  are	  also	  processed	  involuntarily.	  To	  address	  this	  question	  we	  included	  two	  different	  tasks	  using	  the	  same	  stimuli	  (i.e.	  Intention	  task	  and	  Colour	  task).	  In	  the	  Intention	   task	  we	  asked	  participants	   to	  detect	  mismatches	  between	   the	   intentions	  the	   actors	   had	   expressed	   in	   the	   dialogue	   events	   and	  what	   they	   subsequently	   did.	  This	  makes	  an	  explicit	  demand	  on	  monitoring	  the	  intentions	  underlying	  the	  actions	  observed.	   In	   the	  Colour	   task	  participants	  were	   asked	   to	  detect	   a	   colour	   change	   in	  dots	  superimposed	  on	  the	  videos.	  This	  involved	  monitoring	  only	  perceptual	  features	  of	  the	  observed	  actions.	  If	  intentional	  relations	  are	  implicity	  monitored	  even	  when	  it	  is	  irrelevant	  for	  task	  performance,	  then	  we	  should	  find	  the	  same	  neural	  areas	  to	  be	  recruited	  in	  both	  the	  Intention	  and	  the	  Colour	  tasks.	  Finally,	  the	  third	  aim	  of	  the	  study	  was	  to	  determine	  whether	  observing	  joint	  actions	  based	  on	  shared	  intentions	  elicits	  a	  reward	  response	  in	  the	  observer,	  which	  would	  be	  reflected	  in	  activations	  in	  the	  reward-­‐relevant	  neural	  network,	  particularly	  in	  the	  ventral	   striatum.	   Numerous	   studies	   have	   implicated	   this	   area	   when	   people	   are	  actively	   engaged	   in	   social	   interactions	   with	   others,	   for	   example	   when	   acting	   in	  synchrony	   (Miles,	   et	   al.,	   2009),	   engaging	   in	  direct	   eye	  gaze	   (Redcay,	  Dodell-­‐Feder,	  Pearrow,	  Mavros	  &	  Kleiner	  et	  al.,	  2010;	  Schilbach,	  Wilms,	  Eickhoff,	  Romanzetti,	  Tepest	  et	   al.,	   2010)	   or	  when	   cooperating	  with	   others	   (Rilling	   et	   al.,	   2002;	   Rilling,	   Sanfey,	  Aronson,	   Nystrom	  &	   Cohen,	   2004).	   	   It	   has	   been	   proposed	   that	   when	  we	   observe	  others,	   the	   experience	   we	   attribute	   to	   them	   is	   mapped	   onto	   our	   own	   prior	  experiences	   (Barresi	  &	  Moore,	  1996).	   If	   a	   similar	  mechanism	  applies	   to	  observing	  interactions,	  then	  the	  same	  affective	  component	  of	  socializing	  with	  others	  should	  be	  resonated	   in	   the	   observer.	   This	   would	   be	   reflected	   in	   increased	   activation	   of	   the	  ventral	  striatum	  in	  the	  Shared	  Intention	  condition	  when	  compared	  with	  the	  Parallel	  Intentions	  condition.	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Method	  Participants	  21	  native	  speakers	  of	  Dutch	  (9	  females;	  Mean	  age=22,	  SD=2.93)	  participated	  in	  this	  study	   and	   received	   monetary	   compensation.	   From	   the	   21,	   we	   excluded	   the	   data	  acquired	   from	  5	   participants	   from	   the	   analysis	   due	   to	   excessive	   head	  movements	  (>5mm)	  or	  other	  technical	  difficulties	  at	  the	  time	  of	  data	  collection.	  All	  participants	  were	  right	  handed	  and	  had	  normal	  or	  corrected	  sight.	  The	  study	  was	  approved	  by	  the	  local	  ethics	  committee	  and	  complied	  with	  the	  Declaration	  of	  Helsinki.	  	  Stimuli	  and	  Design	  	  Video	   clips	   of	   two	  people	   performing	   actions	  were	   embedded	   in	   varying	   contexts	  that	   framed	   the	  way	   the	   videos	   could	   be	   interpreted.	   Context	  was	   established	   by	  means	  of	  a	  dialogue	  that	  took	  place	  between	  the	  actors,	  which	  was	  presented	  prior	  to	  the	  action	  video.	  In	  the	  Shared	  Intentions	  (SI)	  condition,	  two	  people	  were	  heard	  to	  agree	  on	  doing	  something	  together	  (e.g.	  A:	  Shall	  we	  set	  the	  table?	  B:	  Yes	  good	  idea!).	  This	  was	  followed	  by	  the	  action	  video	  where	  two	  actors	  were	  engaged	  in	  action.	  In	  the	  Parallel	   Intentions	  (PI)	   condition	   the	   identical	   action	   video	  was	  preceded	  by	   a	  different	  dialogue,	  where	  actors	  express	  independent	  intentions	  (e.g.	  A:	  Shall	  we	  set	  the	  table?	  B:	  No	  I	  think	  I’ll	  clean	  the	  cutlery).	  We	  included	  two	  tasks	  in	  the	  paradigm	  that	  were	  blocked.	  In	  both	  tasks	  the	  participants	  were	  instructed	  to	  count	  ‘mismatch	  trials’	  within	  each	  block.	  In	  the	  mismatch	  trials	  of	  the	  Intention	  Task	  the	  content	  of	  the	  action	  video	  did	  not	  match	  the	  content	  of	  the	  dialogue	  video.	  In	  the	  Colour	  Task,	  the	  action	  videos	  that	  were	  presented	  in	  the	  Intention	  task	  were	  superimposed	  with	  two	  coloured	  dots	  that	  followed	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  actors.	  Here	  the	  task	  was	  to	  detect	  the	  trials	  where	  one	  of	  the	  dots	  changed	  colour.	  The	  stimuli	  consisted	  of	  two	  types	  of	  videos:	  dialogue	  videos	  and	  action	  videos.	  We	  recorded	  the	  videos	  in	  an	  actual	  apartment	  for	  natural	  scenery.	  In	  action	  videos,	  two	  different	   mixed-­‐gender	   pairs	   acted	   out	   5	   different	   scenarios:	   cleaning	   the	   living	  room,	  setting	  the	  dining	  table,	  repairing	  the	  TV,	  folding	  the	  laundry,	  and	  making	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coffee	  (see	  Appendix	  for	  details	  on	  scenarios).	  For	  example,	  in	  the	  cleaning	  scenario	  one	  of	  the	  actors	  sprayed	  cleaning	  liquid	  on	  a	  dining	  table	  and	  wiped	  it	  with	  a	  paper	  towel.	  The	  other	  actor,	  standing	  at	  the	  other	  end	  of	  the	  table,	  removed	  some	  books	  from	  a	  bookshelf	  located	  behind	  the	  actor	  and	  placed	  them	  on	  the	  table.	  The	  actors	  did	   not	   engage	   in	   eye	   contact	   during	   the	   videos,	   and	   no	   verbal	   or	   non-­‐verbal	  communication	  took	  place.	  In	  the	  dialogue	  videos	  that	  were	  presented	  prior	  to	  the	  action	   videos,	   a	   still	   photograph	   of	   the	   room	   set-­‐up	  was	   seen	  while	   the	   dialogue	  between	   the	   actors	   was	   overheard.	   In	   the	   Shared	   Intentions	   dialogue	   (SD),	   the	  actors	   agreed	   on	   cleaning	   the	   living	   room	   together.	   In	   the	   Parallel	   Intentions	  dialogue	  (PD)	  one	  actor	  expressed	  the	  intention	  to	  clean	  the	  living	  room,	  while	  the	  other	  expressed	  the	  intention	  to	  search	  for	  a	  book.	  Additional	  videos	  were	  recorded	  for	  mismatch	   trials	   (see	   Supplementary	  Materials	   for	   details).	   For	   example	   in	   the	  cleaning	  scenario,	  following	  the	  dialogue,	  the	  actors	  were	  seen	  playing	  cards	  in	  the	  same	  setting.	  We	  piloted	   the	   stimuli	  prior	   to	   the	  experiment.	   In	  a	   two	  choice	   task	  participants	  were	  asked	  after	  each	  trial	  (dialogue	  video	  +	  action	  video)	  whether	  the	  trial	   was	   a	   match	   or	   a	   mismatch.	   The	   difference	   in	   accuracy	   scores	   between	  mismatch	  and	  match	  trials	  was	  not	  significant	  (mismatch:	  M=96%,	  SD=	  3.6,	  match:	  
M=86%,	  SD=15.7,	  t(4)=1.33,	  p>.05).	  	  The	   same	  videos	  were	   further	  processed	   to	   create	   the	   stimuli	  used	   for	   the	  Colour	  task.	  The	  action	  videos	  were	  superimposed	  with	  two	  coloured	  dots,	  one	  placed	  on	  each	  actor.	  These	  dots	  followed	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  actors.	  For	  the	  mismatch	  trials	  in	  the	  Colour	  task	  one	  of	   the	  two	  dots	  changed	  colour	  at	  a	  particular	   time	  point.	  The	  average	   time	   the	   participants	   required	   to	   categorize	   each	   video	   as	   a	   match	   or	   a	  mismatch	  in	  the	  pilot	  study	  determined	  the	  time	  point	  for	  the	  colour	  change	  of	  the	  dot	  in	  the	  Colour	  task.	  All	  videos	  were	  processed	  using	  Adobe	  Premiere	  Pro	  CS4.	  The	  sound	   files	   in	   the	   dialogue	   videos	   were	   equalized	   using	   EQ	   Filtering	   2.0	  (www.sens.com)	  software	  to	  correct	  for	  the	  distortion	  created	  by	  MRI	  signal.	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Procedure	  Having	   provided	   informed	   consent,	   participants	   received	   instructions	   and	   were	  familiarized	  with	   the	   task	   in	  a	  short	  practice	  run	  before	   the	  scanning	  session.	  The	  practice	   task	   included	   different	   videos	   than	   the	   ones	   included	   in	   the	   experiment.	  The	   experiment	   consisted	   of	   126	   trials	   in	   total	   (see	   Supplementary	  Materials	   for	  details).	  The	  trial	  types	  (five	  scenarios,	  two	  actor	  pairs,	  and	  two	  actor	  locations)	  for	  each	   of	   the	   two	   tasks	   (Intention	   and	   Colour)	   were	   randomized	   across	   the	  experiment.	   In	   one	   such	   trial	   type	  Actor	  A	   started	   the	   dialogue	   and	  B	   responded,	  which	  was	   followed	  by	   the	   action	   video	  where	  A	  was	   seen	   on	   the	   left	   part	   of	   the	  screen	  and	  B	  on	  the	  right.	  In	  another	  trial	  type	  B	  started	  the	  dialogue	  and	  was	  seen	  on	  the	  left	  part	  of	  the	  screen	  in	  the	  subsequent	  action	  video.	  	  	  
	  	  
Figure	  5.1:	  Diagram	  illustrating	  the	  course	  of	  each	  trial.	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Tasks	   were	   blocked,	   and	   blocks	   were	   presented	   in	   random	   order.	   Each	   block	  consisted	   of	   10	   (Colour	   task)	   or	   11	   trials	   (Intention	   task).	   Each	   trial	   (Figure	   5.1)	  commenced	  with	  a	   fixation	  cross	  which	  was	  succeeded	  by	   the	  dialogue	  video	   that	  lasted	  for	  approximately	  3	  seconds.	  A	  jittered	  delay	  of	  5-­‐7s	  separated	  the	  dialogue	  event	  from	  the	  action	  event.	  The	  duration	  of	  the	  action	  events	  varied	  between	  11	  to	  13	  s	  depending	  on	  the	  scenario.	  This	  was	   followed	  by	  a	   jittered	   inter-­‐trial	   interval	  (ITI;	  5-­‐7s).	  The	  task	  question	  was	  presented	  in	  the	  beginning	  of	  each	  block.	  For	  the	  Intention	   task	   the	  question	  was	  “In	  how	  many	  of	  the	  following	  videos	  did	  the	  actors	  
not	  do	  what	   they	  had	  agreed	   to	  do?”,	   and	   for	   the	   Colour	   task	   the	   question	  was	  “In	  
how	  many	  of	  the	  following	  trials	  does	  one	  of	  the	  moving	  dots	  change	  colour?”.	  At	   the	  end	  of	  the	  block	  participants	  were	  prompted	  to	  provide	  a	  response	  by	  choosing	  one	  of	   the	   given	   4	   options	   (0,	   1,	   2	   or	   3)	   via	   the	   button-­‐box	   placed	   under	   their	   right	  hands.	  Stimuli	  were	  presented	  with	  Presentation®	  software	  (www.neurobs.com).	  Neuroimaging	  data	  acquisition	  Participants	  lay	  in	  the	  scanner	  in	  supine	  position.	  Visual	  stimuli	  were	  presented	  on	  a	  computer	   screen	   outside	   of	   the	   scanner,	  which	   participants	   could	   see	   via	  mirror-­‐glasses.	   Participants’	   heads	   rested	   within	   a	   32-­‐channel	   head	   array	   coil	   and	   was	  secured	   with	   pads	   and	   masking	   tape.	   T2-­‐weighted	   echo-­‐planar	   imaging	   blood-­‐oxygenation-­‐level-­‐dependent	  (EPI-­‐BOLD)	  fMRI	  measurements	  were	  acquired	  in	  34	  axial	  slices	  in	  ascending	  ordering	  (3	  mm	  thickness,	  0.5	  mm	  slice	  gap)	  with	  a	  Siemens	  Trio	  3T	  system	  using	  a	  5	  pulse	  multi-­‐echo	  sequence	   (TE	  durations	  of	  6.9,16.2,	  25,	  35,	   44	  ms,	   TR=2.19	   s,	   flip	   angle=80	   deg,	   isotropic	   voxel	   size=3.5	  mm).	   Following	  functional	  imaging	  T1-­‐weighted	  images	  were	  obtained	  (TR=2.3	  s,	  TE=3.03	  ms).	  Neuroimaging	  data	  analysis	  The	  fMRI	  data	  were	  analyzed	  in	  an	  event-­‐related	  manner	  within	  the	  general	  linear	  model,	   using	   SPM8	   software	   (Welcome	   Deparment	   of	   Imaging	   Neuroscience,	  London,	   UK)	   and	   Matlab	   R2007b	   (The	   MathWorks	   Inc.,	   Natick,	   MA,	   USA).	   The	   5	  pulse	   multi-­‐echo	   images	   were	   combined	   with	   an	   ad	   hoc	   Matlab	   script.	   Standard	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spatial	  pre-­‐processing	   (spatial	   realignment,	   slice-­‐time	  correction,	  normalization	   to	  MNI	   space	   and	   spatial	   smoothing	  with	   a	   6	  mm	  Gaussian	   kernel	   (Friston,	   Holmes,	  Poline,	  Grasby	  &	  Williams	  et	  al.,	  1995)	  was	  performed.	  For	   the	  statistical	  analysis,	  the	   dialogue	   and	   action	   events	   were	   modeled	   as	   the	   events	   of	   interest	   for	   each	  condition.	   A	   jittered	   null	   event	   (5-­‐7	   s)	   placed	   between	   the	   dialogue	   and	   action	  events	   allowed	   the	   two	   events	   to	   be	   analyzed	   separately.	   12	   regressors	   were	  created	  for	  the	  six	  conditions	  (three	  action	  conditions	  x	  two	  tasks)	  with	  two	  events	  in	  each	  condition	  (dialogue	  and	  action).	  	  Mismatch	  trials	  were	  modeled	  as	  separate	  regressors	  and	  were	  not	  included	  in	  further	  analyses.	  All	  regressors	  were	  convolved	  with	   a	   canonical	   hemodynamic	   response	   function	   (HRF).	   To	   correct	   for	   motion-­‐related	  artifacts,	  we	  modeled	  subject-­‐specific	  realignment	  parameters	  as	  covariates	  of	   no	   interest.	   Linear	   contrasts	   of	   regression	   coefficients	   were	   computed	   at	   the	  individual	  subject	  level	  and	  then	  taken	  to	  a	  group-­‐level	  random-­‐effects	  analysis.	  The	  group	   analysis	   consisted	   of	   one-­‐sample	   t-­‐tests	   of	   the	   contrast	   images	   of	   all	  participants	  that	   indicated	  whether	  observed	  differences	  between	  conditions	  were	  significantly	  distinct	  from	  zero,	  or	  of	  paired	  t-­‐tests	  of	  contrast	  images	  to	  analyze	  the	  statistical	  difference	  between.	  To	  protect	  against	  false-­‐positive	  activations	  a	  double	  threshold	   was	   applied,	   by	   which	   only	   regions	   with	   a	   z	   score	   exceeding	   2.94	  (p<0.005,	   uncorrected,	   and	   to	   p<0.05,	   corrected)	   and	   a	   volume	   exceeding	   60	  contiguous	  voxels	   (corresponding	   to	  p<0.05,	   corrected).	  This	  was	  determined	   in	  a	  Monte	   Carlo	   simulation	   using	   a	   Matlab	   script	   provided	   by	   Scott	   Slotnick	  (http://www2.bc.edu/-­‐slotnics/scripts.htm).	  	  
Results	  Behavioural	  results	  Due	  to	  a	  technical	  problem	  we	  were	  not	  able	  to	  acquire	  behavioural	  data	  from	  four	  out	  of	  16	  participants.	  The	  task	  was	  to	  count	  the	  number	  of	  mismatch	  trials	  within	  each	  block	  of	   trials.	  Participants	  correctly	  counted	  71	  of	   the	  74	   the	  mismatches	   in	  the	  Colour	   task	   (one	   sample	   t-­‐test,	   t(11)=	  0.737,	  p>.05).	   In	   the	   Intention	   task	   they	  overestimated	  the	  occurrence	  of	  mismatches	  (mean	  occurrence=74,	  mean	  reported	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count=150,	  one	  sample	  t-­‐test,	  t(11)=	  5.175,	  p<.05).	  Performance	  was	  thus	  better	  for	  the	  Colour	  task	  	  (paired	  samples	  t-­‐test,	  t(11)=7.65,	  p<.05).	  Neuroimaging	  results	   	   	  The	  primary	  question	  of	  this	  study	  was	  whether	  any	  neural	  regions	  would	  be	  more	  sensitive	   to	   shared	   intentions	   in	   observed	   social	   interactions	   than	   to	   multiple	  individual	   intentions	   when	   attending	   to	   intentions	   relative	   to	   when	   attending	   to	  perceptual	  events.	  To	  answer	  this	  question	  we	  first	  set	  out	  to	  investigate	  the	  main	  effects	  of	  the	  factors	  Intention	  and	  Task.	  When	  contrasting	  the	  Intention	  task	  against	  the	   Colour	   task	   ([SIintention+PIintention]>[SIcolour+PIcolour])	   we	   noted	   activations	   in	   the	  postcentral	  gyrus	  bilaterally,	  and	  the	  temporal	  pole	  in	  the	  right	  hemisphere	  (Table	  5.1b).	   In	   the	   reverse	   contrast,	   activity	   in	   the	   bilateral	   middle	   occipital	   gyri,	   right	  fusiform	  gyrus,	  left	  superior	  parietal	  lobe,	  right	  middle	  frontal	  and	  right	  precentral	  gyri	   were	   noted	   (Table	   5.1b).	   The	   main	   effect	   of	   Intention	  ([SIintention+SIcolour]>[PIintention+PIcolour])	  revealed	  significant	  activity	  in	  left	  middle	  and	  right	   superior	  occipital	   and	   right	   calcerine	  gyri	   (Table	  5.1b).	  The	   contrast	  Parallel	  Intentions	   vs.	   Shared	   Intentions	   ([PIintention+PIcolour]>[SIintention+SIcolour])	   elicited	   no	  suprathreshold	  activations.	  	  To	   explore	   the	   interaction	  between	   the	   factors	   Intention	   (Shared	  vs.	   Parallel)	   and	  Task	   (intention	   vs.	   colour)	   we	   carried	   out	   the	   following	   paired	   t-­‐test:	  ([SIintention>PIintention]	   >	   [SIcolour>PIcolour]).	   An	   interaction	   effect	   was	   associated	   with	  activation	   in	   the	   bilateral	  middle	   frontal	   gyri,	   left	   precentral	   and	   superior	   frontal	  gyri,	   posterior	   cingulate	   /	   precuneus,	   right	   temporal	   pole,	   nucleus	   accumbens	  bilaterally,	   right	  Heschl’s	  gyrus,	   thalamus/caudate	  and	  the	  cerebellum	  (Table	  5.1a,	  Figure	  5.2).	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Figure	   5.2:	   Significant	   activations	   revealed	   by	   the	   paired	   t-­‐test	   ([SIintention>PIintention]	   >	  [SIcolour>PIcolour])	  overlaid	  on	  a	  single	  subject	  T1	  (voxel	  p<.005,	  cluster	  p<.05).	  	  To	   further	   scrutinize	   the	   interaction	   between	   the	   Intention	   and	   Task	   factors	   we	  carried	  out	  the	  following	  simple	  contrasts.	  The	  contrast	  between	  Shared	  Intentions	  and	  Parallel	  Intentions	  in	  the	  Intention	  task	  (SIintention>PIintention)	  revealed	  activations	  in	   the	   rostral	   part	   of	   the	   anterior	   cingulate	   cortex	   (rACC)	   bilaterally,	   bilateral	  superior	  frontal	  gyri	  including	  pre/postcentral	  gyrus	  of	  the	  left	  hemisphere,	  middle	  cingulate	  gyrus	  and	  the	  precuneus,	  bilateral	  superior	  temporal	  gyri	  and	  medial	  parts	  of	  the	  temporal	  poles.	  Additional	  activations	  were	  found	  in	  midline	  thalamus,	  right	  caudate	  nucleus	  and	  right	  nucleus	  accumbens,	  and	  finally	  in	  the	  cerebellum	  (Table	  1c).	   Conversely,	  when	   Parallel	   Intentions	  were	   contrasted	  with	   Shared	   Intentions	  (PIintention>SIintention)	   no	   suprathreshold	   activations	   were	   observed.	   The	   contrast	  between	   Shared	   Intentions	   and	   Parallel	   Intentions	   events	   in	   the	   Colour	   task	  (SIcolour>PIcolour)	  yielded	  no	  significant	  activations	  either.	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Table	  5.1a:	  Differential	  neural	  activations	  noted	  in	  the	  paired-­‐test	  [SIintention>PIintention]	  >	  [SIcolour>PIcolour]	  to	  investigate	  the	  interaction	  between	  factors	  TASK	  x	  INTENTION	  (voxel	  level	  p<0.005,	  and	  cluster	  corrected	  for	  multiple	  comparisons,	  p<0.05,	  unless	  otherwise	  indicated).	  	  	  
Anatomical	  region	   	   MNI	  coordinates	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Table	  5.1b:	  Differential	  neural	  activations	  noted	  in	  main	  effects	  (voxel	  level	  p<0.005,	  and	  cluster	  corrected	  for	  multiple	  comparisons,	  p<0.05,	  unless	  otherwise	  indicated).	  	  
	  
Anatomical	  region	   	   MNI	  coordinates	  




	  	   	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
B.	  MAIN	  EFFECS	   	  
	   	   	   	   	  
	  
I.	  Intention	  (SI>PI)	   	  
	   	   	   	   	  Middle	  temporal	  gyrus	   L	   -­‐52	   -­‐22	   0	   70	   3.78	  Superior	  occipital	  gyrus	   R	   24	   -­‐102	   8	   124	   3.19	  Middle	  occipital	  gyrus	   L	   -­‐34	   -­‐80	   2	   65	   3.17	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
II.	  Intention	  (PI>SI)	   	  
	   	   	   	   	  None	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
III.	  Task	  (Intention>Colour)	   	  
	   	   	   	   	  Postcentral	  gyrus	   R	   48	   -­‐30	   52	   399	   3.64	  	   L	   -­‐50	   -­‐24	   46	   71	   2.95	  Middle	  temporal	  pole	   R	   56	   10	   -­‐34	   61	   3.17	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
IV.	  Task	  (Colour>Intention)	   	  
	   	   	   	   	  Middle	  occipital	  gyrus	   L	   -­‐38	   -­‐72	   14	   1852	   3.91	  	   R	   30	   78	   18	   118	   4	  Fusiform	  gyrus	   R	   28	   -­‐74	   -­‐8	   93	   3.16	  Superior	  parietal	  lobule	   L	   -­‐20	   -­‐58	   52	   173	   3.26	  Inferior	  frontal	  gyrus	   R	   48	   18	   6	   502	   3.7	  Precentral	  gyrus	   R	   36	   -­‐2	   48	   320	   3.58	  Middle	  frontal	  gyrus	   R	   36	   34	   24	   140	   3.28	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Table	  5.1c:	  Differential	  neural	  activations	  noted	  in	  simple	  contrasts.	  (voxel	  level	  p<0.005,	  and	  cluster	  corrected	  for	  multiple	  comparisons,	  p<0.05,	  unless	  otherwise	  indicated).	  	  	  
Anatomical	  region	   	   MNI	  coordinates	  






	   	   	   	   	  
C.	  SIMPLE	  CONTRASTS	   	  
	   	   	   	   	  
I.	  SIntention	  >PIintention	   	  
	   	   	   	   	  rACC	   R	   6	   36	   8	   173	   3.56	  	   L	   -­‐4	   40	   12	   <60	   3.01	  Precuneus/PCC	   L	   -­‐12	   -­‐38	   36	   288	   3.36	  Middle	  frontal	  gyrus	   R	   32	   30	   42	   593	   4.04	  	   L	   -­‐24	   6	   68	   760	   3.83	  Frontal	  pole	   L	   -­‐16	   62	   16	   331	   3.93	  Postcentral	  gyrus	   L	   -­‐32	   -­‐32	   56	   70	   3.42	  Temporal	  pole	   L	   -­‐18	   0	   -­‐34	   152	   3.41	  	   L	   -­‐20	   -­‐28	   -­‐14	   72	   3.32	  	   L	   -­‐18	   0	   -­‐34	   96	   3.36	  Superior	  temporal	  gyus	   L	   -­‐50	   -­‐20	   8	   902	   3.88	  	   R	   52	   -­‐16	   4	   91	   3.48	  Putamen	   R	   26	   10	   -­‐12	   84	   3.12	  Caudate	   R	   24	   2	   16	   376	   3.61	  Cerebellum	   R	   48	   -­‐52	   -­‐28	   206	   3.75	  	   R	   22	   -­‐32	   -­‐28	   472	   3.71	  	   L	   -­‐14	   -­‐34	   -­‐32	   627	   3.89	  
II.	  PIintention>SIintention	   	  
	   	   	   	   	  None	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
III.	  SIcolour>PIcolour	   	  
	   	   	   	   	  None	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Discussion	  We	   set	   out	   to	   investigate	   whether	   observing	   social	   interactions	   with	   shared	  intentions	  recruits	  different	  neural	  regions	   than	  observing	  social	   interactions	  with	  multiple	  independent	  intentions	  when	  attending	  to	  the	  intentions	  of	  those	  involved	  in	  the	  interactions	  compared	  to	  when	  attending	  to	  perceptual	  aspects	  of	  the	  stimuli.	  To	   that	   end,	   we	   compared	   the	   BOLD	   response	   evoked	   by	   observing	   perceptually	  identical	   yet	   intentionally	   ambiguous	   joint	   actions	   embedded	   in	   two	   different	  intentional	   contexts	   (i.e.	   Shared	   Intentions	   vs.	   Parallel	   Intentions)	   and	   in	   two	  different	   task	   settings	   (i.e.	   attend	   to	   intention	   vs.	   attend	   to	   colour).	   Our	   main	  contrast	   of	   interest	   was	   between	   the	   Shared	   Intention	   condition	   and	   the	   Parallel	  Intentions	   condition	   in	   the	   Intention	   task	   versus	   the	   Colour	   task	  ([SIintention>PIintention]	   >	   [SIcolour>PIcolour]).	   This	   test	   revealed	   activations	   in	   the	   right	  temporal	   pole,	   precuneus/PCC	   (posterior	   cingulate),	   and	   bilaterally	   in	   the	   ventral	  striatum,	  as	  well	   as	   in	   the	  bilateral	   superior	   frontal	   gyri	   (SFG)	  and	   the	   left	   frontal	  pole.	  We	  focus	  on	  these	  results	  in	  the	  following.	  	  Mentalizing	  	  Our	  first	  aim	  was	  to	  investigate	  whether	  processing	  intentional	  relations	  where	  the	  observed	   individuals’	   intentions	   are	   ‘interlocked’	   (Bratman,	   1992),	   involves	  mentalizing	  related	  computations.	  If	  shared	  intentionality	  in	  observed	  joint	  actions	  called	  upon	  processes	  involved	  in	  representing	  mental	  states	  of	  others’,	  this	  should	  manifest	   itself	   in	   increased	   activations	   in	   the	   mentalizing	   network	   in	   the	   Shared	  Intention	   condition	   compared	   to	   the	   Parallel	   Intentions	   condition.	   Both	   the	  interaction	   analysis	   of	   the	   factors	   Intention	   and	   Task,	   and	   the	   simple	   contrast	  between	  Shared	  Intentions	  and	  Parallel	   Intentions	  conditions	   in	   the	   Intention	  task	  revealed	   activation	   in	   two	   areas	   of	   the	  mentalizing	  network,	   namely,	   the	   bilateral	  temporal	   poles	   and	   the	   precuneus/posterior	   cingulate	   (PCC).	   Other	   than	  participating	   in	   theory	   of	  mind	   reasoning,	   the	   precuenus/PCC	   seems	   to	   take	   on	   a	  more	   general	   role	   in	   social	   cognition.	   It	   is	   involved	   in	   self-­‐awareness	   and	   self-­‐related	   processing	   as	   well	   as	   when	   thinking	   about	   intentions	   of	   one’s	   own	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(Sommer,	   Dohnel,	   Sodian,	   Meinhardt	   &	   Thoermer,	   et	   al.,	   2007;	   den	   Ouden,	   Frith,	  Frith	  &	  Blakemore,	  2005),	  or	  intentions	  of	  others’	  (Abraham	  et	  al.,	  2008).	  Activity	  in	  these	   regions	   are	   observed	   also	   when	   the	   task	   demands	   comprehension	   of	  cooperation	   or	   intentional	   deception	   as	   aspects	   of	   different	   intentional	   relations	  (Lissek,	   Peters,	   Fuchs,	   Witthaus	   &	   Nicolas	   et	   al.	   2008).	   It	   is	   also	   involved	   in	  processing	  others’	  emotions	  (Saxe	  &	  Powell,	  2006),	  as	  well	  as	  in	  self-­‐awareness	  and	  self-­‐related	  processing	  (Cavanna	  &	  Trimble,	  2006).	  	  The	  temporal	  poles	  have	  traditionally	  been	  implicated	  in	  the	  storage	  and	  retrieval	  of	  semantic	   information,	   and	   are	   thought	   to	   play	   a	   supporting	   role	   in	   mental	   state	  reasoning	  (Gallagher	  &	  Frith,	  2003).	  They	  are	  found	  active	  both	   in	  complex	  offline	  (Funnell,	  2001;	  Ross	  &	  Olson,	  2010;	  Calarge,	  Andreasen	  &	  O’Leary,	  2003;	  Abraham	  et	  al.	  2008),	  as	  well	  as	  in	  online	  mentalizing	  tasks	  (Assaf,	  Kahn,	  Pearlson,	  Johnson	  &	  Yeshurun	   et	   al.,	   2009;	   Gallagher	   et	   al.,	   2002;	   Rilling	   et	   al.,	   2002;	   2004)	   especially	  when	   the	   task	   involves	   a	   social	   story.	  Be	   it	   in	   the	   form	  of	   an	  online	   interaction,	   a	  written	  narrative	  or	  a	  comic	  strip,	   these	   tasks	   include	  a	  social	  script	   that	  captures	  conventions	   of	   conduct	   in	   particular	   situations.	   Social	   scripts	   are	   thought	   to	   aid	  processing	  of	   the	   social	   situations	  as	   they	  outline	   the	  behaviour	  of	   the	   interacting	  individuals	   in	   compliance	  with	   socially	   accepted	   practices.	   For	   example	   the	   script	  for	   dining	   at	   a	   restaurant	   entails	   the	  waiter	   seating	   the	   customers,	   bringing	   their	  order	  and	  ends	  with	  the	  customer	  paying	  the	  bill	  at	  the	  table.	  Patients	  with	  lesions	  of	   the	   temporal	   poles	   have	   been	   noted	   to	   struggle	   in	   acting	   according	   to	   these	  scripts	  (Funnell,	  2001).	  Regarding	  the	  current	  study,	  we	  believe	  that	  the	  dialogues	  signaling	  an	  upcoming	  shared	  intentional	  interaction	  activated	  corresponding	  social	  scripts,	   reflected	   in	   the	   temporal	   pole	   activation.	   Social	   scripts	   are	   particularly	  relevant	   for	  social	   interactions	  where	   individuals	  act	  on	  a	  shared	   intention,	  as	   the	  interaction	  needs	  to	  follow	  certain	  rules	  of	  social	  conduct	  stipulated	  by	  the	  scripts	  (Gilbert,	  2009).	  This	  is	  not	  so	  much	  the	  case	  when	  people	  act	  independently,	  which	  could	  explain	  the	  weaker	  response	  in	  the	  Parallel	  Intentions	  condition.	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The	  interaction	  analysis	  did	  not	  result	  in	  differential	  signal	  in	  the	  other	  two	  regions	  that	   are	   commonly	   included	   in	   the	   theory-­‐of-­‐mind	   network.	   These	   areas	   are	   the	  temporo-­‐parietal	   junction	   (TPJ)	   and	   the	   medial	   prefrontal	   cortex	   (MPFC).	   The	  respective	  roles	  of	  these	  two	  areas	  in	  ToM	  reasoning	  are	  still	  subject	  to	  debate	  in	  the	  field.	  Although	   the	  MPFC	   is	   commonly	   found	   in	  mentalizing	   tasks,	   including	   those	  that	   involve	  processing	   social	   interactions,	   it	  has	  been	  argued	   that	   the	   function	  of	  this	   area	   in	   mental	   state	   reasoning	   is	   not	   restricted	   to	   representation	   of	   mental	  states,	   but	   is	  more	   generalizable	   to	   processing	   social	   or	   emotional	   information	   of	  others	  (Saxe	  &	  Powell,	  2006).	  Mental	  state	  representation,	  this	  account	  contends,	  is	  associated	   with	   TPJ	   activation.	   A	   study	   by	   Jenkins	   and	  Mitchell	   (2009)	   sought	   to	  differentiate	   two	   confounding	   aspects	   of	   commonly	   used	   ToM	   tasks:	   inferring	  intentions	   of	   others	   when	   the	   context	   is	   ambiguous,	   and	   representing	   different	  types	  of	  mental	  states	  (e.g.	  beliefs,	  intentions	  etc.).	  They	  found	  that	  while	  the	  latter	  process	  engages	  the	  TPJ,	  making	  sense	  of	  others	  behaviour	  when	  the	  situation	  is	  not	  sufficiently	   clear	   recruits	   the	   MPFC.	   Indeed,	   the	   tasks	   employed	   in	   the	   studies	  discussed	   in	   the	   introduction	   required	   participants	   to	   resolve	   ambiguities	   in	   the	  stimuli	  and	  found	  MPFC	  to	  be	  differentially	  involved	  when	  comparing	  social	  to	  non-­‐social	   conditions	   (e.g.	   Walter	   et	   al.,	   2004;	   Ciaramidaro	   et	   al.,	   2007;	   Grezes	   et	   al.,	  2004;	  de	  Lange,	  Spronk,	  Willems,	  Toni	  &	  Bekkering,	  2008).	  This	  was	  not	  the	  case	  in	  the	  current	  study.	  In	  the	  current	  study	  the	  information	  pertaining	  to	  the	  intentions	  of	  the	  observed	  individuals	  was	  made	  available	  to	  the	  participants	  via	  the	  dialogues	  before	  they	  observed	  the	   interactions.	  This	  explains	  the	   lack	  of	  MPFC	  activation	  in	  our	  results.	  	  Whether	  processing	  mental	  states	  selectively	  recruits	  the	  TPJ	  (Saxe	  &	  Wexler,	  2005;	  Jenkins	  &	  Mitchell,	  2009),	  or	  the	  MPFC	  (Gallagher	  &	  Frith,	  2003;	  Walter	  et	  al.,	  2004),	  the	  lack	  of	  activation	  in	  either	  of	  these	  areas	  in	  our	  results	  suggests	  that	  the	  brain	  is	  impartial	  to	  shared	  intentions	  and	  parallel	  intentions	  in	  observed	  social	  interactions	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  computations	  underpinning	  mental	  state	  representations.	  It	  has	  been	  proposed	  that	  the	  role	  of	  this	  computation	  is	  to	  decouple	  others’	  mental	  states	  apart	   from	   that	   of	   one's	   own	   (Leslie	   et	   al.,	   2005).	  Whether	   individuals	   act	  with	   a	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shared	   intention	  or	  with	   independent	  parallel	   intentions,	  both	  cases	  comprise	  two	  agents	  with	  two	  respective	  intentions,	  which	  remain	  decoupled	  from	  one	  another.	  In	  both	  cases	  processing	  the	  intentional	  relation	  involves	  second-­‐order	  theory	  of	  mind	  reasoning	   (Frith,	   2007)	   to	   comparable	   extents	   in	   the	   two	   conditions.	   As	   Bratman	  argues	  (1992)	  what	  separates	  shared	  intentions	  from	  independent	  intentions	  is	  not	  their	   constitution,	   it	   is	   the	  way	   they	  are	  organized.	  Accordingly,	   shared	   intentions	  are	   ordinary	   intentions	   that	   are	   interlocked,	   processing	   which	   does	   not	   seem	   to	  burden	  neural	  areas	  associated	  with	  representing	  mental	  states.	  	  Expectation	  of	  interlocked	  intentional	  actions	  Are	   there	  other	  neural	   regions	   involved	   in	  computing	   interlocking	  of	   intentions	   in	  observed	  shared	  intentional	  actions?	  Two	  other	  regions	  that	  were	  found	  significant	  in	  the	  interaction	  analysis	  are	  possible	  candidates;	  the	  bilateral	  superior	  and	  middle	  frontal	  gyri	  and	  the	  frontal	  poles	  (Figure	  5.2).	  Frontal	  poles	  have	  been	  implicated	  in	  integrating	   two	   or	   more	   separate	   cognitive	   operations	   in	   pursuit	   of	   higher	   goals	  (Ramnani	  &	  Owen,	  2004),	  for	  example	  in	  multi-­‐task	  coordination	  (Gilbert,	  Spengler,	  Simons,	  Steele	  &	  Lawrie	  et	  al.,	  2006),	  or	  in	  cooperative	  social	  interactions	  (McCabe	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  Superior	  frontal	  gyrus	  and	  the	  frontal	  poles	  have	  been	  asscociated	  with	  organization	  of	  sequential	  movements	  towards	  a	  desired	  final	  goal	  (Majdanzic,	  Grol,	  van	  Schie,	  Verhagen	  &	  Toni	  et	  al.	  2007;	  van	  Schie	  &	  Bekkering,	  2007).	  This	  suggests	  when	   perceiving	   joint	   actions,	   single	   actions	   of	   the	   partaking	   individuals	   are	  perceived	   as	   interlocking	   intermediary	   steps	   towards	   the	   attainment	   of	   the	   final	  goal.	   The	   activations	   we	   found	   in	   the	   SFG	   and	   the	   frontal	   pole	   in	   this	   contrast	  suggest	   that	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   prior	   information	   provided	   with	   the	   dialogues	  people	  expect	   the	  upcoming	  observed	  action	   to	  be	  coordinated	  and	   interlocked	   in	  the	  Shared	  Intention	  condition.	  This	  may	  have	  lead	  them	  to	  monitor	  these	  actions	  as	  if	  they	  were	  indeed	  interlocked,	  even	  though	  they	  were	  perceptually	  identical	  to	  the	  actions	  in	  the	  Parallel	  Intentions	  condition.	  This	  implies	  a	  difference	  in	  processing	  of	  the	  otherwise	   identical	   stimuli.	   It	   is	  possible	   that	   the	  prior	  contextual	   information	  provided	   with	   the	   dialogues	   set	   the	   system	   to	   anticipate	   a	   certain	   contingency	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between	   the	   actions	   of	   the	   observed	   individuals.	   The	   expected	   contingency	   could	  explain	  the	  activation	  also	  noted	  in	  cerebellum,	  an	  area	  known	  for	  its	  involvement	  in	  monitoring	   temporal	   aspects	   of	   movements	   (Schubotz,	   Friederici	   &	   von	   Cramon,	  2000).	  	  Is	  monitoring	  intentional	  relations	  implicit?	  Recent	  behavioural	  evidence	  suggests	  that	  mental	  states	  of	  others	  can	  be	  computed	  implicitly	   (Samson	   et	   al.,	   2010;	   Kovacs	   et	   al.,	   2010).	   Our	   second	   aim	   was	   to	   test	  whether	  intentional	  relations	  in	  observed	  interactions	  are	  also	  processed	  implicitly.	  We	   addressed	   this	   question	  by	   including	   the	  Colour	   task,	  which	  was	   a	   perceptual	  task	   requiring	   participants	   to	   attend	   to	   the	   perceptual	   features	   of	   the	   stimuli.	  Monitoring	  the	  intentions	  behind	  the	  observed	  interactions	  was	  not	  relevant	  for	  this	  task.	   Therefore	   any	  mentalizing	   related	   activity	   found	   in	   this	   task	   (SIcolour>PIcolour)	  would	  have	  indicated	  an	  implicit	  processing	  of	  intentional	  relations	  in	  the	  observed	  actions.	   However	   this	   contrast	   did	   not	   reveal	   any	   significant	   activation	   in	   the	  mentalizing	  network,	  or	  elsewhere,	  ruling	  out	  any	  differences	  in	  implicit	  processing	  between	  the	  contrasted	  conditions.	  	  Reward	  processing	  A	   further	   aim	   of	   the	   study	  was	   to	   determine	   if	   observing	   actions	   performed	  with	  shared	   intentionality	   triggers	   neural	   activity	   in	   reward	   areas	   in	   the	   onlookers.	  Indeed	  we	  found	  activation	  in	  the	  ventral	  striatum	  (nucleus	  accumbens),	  bilaterally.	  These	   areas	   (Izuma,	   Saito	   &	   Sadato,	   2008)	   are	   involved	   in	   evaluation	   of	   social	  rewards	  (e.g.	  Delgado,	  Stenger	  &	  Fiez,	  2004),	  such	  as	  money	  or	  reputation	  (Izuma	  et	  al.,	   2008;	   Elliott,	   Friston	   &	   Dolan,	   2000).	   Just	   as	   in	   primary	   rewards,	   the	   reward	  circuitry	   mediates	   learning	   of	   contingencies	   between	   actions	   and	   their	   social	  rewards.	  Of	  particular	  interest,	  a	  number	  of	  neuroimaging	  studies	  detected	  activity	  in	  these	  areas	  when	  people	  were	  engaged	  in	  online	  social	  interactions	  where	  there	  is	   mutual	   contingency	   between	   the	   interacting	   individuals,	   compared	   to	   when	  individuals’	  actions	  are	  not	  contingent	  on	  one	  another	  (Walter,	  Abler,	  Ciaramidaro	  &	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Erk,	  2005;	  Behrens,	  Hunt,	  Woolrich	  &	  Rushworth,	  2008).	  From	  minimal	  cases	  such	  as	   interpersonal	   gaze	   (Kuzmanovic,	   Georgescu,	   Eickoff,	   Shah	  &	  Bente	   et	   al.,	   2009;	  Redcay	  et	  al.	  2010;	  Schilbach	  et	  al.,	  2010;	  Williams,	  Walter,	  Perra,	  Perrett	  &	  Whiten,	  2005)	   or	   simple	   interactions	   such	   as	   playing	  ball	  with	   avatars	   (David,	   Bewernick,	  Cohen,	   Newen	   &	   Lux	   et	   al.,	   2006),	   to	  more	   complex	   ones	   that	   require	   reciprocal	  cooperative	   behaviour,	   for	   example	   in	   neuroeconomic	   trust	   games	   (Rilling	   et	   al.,	  2002),	  social	  interactions	  of	  a	  range	  of	  complexity	  call	  on	  these	  areas.	  This	  suggests	  that	  interacting	  with	  others	  where	  there	  is	  mutual	  contingency	  between	  individuals’	  behaviour	   generates	   a	   rewarding	   experience.	  What	   our	   findings	   suggest	   is	   that	   a	  similar	   response	   occurs	   when	   observing	   others	   in	   interaction,	   which	   possibly	  reflects	   a	   resonance	   with	   those	   observed	   and	   one’s	   past	   experiences.	   To	   our	  knowledge,	   this	   is	   the	   first	   study	   to	  demonstrate	   that	  performing	  actions	   together	  based	  on	   shared	   intentions	   creates	  a	   rewarding	  experience	  not	  only	   in	   those	  who	  are	  engaged	  in	  the	  interaction,	  but	  also	  in	  those	  that	  are	  passively	  observing	  it.	  	  What	   could	   be	   the	   reward	   value	   in	   observing	   interactions?	   We	   know	   that	  participating	   in	   social	   interactions	   is	   rewarding	   and	   facilitates	   subsequent	  cooperative	   and	   prosocial	   behaviours	   (Tomasello,	   Carpenter,	   Call,	   Behne	   &	   Moll,	  2005).	  When	  observing	  others	  in	  interaction,	  the	  pleasant	  rewarding	  experience	  we	  attribute	  to	  those	  we	  observe	  might	  be	  mapped	  onto	  our	  own	  experiences	  that	  we	  previously	   acquired	   during	   our	   interactions	   (Barresi	   &	   Moore,	   1996).	   Such	   a	  response	  might	   further	   reinforce	   our	  motivation	   to	   engage	   in	   shared	   experiences	  with	   others	   (Tomasello	   et	   al.,	   2005).	   It	   may	   also	   serve	   as	   a	   means	   to	   learn	  information	   that	   is	   not	   available	   when	   observing	   others	   in	   isolation,	   thereby	  facilitating	  cultural	  transmission	  of	  joint	  practices.	  As	   a	   final	   note,	   the	   simple	   contrast	   between	   Shared	   Intentions	   and	   Parallel	  Intentions	  in	  the	  Intention	  task	  (SIintention>PIintention)	  revealed	  a	  very	  similar	  patter	  of	  activation	   as	   observed	   in	   the	   main	   contrast	   reported	   in	   the	   above.	   However,	   no	  suprathreshold	  activity	  was	  detected	  in	  the	  opposite	  contrast	  (PIintention>SIintention).	  In	  all,	   this	   unidirectional	   difference	   in	   the	   neural	   response	   we	   find	   between	   Shared	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Intention	   and	   Parallel	   Intentions	   conditions	   when	   the	   task	   was	   to	   attend	   to	  intentions,	   suggests	   that	   observing	   social	   interactions	   with	   shared	   intentions	   has	  increased	   processing	   demands	   compared	   to	   observing	   individuals	   who	   act	  independently.	  This	  relative	  demand	  seems	  to	  be	  related	  to	  the	  (explicit)	  tracking	  of	  interlocking	  intentions,	  which	  involves	  social	  cognitive	  processes.	  Observing	  shared	  intentional	  interactions	  seem	  to	  recruit	  social	  script	  knowledge,	  which	  in	  turn	  might	  bias	  how	  the	  unfolding	  of	  the	  interaction	  is	  perceptually	  monitored.	  Finally,	  our	  data	  suggest	   that	   the	   rewarding	   experience	   elicited	   in	   individuals	   who	   are	   socially	  engaged	  in	  interactions	  (Schilbach	  et	  al.,	  2010)	  spreads	  to	  others	  who	  observe	  them.	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Supplementary	  Materials	  	  Stimuli	  The	  experiment	  consisted	  of	  126	  trials	  in	  total,	  equally	  distributed	  across	  the	  three	  conditions	   (Shared	   Intention,	  Parallel	   Intentions,	   Individual	   Intention).	  The	  Colour	  task	  comprised	  60	  trials.	  6	  of	  those	  trials	  were	  randomly	  picked	  and	  modified	  as	  a	  mismatch	   trial,	   in	   which	   one	   of	   the	   two	   superimposed	   dots	   changed	   colour.	   The	  Intention	   task	   comprised	  66	   trials.	  The	  extra	   six	   trials	   included	  action	  videos	   that	  had	   a	   different	   content	   than	   any	   of	   the	   five	   scenarios.	   We	   did	   not	   include	   these	  content-­‐wise	   mismatches	   in	   the	   Colour	   task,	   because	   adding	   a	   colour	   change	   on	  them	  would	  create	  a	  mismatch	  in	  two	  dimensions:	  content	  and	  colour.	  	  	  	  Individual	  Intention	  Condition	  A	   third	   condition	   was	   included	   in	   the	   experiment	   that	   involved	   an	   individual	  intention	   (II).	  Here,	  the	  dialogue	  portrayed	  only	  one	  actor	  expressing	  an	   intention	  (e.g.	  A:	  What	  are	  you	  going	  to	  do?	  B:	  I	  think	  I’ll	  clean	  the	  cutlery).	  The	  action	  video	  that	   followed	   only	   one	   of	   the	   actors	   engaged	   in	   an	   action	   and	   was	   passively	  observed	  by	  the	  other.	  The	   data	   analysis	   of	   the	   contrast	   between	   Shared	   Intentions	   and	   Individual	  Intention	  conditions	   in	   the	   Intention	   task	   (SI_intention>II_intention)	   revealed	  significant	  activations	   in	   bilateral	   occipital	   cortices,	   bilateral	   superior	   temporal	   gyri,	  overlapping	  with	   auditory	   cortices	   and	   flowing	   posteriorly	   towards	   the	   temporo-­‐parietal	  junction,	  bilateral	  pre/post	  central	  sulci	  as	  well	  as	  the	  left	  frontal	  eye	  field,	  left	   frontal	   pole,	   precuneus	   and	   the	   left	   superior	   parietal	   lobule.	   Parallel	   actions,	  when	  contrasted	  with	   individual	  actions	   in	   the	   intention	   task	   (PI_intention>II_intention)	  recruited	   the	   occipital	   cortices	   and	   the	   superior	   temporal	   gyri	   bilaterally	  (Supplementary	  Table	  5.1).	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Supplementary	   Table	   5.1.	   Differential	   neural	   activations	   noted	   in	   simple	   contrasts:	   I.	  Shared	  Intentions	  and	  Individual	  Intention	  in	  the	  Intention	  task,	  and	  II.	  Parallel	  Intentions	  and	  Individual	  Intention	  in	  the	  Intention	  task	  (voxel	  level	  p<0.005,	  and	  cluster	  corrected	  for	  multiple	  comparisons,	  p<0.05).	  	  	  
Anatomical	  region	   	   MNI	  coordinates	   Cluster	  size	   Z	  	  
	  
	   x	   y	   z	   	   	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
I.	  SIintention	  >	  IIintention	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Heschl's	  gyrus	   R	   58	  	   -­‐20	   	  6	   2096	   4.92	  	   L	   -­‐50	   	  -­‐2	   	  6	   2442	   4.73	  Middle	  frontal	  gyrus	   L	   -­‐36	   	  16	   52	   546	   3.88	  	   L	   -­‐26	   	  56	   	  8	   259	   3.25	  	   R	   42	  	   20	  	   48	   92	   3.16	  	   R	   38	  	   60	  	   10	   64	   3.22	  Postcentral	  gyrus	   L	   -­‐28	   	  -­‐4	   62	   130	   3.32	  	   R	   56	  	   -­‐24	   56	   239	   3.29	  	   R	   8	  	   -­‐44	  	   68	   209	   3.15	  	   L	   -­‐30	   	  -­‐5	   60	   66	   2.79	  Superior	  fontal	  gyrus	   L	   -­‐10	   	  28	   60	   134	   3.19	  Precuneus	   R	   10	  	   -­‐44	   12	   222	   3.24	  Cuneus	   R	   10	  	   -­‐94	   14	   7904	   4.72	  Cerebellum	   R	   48	  	   -­‐60	   26	   220	   3.26	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Appendix	  Stimulus	  scenarios	  that	  describe	  various	  activities	  of	  the	  actors	  in	  the	  stimuli.	  	  1.	  Cleaning	  
Dialogues:	  Shared	  Intention:	  A:	  Shall	  we	  clean	  the	  living	  room?	  B:	  Yes	  good	  idea!	  Parallel	  Intention:	  A:	  Shall	  we	  clean	  the	  living	  room?	  B:	  No,	  I	  think	  I	  am	  going	  to	  look	  for	  my	  book.	  Individual	   Intention:	  A:	  What	  are	  you	  going	  to	  do?	  B:	   I	   think	  I	  will	  clean	  the	   living	  room.	  	  
Action	  Videos:	  Shared/Parallel	  Intention:	  A	  sprays	  cleaning	  liquid	  on	  the	  table	  and	  wipes	  it	  with	  a	  paper	  towel.	  B	  is	  standing	  up	  across	  the	  other	  end	  of	  the	  table	  and	  takes	  some	  books	  out	  of	  the	  bookshelf	  behind	  and	  places	  them	  on	  the	  table.	  	  Individual	   Intention:	  A	  wipes	   the	   table	   in	   the	   same	  way	   as	   in	   the	   Shared/Parallel	  Intention	  videos,	  while	  B	  is	  standing	  up	  across	  the	  other	  end	  table	  and	  watches	  A.	  	  2.	  Repairing	  
Dialogues:	  Shared	  Intention:	  A:	  Shall	  we	  repair	  the	  TV?	  B:	  Yes	  good	  idea!	  Parallel	  Intention:	  A:	  Shall	  we	  repair	  the	  TV?	  B:	  No,	  I	  think	  I	  will	  repair	  the	  door.	  	  Individual	  Intention:	  A:	  What	  are	  you	  going	  to	  do?	  B:	  I	  think	  I	  will	  repair	  the	  TV.	  
Action	  Videos:	  Shared./Parallel	   Intention:	  A	   is	   sitting	  on	   the	   sofa	  next	   to	   the	  TV,	   and	  presses	   the	  switch	  button	  on	  it	  and	  then	  tries	  the	  remote	  control.	  B	  is	  standing	  across	  A	  by	  the	  door	  and	  takes	  a	  screwdriver	  out	  of	  the	  toolbox.	  Individual	   Intention:	  A	   is	   attending	   to	   the	  TV	   and	   the	   remote	   control	   in	   the	   same	  way	  as	  in	  the	  Shared/Parallel	  Intention	  videos	  while	  B	  is	  standing	  and	  watching	  A.	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3.	  Table	  setting	  
Dialogues:	  Shared	  Intention:	  A:	  Shall	  we	  set	  the	  table?	  B:	  Yes	  good	  idea!	  Parallel	  Intention:	  A:	  Shall	  we	  set	  the	  table?	  B:	  No,	  I	  think	  I	  will	  clean	  the	  cutlery.	  	  Individual	  Intention:	  A:	  What	  are	  you	  going	  to	  do?	  B:	  I	  think	  I	  will	  set	  the	  table.	  
Action	  Videos:	  Shared/Parallel	  Intention:	  A	  is	  placing	  place	  mats	  on	  the	  table.	  B	  is	  sitting	  across	  the	  table	  and	  wipes	  the	  cutlery	  on	  the	  table	  with	  a	  kitchen	  towel.	  Individual	   Intention:	   A	   is	   placing	   place	  mats	   on	   the	   table.	   B	   is	   sitting	   across	   and	  watching	  A.	  	  4.	  Folding	  
Dialogues:	  Shared	  Intention:	  A:	  Shall	  we	  do	  the	  laundry?	  B:	  Yes	  good	  idea!	  Parallel	  Intention:	  A:	  Shall	  we	  do	  the	  laundry?	  B:	  No,	  I	  think	  I	  will	  pack	  my	  suitcase.	  	  Individual	  Intention:	  A:	  What	  are	  you	  going	  to	  do?	  B:	  I	  think	  I	  will	  do	  the	  laundry.	  
Action	  Videos:	  Shared/Parallel	   Intention:	   A	   is	   sitting	   on	   one	   end	   of	   the	   bed	   and	   folding	   some	  clothes.	  B	  is	  sitting	  on	  the	  other	  of	  the	  end	  next	  to	  a	  small	  suitcase	  places	  on	  the	  bed,	  and	  also	  folds	  some	  clothes.	  Individual	  Intention:	  A	  is	  sitting	  on	  one	  end	  of	  the	  bed	  and	  folding	  some	  clothes.	  B	  is	  sitting	  on	  the	  other	  end	  of	  the	  bed	  and	  watches	  A.	  	  5.	  Coffee	  making	  Dialogues:	  	  Shared	  Intention:	  A:	  Shall	  we	  make	  coffee?	  B:	  Yes	  good	  idea!	  Parallel	  Intention:	  A:	  Shall	  we	  make	  coffee?	  B:	  No,	  I	  think	  I’ll	  have	  some	  yogurt.	  Individual	  Intention:	  A:	  What	  are	  you	  going	  to	  do?	  B:	  I	  think	  I’ll	  make	  coffee.	  Action	  Videos:	  	  Shared/Parallel	  Intention:	  A	  is	  filling	  the	  kettle	  with	  water	  from	  the	  tap,	  and	  turning	  it	  on.	  B	  is	  next	  to	  A,	  taking	  the	  milk	  carton	  from	  the	  fridge.	  ……………………………………
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  Navigating	   the	   social	   world	   relies	   on	   our	   capacity	   of	   explaining	   and	   anticipating	  what	  others	  are	  doing.	  Whether	  we	  passively	  observe	  a	  dancer	  in	  the	  park	  or	  listen	  to	  a	  defense	  attorney	  at	  a	  hearing,	  we	  are	  in	  demand	  of	  social	  perception	  processes	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  others’	  behaviour.	  This	  thesis	  aimed	  to	  explore	  the	  workings	  of	   social	  perception	  as	  a	  mediator	  between	   individual	   cognitive	  processes	  and	   the	  requirements	  of	  social	  interaction.	  Four	  studies	  investigated	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  low	  level	   processes,	   supporting	   action	   perception,	   are	   exploited	   and	   constrained	   by	  processes	   that	  operate	  at	  higher	   levels,	   such	  as	  mentalizing,	   in	  understanding	  and	  explaining	  what	  others	  will	  do.	  Three	  different	  social	  contexts	  or	  social	  interactions	  have	   been	   employed	   (Figure	   6.1):	   observation	   of	   an	   individual’s	   actions,	   a	   social	  interaction	  where	  two	  individuals	  jointly	  perform	  a	  task,	  and	  finally	  observation	  of	  a	  social	   interaction	   that	   takes	   place	   between	   others.	   I	   summarize	   below	   the	   main	  findings	  of	   the	   thesis.	   Subsequent	   to	   that	   is	   a	   three-­‐part	  discussion	   that	   examines	  the	  implications	  of	  the	  studies	  followed	  by	  concluding	  remarks.	  	  
	  
Figure	  6.1:	  The	  different	  social	  contexts	  addressed	  in	  this	  thesis.	  Black	  circles	  represent	  the	  observing	  agent	  (the	  participant),	  blue	  circles	  represent	  the	  observed	  agents.	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Summary	  
Chapters	  2	  and	  3	  were	  concerned	  with	  the	  role	  of	  perception	  action	  matching	  and	  motor	  simulation	  in	  observation	  of	  individual	  actions	  and	  specifically	  addressed	  the	  following	   questions:(a)	   Does	   the	   basic	   principle	   of	   speed-­‐accuracy	   trade-­‐off	   in	  motor	  control	  constrain	  action	  simulation?	  (b)What	  is	  the	  role	  of	  the	  motor	  regions	  in	  calculation	  of	  the	  speed-­‐accuracy	  tradeoff	  in	  observed	  actions?	  In	  two	  studies	  an	  observation	  version	  of	  Fitts’	  task	  was	  adopted.	  Participants	  were	  asked	  to	  judge	  the	  feasibility	  of	  an	  observed	  repetitive	  movement	  between	  two	  identically	  sized	  targets	  that	   were	   varied	   in	   size	   and	   placed	   at	   varying	   distances.	   According	   to	   Fitts’	   law	  (Fitts,	   1954),	   a	   fixed	   relation	   between	   the	   size	   of	   the	   targets	   and	   the	   distance	  separating	   them	   (movement	   amplitude)	   indexes	   the	   difficulty	   of	   a	   particular	  movement	  and	  determines	  the	  time	  required	  to	  complete	  it.	  	  The	   study	   reported	   in	   Chapter	   2	   specifically	   investigated	   whether	   and	   how	   a	  selective	  impairment	  in	  the	  execution	  of	  an	  action	  would	  be	  present	  when	  the	  same	  action	   is	   perceived.	  A	  neuropsychological	   patient	  who	   suffers	   from	  a	   lesion	   in	   his	  left	  motor	   cortex	   presented	   in	   his	   action	   execution	   a	   particular	   violation	   of	   Fitts’	  law.	   When	   performing	   the	   Fitts’	   task—alternating	   a	   finger	   between	   the	   targets	  without	  missing	  them—the	  movement	  times	  scaled	  with	  the	  movement	  amplitude,	  instead	  of	  the	  index	  of	  difficulty.	  Likewise,	  when	  asked	  to	  judge	  the	  feasibility	  of	  the	  same	   repetitive	  movement	   performed	   by	   an	   observed	   actor,	   his	   judgments	   again	  changed	  as	  a	  function	  of	  the	  movement	  amplitude.	  In	  both	  cases	  of	  production	  and	  perception	  of	  the	  movement	  the	  patient	  exhibited	  a	  specific	  deficiency	  in	  integrating	  the	  target	  size	   into	  his	  motor	  representations.	  Due	  to	  neural	  damage,	   the	  patient’s	  motor	   system	   seemed	   to	   fail	   at	   computing	   all	   the	   relevant	   information	   for	  production	  of	  a	  movement,	  and	  thereby	  failing	  to	  fully	  inform	  his	  motor	  simulations	  of	  the	  same	  action	  that	  is	  observed.	  	  
Chapter	   3	   presented	   a	   functional	   neuroimaging	   (fMRI)	   study	   conducted	   with	  healthy	  adults.	   In	   a	   similar	   action	  perception	  paradigm	  as	  described	   in	  Chapter	  2,	  the	   motor	   difficulty	   of	   the	   observed	   movements	   was	   systematically	   manipulated	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while	  controlling	  for	  perceptual	  features.	  The	  results	  revealed	  an	  increase	  in	  neural	  signal	   in	   response	   to	   increasing	   levels	   of	   motor	   difficulty	   in	   the	   observed	  movements	   in	  brain	   regions	   that	  are	   involved	   in	  motor	  production.	  These	   regions	  include	   the	  primary	  motor	  cortex	   (M1),	   supplementary	  motor	  area	   (SMA)	  and	   the	  globus	   pallidus	   of	   the	   basal	   ganglia	   (BG).	   Crucially,	   perceptual	   aspects	   of	   the	  observed	  movements	  (i.e.	  varying	  levels	  of	  target	  size	  and	  movement	  amplitude)	  did	  not	  yield	  any	  signal	   change	   in	   these	   regions.	  Particularly	   interesting	   in	   the	  data	   is	  the	   lack	  of	  any	  activation	   in	   the	  human	  mirror	  system	  (i.e.	   inferior	  parietal	   lobule,	  IPL,	   prefrontal	   cortex,	   PFC,	   and	   the	   superior	   temporal	   sulcus,	   STS)	   (Rizzolatti	   &	  Sinigaglia,	   2010).	  Research	  on	  mirroring	  mechanism	   in	  humans	   suggests	   that	   this	  neural	   circuitry	   is	   particularly	   sensitive	   to	   the	   degree	   of	   overlap	   between	   the	  observed	   actions	   and	   the	   corresponding	   motor	   representations.	   Such	   overlap	   is	  reflected	   in	   the	   intensity	  of	   the	  neural	   signal	  notes	   in	   these	   regions.	   In	   this	   study,	  however,	  the	  manipulation	  targeted	  a	  specifically	  motor	  parameter,	  the	  difficulty	  of	  the	   observed	   movement.	   Therefore,	   differential	   activation	   noted	   in	   the	   reported	  motor	  regions	  reflects	  a	  modulation	   in	   the	  system	  once	  a	  perception	  action	  match	  has	  been	  established.	  	  
Chapter	   4	   addressed	   the	   modulating	   effects	   of	   representing	   another’s	   goal	   on	  individual	   processing	   during	   an	   ongoing	   social	   interaction.	   Particularly,	   two	  experiments	   investigated	   whether	   and	   how	   representing	   another’s	   task	   during	   a	  joint	  task	  performance	  would	  result	  in	  diffusion	  of	  information	  across	  agents	  during	  memory	  encoding.	  Two	  individuals	  performed	  a	  word	  categorization	  task	  that	  was	  distributed	   between	   them.	   They	   responded	   to	   the	   words	   of	   their	   individually	  assigned	   categories.	   They	   performed	   the	   task	   once	   alone	   and	   once	   together	   with	  their	  partners,	   and	  were	   later	  on	   tested	   for	   their	  memory	   in	  a	   surprise	   free	   recall	  protocol.	   The	   results	   of	   the	   first	   experiment	   demonstrated	   that	   individuals	  involuntarily	  remembered	  items	  belonging	  to	  their	  partners	  even	  though	  it	  was	  not	  relevant	   for	   their	   individual	   performance.	   The	   second	   experiment	   presented	  participants	  with	  a	  monetary	  incentive	  to	  encode	  items	  belonging	  to	  their	  assigned	  word	   categories.	   In	   the	   cued	   recall	   protocol	   they	  were	   asked	   to	   remember	   items	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from	  all	  categories.	  The	  results	  confirmed	  the	  findings	  of	   the	   first	  experiment,	  and	  further	   demonstrated	   that	   remembering	   items	   that	   are	   irrelevant	   for	   one’s	  individual	  task	  does	  not	  tax	  performance.	  
Chapter	   5	   was	   concerned	   with	   ascription	   of	   shared	   intentions	   to	   observed	  interactions.	  An	  fMRI	  study	  that	  asked	  whether	  processing	  of	  social	  interactions	  that	  are	   driven	   by	   shared	   intentions	   recruits	   different	   neural	   computations	   than	   the	  processing	   of	   independent	   actions	   of	   multiple	   individuals.	   In	   an	   observation	  paradigm,	  perceptually	   identical	  actions	  carried	  out	  by	   two	  actors	  were	  presented	  in	  different	  intentional	  contexts	  that	  defined	  whether	  actors	  were	  going	  to	  perform	  a	   joint	   action	   or	   not.	   A	   dialogue	   that	   took	   place	   between	   the	   actors	   was	   heard	  beforehand	  that	  described	  the	  intentional	  relations	  (i.e.	  shared	  intention	  vs.	  parallel	  independent	  intentions)	  involved	  in	  the	  upcoming	  interaction.	  The	  results	  revealed	  that	   when	   compared	   to	   observation	   of	   interactions	   based	   on	   parallel	   intentions,	  observation	  of	  interactions	  based	  on	  shared	  intentions	  elicited	  increased	  activation	  in	   areas	   that	   include	   the	   temporal	   poles,	   the	  precuneus,	   and	   the	   ventral	   striatum.	  Precuneus	   and	   the	   temporal	   poles	   have	  been	   implicated	   in	  mentalizing,	   the	   latter	  with	  a	  more	  specific	  role	  in	  retrieving	  memories	  associated	  with	  social	  scripts.	  Thus	  mentalizing	  related	  computations	  also	  play	  an	   important	  role	   in	   identifying	   	  social	  interactions.	  The	  noted	  activation	   in	  the	  ventral	  striatum,	  with	   its	  well	  established	  involvement	  in	  processing	  primary	  as	  well	  as	  social	  rewards,	  might	  be	  indicative	  of	  a	   rewarding	   experience	   in	   the	   observer	   induced	   by	   observation	   of	   social	  interactions	  that	  are	  based	  on	  shared	  intentions.	  	  
General	  Discussion	  
Observing	  individual	  actions	  and	  the	  role	  of	  motor	  simulations	  When	   we	   observe	   a	   movement	   by	   somebody	   else	   our	   motor	   system	   activates	   a	  corresponding	   representation	   that	   we	   use	   in	   executing	   the	   same	   movement.	   As	  postulated	   by	   action	   perception	   theories,	   common	   coding	   of	   perceived	   and	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executable	   actions	   (Prinz,	   1997)	   allows	   for	   motor	   simulations	   harnessing	   the	  observer’s	  internal	  models	  that	  are	  essential	  for	  production	  of	  movements	  (Wilson	  &	  Knoblich,	  2005).	  A	  system	  that	  utilizes	  production	  mechanisms	   in	  perception	  of	  movements	   renders	   action	   perception,	   largely	   a	   motor	   process.	   Both	   studies	  presented	   in	   Chapters	   2	   and	   3	   provide	   strong	   support	   for	   this	   theory.	   The	  neuropsychological	   case	   study	   reported	   in	   Chapter	   2	   provides	   a	   clear	  demonstration	  of	  how	  it	  is	  through	  the	  models	  that	  reside	  in	  the	  motor	  system	  that	  we	   get	   to	   process	   the	   actions	   we	   observe.	   The	   studied	   patient’s	   processing	   of	  movements	  mirrored	  a	  particular	  impairment	  in	  the	  internal	  models	  that	  was	  likely	  caused	  by	  neural	  damage	  in	  his	  brain.	  The	  findings	  of	  the	  neuroimaging	  study	  in	  the	  subsequent	  chapter	  are	  more	  distinct.	  	  In	  this	  study,	  the	  motor	  system	  was	  found	  to	  specifically	   respond	   to	   a	  motor	   parameter	   (i.e.	   difficulty)	   of	   the	   observed	   actions.	  This	   suggests	   that	   once	   the	   corresponding	   action	   representations	   get	   activated,	  motor	   system	   codes	   the	   parameters	   that	   are	   not	   perceptual	   but	   purely	   motor,	  implying	  that	  action	  perception	  process	  involves	  more	  than	  just	  recognizing	  actions,	  and	   recruits	   neural	   regions	   beyond	   the	   mirror	   system.	   The	   involvement	   of	   the	  motor	   system	   in	   perception	   could	   provide	   the	   observer	   with	   information	   that	   is	  motor-­‐specific.	  To	  illustrate,	  going	  back	  to	  our	  kitchen	  scenario,	  when	  my	  friend	  lifts	  the	  heavy	  pot	  filled	  with	  water	  my	  motor	  system	  doesn’t	  only	  recognize	  the	  action	  as	  lifting,	  but	  it	  also	  identifies	  the	  effort	  she	  applies.	  This	  is	  consistent	  with	  previous	  behavioural	   work	   that	   has	   shown	   how	   this	   information	   leaks	   into	   the	   autonomic	  system	  and	  modulates	  the	  observer’s	  heart	  rate	  and	  respiration	  (Mulder,	  de	  Vries	  &	  Zijlstra,	  2005;	  Decety,	  Jeannerod,	  Durozard	  &	  Baverel,	  1993).	  What	   kind	   of	   advantages	   does	   such	   intimate	   motor	   knowledge	   offer?	   Motor	  simulations	   deliver	   fine-­‐grained	   predictions	   with	   respect	   to	   the	   perceptual	  consequences	  of	  another’s	  action	  and	  in	  real-­‐time	  (Wilson	  &	  Knoblich,	  2005).	  Such	  anticipated	  effects	  serve	  to	  inform	  individuals’	  action	  plans	  and	  allow	  them	  to	  make	  the	  necessary	  adjustments	  in	  performance.	  For	  example,	  when	  my	  friend	  raises	  her	  hand	   in	   anger	   (because	   I	   dropped	   the	   sugar	   packet	   and	   we’re	   covered	   in	   caster	  sugar)	  owing	   to	  my	  proficiency	   in	  predicting	  exactly	  when	  and	  where	  her	  hand	   is	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going	  to	   land	  I	  can	  duck	  down	  at	  the	  right	  moment	  to	  save	  my	  face.	  Thanks	  to	  my	  motor	   system	   that	   computes	   the	   force	   involved	   I	   can	   also	   anticipate	   the	   pain	   the	  slap	  would	   cause	  me.	   An	   interesting	   question	   is	  whether	   and	   how	   simulating	   the	  effort	  involved	  in	  an	  observed	  action	  might	  relate	  to	  empathic	  responses.	  Would	  an	  observer	   simulate	   the	   pain	   that	   is	   associated	   by	   exertion	   in	   the	   absence	   of	  perceptual	  information	  about	  emotional	  expressions	  of	  the	  observed	  person?	  	  What	   other	   information	   can	   individuals	   derive	   about	   the	   observed	   actions	   by	  simulating	   them?	   An	   ongoing	   debate	   that	   initially	   started	   with	   the	   discovery	   of	  mirror	   neurons	   has	   been	   on	   the	   role	   of	   action	   matching	   in	   understanding	   the	  intentions	  of	  observed	  actions.	  One	  account	  asserts	  that	  through	  the	  direct	  matching	  process	   that	   activates	   the	  mirror	   system	  we	   can	   understand	   actions	   (Rizzolatti	   &	  Sinigaglia,	   2010;	  Gallese,	  Rochat,	   Cossu	  &	   Sinigaglia,	   2009).	   The	  opposing	   account	  argues	   that	   understanding	   is	   an	   inferential	   process	   that	   involves	   functional	   and	  neural	   computations	   that	   are	   beyond	  mirroring	   (Gergely,	   2007).	   Recent	   evidence	  supports	   the	   latter.	   The	   most	   likely	   reasons	   behind	   actions	   can	   be	   computed	   by	  direct	   matching	   through	   integrating	   the	   observed	   kinematics	   and	   the	   contextual	  cues	  to	  generate	  predictions	  that	  are	  continuously	  tested	  as	  the	  action	  unfolds	  until	  a	   hypothesis	   is	   confirmed	   (Kilner,	   Friston	   &	   Frith,	   2007;	   Rizzolatti	   &	   Sinigaglia,	  2010;	  Iacoboni,	  Molnar-­‐Szakacs,	  Gallese,	  Buccino	  &	  Mazziotta	  et	  al.,	  2005).	  However,	  when	   the	   actions	   appear	   ‘implausible’	   given	   particular	   contextual	   cues,	   neural	  regions	   associated	   with	   mentalizing	   are	   recruited	   (Brass,	   Schmitt,	   Spengler	   &	  Gergely,	  2007;	  de	  Lange	  et	  al.,	  2008;	  Wheatley,	  Millville	  &	  Marvin,	  2007).	  	  These	   findings	   imply	   that	   understanding	   observed	   behaviour	   involves	   a	  complementary	   interaction	   between	   the	   functional	   and	   neural	   mechanisms	   that	  subserve	  mirroring	  and	  those	  that	  subserve	  mentalizing.	  This	  might	  entail	  attaching	  the	   activated	   motor	   representation,	   which	   is	   thought	   to	   be	   agent-­‐neutral	   (Frith,	  2007),	   to	   an	   agent.	   In	   line	   with	   this	   reasoning,	   a	   particular	   computation	   that	   is	  thought	   to	   underpin	   mentalizing	   is	   the	   decoupling	   of	   perspectival	   states	   of	   the	  observer	  and	  the	  target	  agent,	  which	  differentiates	  the	  self	  from	  the	  other	  (Decety	  &	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Sommerville,	   2003;	   Ruby	   &	   Decety,	   2001;	   Roepstorff	   &	   Frith,	   2004).	   	   Self-­‐other	  differentiation	   is	   important	   not	   only	   when	   a	   bottom-­‐up	   inference	   is	   required	   to	  ascribe	   likely	   intentions	   to	  observed	  actors.	   It	  becomes	  especially	   critical	   in	   social	  interactions	   where	   one	   has	   to	   inhibit	   the	   mirroring	   activation	   in	   selection	   of	   an	  appropriate	   course	   of	   action.	   The	   next	   part	   of	   the	   thesis	   addressed	   social	  interactions	  with	  a	  focus	  on	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  automatic	  sensorimotor	  mechanisms	  and	   higher	   level	   thought	   processes	   reciprocally	   influence	   each	   other	   to	   optimize	  predictions	  in	  support	  of	  the	  social	  interaction.	  	  
Task	  sharing	  and	  memory	  encoding	  The	  study	  described	  in	  Chapter	  4	  examined	  a	  participatory	  case	  of	  social	  perception,	  addressing	  the	  particular	  question	  of	  how	  representing	  another’s	  goal	  can	  modulate	  individual	  cognitive	  processes	  during	  an	  ongoing	  interaction.	  The	  particular	  context	  captured	  is	  a	  common	  case	  of	   interaction	  between	  two	  people	  who	  perform	  a	  task	  alongside	  one	  another.	  Previous	  work	  on	  task	  sharing	  has	  shown	  that	  when	  people	  perform	  two	  independent	  halves	  of	  a	  task	  they	  form	  representations	  that	  detail	  not	  only	  their	  own	  part	  of	  the	  task,	  but	  also	  the	  part	  of	  their	  interaction	  partner’s	  (e.g.	  Sebanz	   et	   al.,	   2003;	   2005;	   Atmaca	   et	   al.,	   2011).	   Individuals	   take	   into	   account	   the	  specific	   features	   of	   a	   stimulus	   that	   require	   the	   other	   to	   act	   upon,	   as	  well	   as	   their	  visuo-­‐spatial	  perspectives	  (Boeckler	  et	  al.,	  2011;	  Samson	  et	  al.,	  2010)	  or	  attentional	  relations	  with	  the	  stimuli	  (Boeckler,	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  This,	  in	  turn,	  influences	  a	  range	  of	  online	   processes	   including	   prediction	   and	   monitoring	   during	   the	   ensuing	  interaction	  (Ramnani	  &	  Miall,	  2003,	  Schuh	  &	  Tipper,	  2007;	  de	  Bruijn	  et	  al.,	  2009),	  and	  stimulus	  processing.	  The	  study	  in	  Chapter	  4	  demonstrated	  that	  representing	  a	  co-­‐actor’s	  task	  also	  influences	  processes	  of	  memory	  encoding.	  Information	  that	  was	  strictly	   relevant	   for	   the	   co-­‐actor	  was	  encoded	  even	   though	   it	  was	  not	   relevant	   for	  the	  purposes	  of	  one’s	  own	  task	  performance.	  	  These	   findings	   contribute	   to	   the	   understanding	   of	   social	   influences	   on	   memory.	  Research	   on	   collaborative	   memory	   (e.g.	   Basden	   et	   al.,	   2000;	   Rajaram	   &	   Pereira-­‐Passarin,	   2007;	   Weldon	   &	   Belringer,	   1997,	   Basden,	   Basden	   &	   Henry,	   2000)	   and	  
•	  	  	  	  CHAPTER	  6	  	  	  	  •	  	  	  	  SUMMARY	  &	  GENERAL	  DISCUSSION	  	  	  	  •	  
	   121	  
memory	   conformity	   (Wright	   &	   Schwartz,	   2010)	   has	   demonstrated	   how	  remembering	   information	   together	   with	   others	   reshapes	   memories.	   The	   study	  reported	   in	   Chapter	   4,	   by	   manipulating	   the	   social	   context	   during	   encoding	   of	  information,	   demonstrated	   that	   effects	   of	   social	   interaction	   on	   memory	   are	   not	  restricted	  to	  retrieval,	  but	  also	  influence	  encoding.	  Most	  importantly,	  it	  showed	  that	  even	  when	   individuals	   do	   not	   need	   to	   pay	   attention	   to	   each	   other’s	   stimuli,	   a	   co-­‐actor	   can	  affect	  memory	  performance.	  This	   suggests	   that	   social	   effects	  of	  memory	  can	   occur	   even	   when	   people	   do	   not	   have	   the	   shared	   goal	   to	   retrieve	   or	   encode	  information	   together.	  An	   intriguing	  question	   is	  how	  would	   the	   results	   change	  had	  the	   individuals	  been	  asked	   to	  perform	   together?	  Research	  on	   transactive	  memory	  (Wegner,	  1986;	  Wegner	  et	  al.,	  1991)	  shows	  that	  when	  individuals	  act	  as	  a	  pair	  with	  a	  common	  goal	  to	  learn	  a	  material	  together,	  they	  distribute	  the	  material	  across	  the	  individuals	  as	  a	  strategy	  to	  maximize	  resources	  and	  recall	  performance.	  Would	  task-­‐sharing	  individuals	  still	  encode	  their	  co-­‐actor’s	  information	  in	  a	  cooperative	  context,	  or	   would	   they	   be	   able	   to	   inhibit	   this	   involuntary	   mechanism	   for	   the	   sake	   of	   the	  group?	  This	  hypothesis	  has	  yet	  to	  be	  tested.	  The	   findings	   of	   the	   study	   also	   add	   to	   the	   previous	  work	   on	   co-­‐representation	   by	  demonstrating	  that	  co-­‐representation	  effects	  are	  not	  restricted	  to	  online	  processes.	  As	   revealed	   by	   two	   experiments,	   individuals	   recalled	   the	   stimuli	   that	   required	   an	  interaction	  partner	  to	  act	  better	  than	  the	  stimuli	   that	  required	  nobody	  to	  act.	  This	  suggests	   that,	   representing	   the	   co-­‐actors	   task	   rendered	   information	   relevant	   for	  them	   also	   relevant	   for	   oneself	   and	   enhanced	   encoding	   of	   the	   information,	   even	  though	   this	   was	   unnecessary	   for	   one’s	   performance	   of	   the	   task.	   	   Surprisingly,	  processing	   the	   co-­‐actor’s	   information	   did	   not	   come	   at	   a	   cost	   to	   individuals’	   own	  memory	   performance.	   As	   clearly	   demonstrated	   in	   Experiment	   2,	   even	   though	   the	  monetary	   incentive	   motivated	   individuals	   to	   allocate	   all	   resources	   to	   learning	   of	  their	  own	  stimuli,	  the	  recall	  rate	  for	  other-­‐relevant	  information	  remained	  the	  same	  with	  that	  in	  Experiment	  1.	  This	  indicates	  not	  only	  that	  individuals	  could	  not	  help	  but	  learn	  each	  other’s	  information,	  but	  also	  it	  did	  not	  tax	  their	  memory	  processing	  of	  the	  stimuli.	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This	   finding	   seems	   to	   conflict	   with	   the	   previous	   findings	   in	   task-­‐sharing	   studies,	  where	   co-­‐representation	  was	   found	   to	   interfere	  with	   individual	  processing	  and	   to	  result	   in	   a	   slowing	   down	   of	   reaction	   times.	   Although	   the	   exact	   mechanisms	  underlying	   this	   effect	   are	   not	   yet	   fully	   understood,	   a	   recent	   account	   compellingly	  suggests	   that	   self-­‐other	   discrimination	   could	   be	   a	   potential	   answer	   (Wenke	   et	   al.,	  2011).	   Representing	   a	   co-­‐actor	   as	   another	   agent	   with	   a	   perspective	   (visual	   or	  mental)	   different	   from	   one’s	   own	   is	   likely	   to	   be	   resource	   consuming	   when	   the	  stimulus	   or	   the	   required	   response	   presents	   a	   conflict	   that	   one	   has	   to	   resolve.	   In	  particular,	  costs	  will	  occur	  when	  one	  needs	  to	  juxtapose	  two	  perspectival	  states	  (of	  self	   and	   of	   the	   other)	   in	   order	   to	   resolve	   a	   present	   conflict	   in	   selecting	   the	  appropriate	   course	   of	   action	   (Samson	   et	   al.	   2010,	   Qureishi,	   Apperly	   &	   Samson,	  2010).	   If	   this	   need	   is	   not	   present	   we	   can	   spontaneously	   and	   efficiently	   compute	  others’	   visuo-­‐spatial	   perspectives	   (Samson	   et	   al.,	   2010)	   and	   belief-­‐like	   states	  (Kovacs	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  In	  the	  experiments	  reported	  in	  Chapter	  4	  of	  this	  thesis,	  when	  responding	  to	  the	  stimuli,	   there	  was	  no	  need	  to	  resolve	  a	  conflict	   to	   interfere	  with	  individual	  processing	  and	  therefore,	  no	  need	  to	  decouple	  self	  from	  the	  other.	  Thus,	  just	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  computing	  perspectives	  and	  belief-­‐like	  states,	  individuals	  may	  have	   implicitly	   coded	   the	   information	   that	  was	   relevant	   for	  another,	   and	   this	  may	  have	  enhanced	  the	  encoding	  processes.	  	  In	   summary,	   this	   study	  has	   contributed	   to	   joint	   action	   research	  by	  demonstrating	  that	  when	  individuals	  act	  together	  to	  perform	  different	  parts	  of	  a	  task,	  they	  cannot	  help	   but	   encode	   the	   information	   their	   partner	   is	   processing.	   In	   general,	   co-­‐representation	  mechanisms	  serve	   individuals	  by	  constraining	   the	  predictions	   they	  generate	   whilst	   trying	   to	   interpret	   other	   people’s	   behaviour	   (Ramnani	   &	   Miall.	  2003).	   Knowing	   in	   advance	   what	   the	   other	   is	   intending	   to	   do	   prevents	   one’s	  predictions	   from	   running	   wild	   with	   infinite	   degrees	   of	   freedom,	   thereby	   aiding	  understanding.	  Co-­‐representation	  can	  also	  aid	   social	   interactions,	   albeit	   indirectly.	  Representing	   another’s	   task,	   how	   they	   relate	   to	   the	   information	   in	   terms	   of	  what	  they	  intend	  to	  do	  (e.g.	  Sebanz	  et	  al.,	  2003;	  2005),	  or	  how	  they	  perceive	  it	  (Boeckler	  et	   al.	   2012)	   provide	   a	   common	   ground	   between	   individuals	   as	   a	   foundation	   for	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understanding	   each	   other’s	   behaviour	   (Clark,	   1996;	   Garrod	   &	   Pickering,	   2004;	  Sebanz	   et	   al.,	   2006b)	   thus	   facilitating	   the	   progression	   of	   social	   interactions.	   The	  findings	  of	  the	  study	  demonstrate	  that	  acting	  together	  can	  be	  a	  means	  to	  maintain	  such	   a	   common	   ground	   because	   remembering	   information	   that	   is	   relevant	   for	   an	  interaction	   partner	   can	   contribute	   to	   the	   formation	   of	   shared	   knowledge	   systems	  (Shteynberg,	  2010).	  	  
Observing	  social	  interactions	  and	  ascribed	  shared	  intentionality	  The	   third	   and	   the	   final	   section	   of	   the	   thesis	   brought	   into	   focus	   the	   processes	  underlying	   observation	   of	   social	   interactions	   that	   take	   place	   between	   other	  individuals.	  The	  available	  findings	  suggest	  that,	  much	  like	  the	  sensitivity	  we	  have	  for	  others’	  actions	  and	  intentions,	  we	  have	  a	  similar	  sensitivity	  towards	  other	  people’s	  intentions	  in	  relation	  to	  one	  another.	  For	  example,	  we	  detect	  contingencies	  between	  the	  movement	   trajectories	  of	  different	  arbitrary	  objects	   (for	  a	  review	  see	  Scholl	  &	  Tremoulet,	  2000)	  and	  attribute	  elaborate	  mental	  states	  to	  them	  (Schultz,	  Imamizu,	  Kawato	  &	  Frith,	  2004;	  Schultz,	  Friston,	  O’Doherty,	  Wolpert	  &	  Frith,	  2005).	  Perceived	  contingency	  can	  elicit	  in	  the	  observer	  a	  tendency	  to	  ascribe	  intentions	  to	  the	  objects	  that	  relate	  them	  to	  each	  other	  (Lakens,	  2010;	  Lakens	  &	  Stel,	  2011;	  Ip,	  Chiu	  &	  Wan,	  2006).	   In	   particular,	  we	   tend	   to	   think	   that	   if	   agents	  move	   together,	   they	  must	   be	  moving	  with	  a	  shared	  intention	  to	  do	  so	  (Ip	  et	  al.,	  2006).	  To	  corroborate	  this	  finding	  recent	   studies	   have	   shown	   that	   observing	   contingent	   actions	   performed	   by	   two	  individuals	   elicits	   neural	   activity	   in	   regions	   that	   are	   associated	  with	  mental	   state	  reasoning	  (i.e.	  medial	  prefontal	  cortex,	  MPFC)	  (1,	  Centelles	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  The	  findings	  sketched	  above	  indicate	  that	  we	  have	  a	  propensity	  to	  detect	  relations	  between	   agents	   and	  perceive	   them	  as	   a	   unit	   that	   acts	  with	   a	   goal	   common	   to	   the	  involved	   agents.	   This	   could	   imply	   that	  much	   like	   the	   intentional	   stance	  we	   adopt	  when	   observing	   individual	   agents,	   we	   may	   well	   have	   a	   tendency	   to	   take	   an	  ‘intentional	  stance’	  (Dennett,	  1996)	  when	  observing	  a	  group	  of	  people	  who	  appear	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Unpublished data collected in collaboration with Cordula Vesper, Janeen Loehr and Floris de Lange. 
Manuscript is in preparation.  
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to	  be	  socially	  engaged	  (Pettit,	  2009).	  The	  intentional	  stance	  is	  thought	  to	  serve	  as	  an	  interpretive	   heuristic	   in	   explaining	   behaviour	   by	   establishing	   a	   set	   of	   predictions	  with	   respect	   to	   how	   that	   behaviour	   should	   ensue.	   Such	   a	   heuristic	   could	   also	   be	  applied	  to	  social	  interactions	  of	  other	  people.	  Then,	  a	  top-­‐down	  modulation	  should	  be	   expected	   in	   processing	   the	   sensory	   features	   of	   the	   observed	   interaction.	   The	  results	  found	  in	  the	  study	  described	  in	  Chapter	  5	  support	  this	  hypothesis.	  This	  study	  specifically	   asked	   how	   advance	   knowledge	   pertaining	   to	   the	   intentional	   relations	  between	   interacting	   individuals	   (shared	   intentions	   compared	   to	   multiple	   parallel	  intentions)	   would	   exploit	   and	   constrain	   neural	   processing	   of	   the	   observed	  interaction.	   The	   differential	   neural	   response	   noted	   in	   lateral	   frontal	   regions	   (i.e.	  middle	   and	   superior	   frontal	   gyri,	   and	   the	   frontal	   pole)	   suggest	   that	   observed	  interactions	   that	   are	   based	   on	   a	   shared	   intention	   may	   be	   perceived	   as	   more	  interdependent	   than	   observed	   interactions	   that	   comprise	   multiple	   individual	  intentions.	  Thus,	  it	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  the	  ascribed	  intentional	  relation	  created	  a	  set	   of	   expectations	   in	   the	   observer,	   which	   manipulated	   how	   the	   actions	   of	   two	  people	  were	  perceived.	  Further	  behavioural	  and	  neuroimaging	  studies	  are	  required	  to	   scrutinize	   this	   interpretation	   and	   to	   specifically	   test	   if	   the	   action	   streams	   of	  interacting	  individuals	  are	  perceived	  as	  interlocked	  and	  hierarchically	  organized.	  	  The	   results	   are	   particularly	   significant	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   underlying	   processes	  associated	   with	   mental	   state	   reasoning.	   When	   interacting	   with	   others,	  representations	   that	   are	   related	   to	   ‘self’,	   and	   representations	   that	   are	   related	   to	  ‘other’	   need	   to	   remain	   differentiated	   in	   order	   for	   the	   interaction	   to	   progress.	  However,	   in	  particular	  cases	  of	   social	   interaction	  where	   individuals	  have	  a	   shared	  intention	   to	   achieve	   a	   certain	   goal,	   a	   group	   level	   representation	  may	   emerge.	   For	  example,	  back	   in	   the	  kitchen	  we	   (my	   friend	  and	   I)	  are	  making	  Turkish	  delight.	  Or,	  
they	  (the	  English	  national	  football	  team)	  are	  playing	  against	  Portugal.	  Attributing	  a	  unified	   ‘they’	   intention	   in	   addition	   to	   attributing	   individual	   intentions	   to	   the	  observed	  individuals	  could	  impose	  a	  higher	  load	  on	  mental	  state	  processes	  that	  are	  recruited	  when	  observing	  an	  interaction	  that	  involves	  a	  shared	  intention.	  However,	  the	  results	  of	  the	  current	  study	  do	  not	  support	  this	  hypothesis.	  A	  differential	  signal	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change	  in	  the	  MPFC	  was	  not	  noted	  during	  the	  observation	  of	  interactions	  based	  on	  a	  shared	   intention	   compared	   to	   the	   observation	   of	   multiple	   independent	   actions,	  suggesting	   a	   lack	   of	   difference	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   neural	   computations	   underlying	  mental	   state	   representations.	   MPFC	   has	   been	   implicated	   in	   theory-­‐of-­‐mind	  processing	   as	   supporting	   the	   decoupling	   of	   perspectival	   states	   of	   individuals	  (Gallagher	  &	  Frith,	  2003;	  Frith,	  2007).	  Accordingly,	  the	  lack	  of	  differential	  activity	  in	  this	   region	   implies	   that	   in	   both	   social	   instances	   the	   observed	   individuals	   are	  represented	   separately	  with	   their	   respective	  mental	   states,	   whether	   their	   actions	  are	  interlocked	  or	  not.	  	  A	  further	  finding	  was	  that	  observing	  interactions	  based	  on	  shared	  intentions	  evoked	  increased	   activation	   in	   the	   nucleus	   accumbens,	   bilaterally.	   Extending	   on	   previous	  neuroimaging	   studies	   that	   detected	   activity	   in	   these	   areas	   when	   people	   were	  engaged	  in	  online	  social	  interactions	  (such	  as	  in	  cooperation,	  e.g.	  Rilling	  et	  al.,	  2002,	  McCabe	   et	   al.,	   2011),	   the	   findings	   suggest	   that	   observing	   others	   perform	   joint	  actions	  may	   be	   as	   rewarding	   as	   being	   engaged	   in	   performing	   a	   joint	   action	   with	  others.	   As	   argued	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter,	   this	   possibly	   reflects	   a	   resonance	  with	  those	  observed	  and	  one’s	  past	  experiences.	  To	  our	  knowledge,	  this	  is	  the	  first	  study	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  performing	  actions	  together	  based	  on	  shared	  intentions	  creates	  a	   rewarding	   experience	  not	   only	   in	   those	  who	  are	   engaged	   in	   the	   interaction,	   but	  also	   in	   those	   that	   are	   passively	   observing	   it.	   This	   raises	   the	   question	   of	  why	   this	  would	  be	  the	  case?	  What	  could	  be	  the	  reward	  value	  in	  observing	  social	  interactions?	  Perhaps	   the	   rewarding	   experience	  we	   attribute	   to	   those	  we	   observe	   are	  mapped	  onto	  our	  own	  experiences	   that	  we	  have	  previously	  acquired	  during	  our	   first	  hand	  social	  interactions	  (Barresi	  &	  Moore,	  1996).	  Such	  a	  response	  might	  further	  reinforce	  our	  motivation	  to	  engage	  in	  shared	  experiences	  with	  others	  (Tomasello	  et	  al.,	  2005),	  and	  facilitate	  subsequent	  prosocial	  behaviours	  (Tomasello,	  Carpenter,	  Call,	  Behne	  &	  Moll,	  2005).	  It	  may	  also	  serve	  as	  a	  means	  to	  learn	  information	  that	  is	  not	  available	  when	  observing	  others	  in	  isolation,	  thereby	  facilitating	  cultural	  transmission	  of	  joint	  practices.	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Conclusion	  As	  humans,	  we	  are	   inherently	  tuned	   in	  with	  others.	  Owing	  to	  our	  acute	  sensitivity	  towards	   others’	   actions,	   perceptual	   or	  mental	   perspectives,	   and	   interactions	  with	  other	  people,	  we	   are	   able	   to	   explain	   their	   behaviour	  with	   remarkable	   ease.	  There	  are	   many	   processes	   that	   offer	   us	   access	   into	   the	   minds	   of	   others,	   and	   different	  aspects	  of	  social	  interactions	  can	  invoke	  them.	  This	  thesis	  reported	  investigations	  of	  three	   such	   mechanisms	   of	   social	   perceptions	   in	   different	   social	   contexts.	   Action	  perception	  coupling	  and	  motor	  simulation	  mechanisms	  allow	  one	   to	  automatically	  track	   and	   process	   the	   actions	   of	   another	   person	   by	   producing	   finely	   specified	  predictions	   into	   the	   future	   of	   the	   observed	   actions	   (Chapter	   2,	   3).	   Shared	   task	  representations	   that	   arise	   when	   performing	   a	   task	   jointly	   with	   another	   person,	  provide	  a	  means	  to	  implicitly	  track	  and	  process	  the	  goals	  of	  that	  person.	  Shared	  task	  representations	   also	   modulate	   the	   processing	   of	   the	   information	   that	   others	   are	  encoding	   (Chapter	   4).	   Finally,	   when	   observing	   social	   interactions	   taking	   place	  between	   other	   people,	   explicit	   mentalizing	   processes	   allow	   us	   to	   attribute	  intentions	   and	   intentional	   states	   to	   the	   observed	   individuals.	   This	   in	   turn	   can	  modulate	  action	  perception	  processes	  	  (Chapter	  5).	  Understanding	  the	  mechanisms	  of	  social	  perception	  is	  key	  to	  understanding	  what	  is	  unique	   in	   the	   way	   humans	   cooperate.	   Cooperation	   in	   essence	   is	   interlocking	   of	  individuals’	   actions,	   goals	   and	   intentions.	   It	   is	   eventuated	  by	   the	  negotiations	   that	  take	  place	  between	  the	  individual	  cognitive	  mechanisms	  and	  the	  demands	  of	  social	  interactions	   that	   are	   situated	   in	   an	   infinitely	   complex	   social	  world.	   If	   there	   is	   one	  vital	  component	  for	  such	  negotiations	  to	  so	  much	  as	  launch,	  it	  is	  the	  proficiency	  with	  which	   individuals	   can	   justify	   and	   predict	   other	   people’s	   behaviour.	   Research	   on	  Social	   Cognition	   and	   Social	   Neuroscience	   has	   accumulated	   a	   wealth	   of	   insight	   in	  understanding	  how	  we	  do	  this.	  So	  far,	  the	  investigations	  have	  focused	  on	  the	  ‘other’	  as	   an	   individual.	   Investigating	   how	   we	   read	   the	   behaviour	   of	   the	   ‘others’	   as	   a	  collective	  would	  be	  a	  worthwhile	  next	  step	  in	  the	  endeavor.	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Nederlandse	  	  Samenvatting	  	  	  	  De	   vraag	   die	   in	   dit	   proefschrift	   centraal	   staat,	   is	   hoe	   individuele	   cognitieve	   en	  neurale	   processen	  waarneming	   en	   begrip	   van	   het	   gedrag	   van	   een	   iemand	   anders	  ondersteunen.	   In	   vier	   hoofdtukken	   wordt	   verslag	   gedaan	   van	   vier	   studies	   naar	  processen	  van	  sociale	  perceptie,	  gebruikmakend	  van	  drie	  verschillende	  vormen	  van	  sociale	   interactie	  of	  sociale	  context,	  namelijk	  het	  observeren	  van	  de	  acties	  van	  een	  individu	  (hoofdstukken	  2	  en	  3),	  het	  interacteren	  met	  een	  ander	  individu	  om	  samen	  een	   taak	   uit	   te	   voeren	   (hoofdstuk	   4),	   en	   het	   observeren	   van	   sociale	   interactie	  (hoofdstuk	  5).	  
Hoofdstukken	  2	  en	  3	  gaan	  over	  de	  vraag	  of	  individuele	  motorische	  processen	  en	  de	  daarbij	  behorende	  neurale	  processen	  bijdragen	  aan	  de	  perceptie	  van	  de	  acties	  van	  een	   ander	   individu.	   In	   twee	   studies	   werd	   een	   observatie	   versie	   van	   Fitts’	   taak	  gebruikt.	   Proefpersonen	   werd	   gevraagd	   een	   geobserveerde	   herhaalde	   beweging	  tussen	  twee	  identiek	  grote	  doelen	  te	  beoordelen.	  De	  grootte	  en	  de	  afstand	  tussen	  de	  twee	  doelen	  werd	  gemanipuleerd.	  	  Volgens	  de	  wet	  van	  Fitts,	  worden	  de	  moeilijkheid	  en	  de	  tijd	  om	  de	  beweging	  uit	   te	  voeren	  bepaald	  door	  een	  constante	  die	  de	  relatie	  weergeeft	   van	   de	   grootte	   van	   de	   doelen	   ten	   opzichte	   van	   de	   afstand	   ertussenin	  (bewegingsamplitude).	  
Hoofdstuk	   2	   onderzocht	   of	   en	   hoe	   een	   selectieve	   aandoening	   wat	   betreft	   de	  uitvoering	  van	  een	  actie	  ook	  waarneembaar	  is	  de	  perceptie	  van	  diezelfde	  actie.	  Een	  neuropsychologische	   patiënt	   met	   een	   lesie	   in	   zijn	   linker	   motor	   schors	   liet	   een	  schending	   van	   de	   wet	   van	   Fitts	   zien	   in	   de	   uitvoering	   en	   waarneming	   van	   acties.	  Vanwege	  de	  neurale	  beschadiging,	  leek	  het	  motor	  systeem	  van	  de	  patiënt	  niet	  goed	  te	   kunnen	   omgaan	   met	   integratie	   van	   informatie	   voor	   het	   uitvoeren	   van	   een	  beweging.	  We	  beargumenteren	  dat	  de	  stoornis	  in	  het	  motor	  systeem	  de	  oorzaak	  is	  van	  dezelfde	  waargenomen	  schending	  in	  de	  actie	  waarneming	  van	  de	  patiënt.	  	  
Hoofstuk	   3	   beschrijft	   een	   functionele	   kernspintomografie	   (fMRI)	   studie	  waarmee	  werd	   onderzocht	   of	   de	   parameters	   die	   zuiver	   motorisch	   en	   niet	   direct	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waarneembaar	   zijn	   de	   neurale	   gebieden	   aandrijven	   die	   uitvoering	   van	   acties	  ondersteunen	   tijdens	   de	   observatie	   van	   dezelfde	   acties	   in	   anderen.	   In	   eenzelfde	  actie	   perceptie	   paradigma	   als	   beschreven	   in	   Hoofdstuk	   2,	   werd	   de	   graad	   van	   de	  moeilijkheid	   van	   de	   geobserveerde	   bewegingen	   (de	   wet	   van	   Fitts)	   systematisch	  gemanipuleerd	  terwijl	  gecontroleerd	  werd	  voor	  perceptuele	  aspecten.	  De	  resultaten	  laten	  een	   stijging	   in	  het	  BOLD	  signaal	   zien	   in	  gebieden	   in	  het	  brein	  die	  betrokken	  zijn	  bij	  uitvoering	  van	  acties	  in	  reactie	  op	  toenemende	  motorische	  moeilijkheid	  van	  de	  geobserveerde	  bewegingen.	  Deze	  gebieden	  omvatten	  de	  primaire	  motor	   cortex	  (M1),	   de	   supplementaire	   motorische	   schors	   (SMA),	   en	   de	   globus	   pallidus	   van	   de	  basale	   ganglia	   (BG).	   Het	   is	   essentieel	   dat	   de	   perceptuele	   aspecten	   van	   de	  geobserveerde	  bewegingen	   (oftewel,	   variërende	  niveaus	  van	  de	  doelgrootte	   en	  de	  bewegingsamplitude)	  geen	  signaalverandering	  lieten	  zien	  in	  de	  deze	  gebieden.	  	  Deze	  bevindingen,	  in	  combinatie	  met	  de	  bevindingen	  uit	  Hoofdstuk	  2,	  laten	  duidelijk	  zien	   dat	   de	   perceptie	   van	   een	   actie	   direct	   gekoppeld	   is	   aan	   de	   motorische	  representaties	   die	   iemands	   uitvoering	   van	   dezelfde	   actie	   bepalen.	  Het	  motorische	  systeem	  bepaalt	  niet	  alleen	  de	  uitvoering	  van	  de	  actie,	  maar	  is	  ook	  direct	  betrokken	  bij	  de	  actie	  waarneming	  alsmede	  andere	  manieren	  van	  motorische	  simulaties	  die	  de	  gedetailleerde	  informatie	  over	  motorische	  paramaters	  opereren	  tijdens	  uitvoering.	  	  	  
Hoofdstuk	   4	   beschrijft	   hoe	   individuele	   verwerking	   beïnvloed	   wordt	   door	   de	  representatie	   van	   iemand	   anders’	   doel	   tijdens	   sociale	   interactie.	   Meer	   specifiek	  werd	  in	  twee	  experimenten	  onderzocht	  of	  en	  hoe	  de	  representatie	  van	  de	  taak	  van	  een	  ander	  tijdens	  een	  gezamenlijke	  taak	  leidde	  tot	  verschillen	  in	  informatie	  tussen	  proefpersonen	   	   tijdens	   geheugen	   encodering.	   Twee	   proefpersonen	   voerden	   een	  woord	  categorisatie	   taak	  uit.	   Ze	   reageerden	  op	  de	  woorden	  uit	  de	   categorieën	  die	  individueel	  aan	  hun	  waren	  toegewezen.	  De	  	  proefpersonen	  voerden	  de	  taak	  eenmaal	  alleen	   uit,	   en	   eenmaal	   samen	   met	   hun	   partner.	   Daarna	   werd	   in	   een	  onaangekondigde	  vrije	  herinningstaak	  getest	  hoe	  goed	  ze	  de	  woorden	   	  onthouden	  hadden.	  De	  resultaten	  van	  het	  eerste	  experiment	  lieten	  zien	  dat	  proefpersonen	  ook	  items	  hadden	  onthouden	  die	  toegewezen	  waren	  aan	  hun	  partner,	  hoewel	  deze	  niet	  relevant	   waren	   voor	   hun	   eigen	   prestatie.	   In	   het	   tweede	   experiment	   werd	  proefpersonen	   verteld	   dat	   ze	   een	   geldelijke	   beloning	   zouden	   krijgen	   om	   items	   te	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onthouden	   die	   tot	   de	   hun	   toegewezen	  woordcategorie	   behoorden.	   In	   een	   geleide	  herinneringstaak	  werd	  hun	  gevraagd	  om	  items	  te	  herinneren	  uit	  alle	  categorieën.	  De	  resultaten	   waren	   in	   overeenstemming	   met	   de	   bevindingen	   van	   het	   eerste	  experiment	  en	  lieten	  verder	  zien	  dat	  het	  onthouden	  van	  items	  die	  niet	  relevant	  zijn	  voor	   de	   eigen	   prestatie,	   geen	   negatieve	   invloed	   had.	   Proefpersonen	   herinnerden	  items	  die	  aan	  hun	  partner	  waren	  toegewezen	  hoewel	  ze	  hier	  niet	  toe	  aangespoord	  waren.	  
Hoofdstuk	   5	   beschrijft	   de	   toewijzing	   van	   gedeelde	   intenties	   aan	   geobserveerde	  interacties.	   In	  een	  fMRI	  studie	  werd	  onderzocht	  of	  sociale	   interacties	  die	  gedreven	  worden	  door	  gedeelde	  intenties	  op	  neuraal	  niveau	  anders	  verwerkt	  worden	  dan	  de	  onafhankelijke	   acties	   van	   meerdere	   individuen.	   Met	   behulp	   van	   een	   observatie	  paradigma	  werden	  videos	  van	  handelingen	  gepresenteerd.	  De	  handelingen	  werden	  uitgevoerd	  door	   twee	  acteurs	  en	  zagen	  er	   identiek	  uit,	  maar	  vonden	  plaats	   in	  een	  verschillende	  context	  die	  bepaalde	  of	  de	  acteurs	  de	  actie	  samen	  zouden	  uitvoeren	  of	  niet.	   Voor	   het	   zien	   van	   de	   video,	   luisterden	   de	   proefpersonen	   naar	   een	   dialoog	  tussen	  de	  acteurs	  die	  de	  intentionele	  relaties	  duidelijk	  maakte	  in	  de	  daaropvolgende	  interactie	   (ofwel	   een	  gedeelde	   intentie	  ofwel	   een	  parallel	   onafhankelijke	   intentie).	  De	  resultaten	   lieten	  zien	  dat	  de	  observaties	  van	   interacties	  gebaseerd	  op	  gedeelde	  intenties	   zorgden	   voor	   verhoogde	   activatie	   in	   hersengebieden	   zoals	   de	   temporale	  polen,	   de	   precuneus	   en	   het	   ventrale	   striatum	   in	   vergelijking	   met	   de	   observaties	  gebaseerd	   op	   parallelle	   intenties.	   De	   precuneus	   en	   de	   temporale	   polen	   worden	  geassocieerd	  met	  mentalisatie;	   het	   ventrale	   striatum	   heeft	   een	   specifiekere	   rol	   in	  het	   ophalen	   van	   herinneringen	   in	   relatie	   tot	   sociale	   scripts.	   Mentalisatie	  gerelateerde	  computaties	  spelen	  daarom	  ook	  een	  belangrijke	  rol	  in	  het	  identificeren	  van	  sociale	  interacties.	  De	  waargenomen	  activatie	  in	  het	  ventrale	  striatum,	  met	  haar	  vastgestelde	  rol	  in	  het	  verwerken	  van	  primaire	  alsmede	  sociale	  beloningen,	  zou	  een	  indicatie	  kunnen	  zijn	  van	  een	  belonende	  ervaring	  in	  de	  waarnemer,	  die	  veroorzaakt	  wordt	  door	  de	  observatie	  van	  sociale	  interacties	  gebaseerd	  op	  gedeelde	  intenties.	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   and	   Günther	   (a.k.a.	   the	  bosses).	   I	  started	  working	  with	  them	  in	  Birmingham.	  When	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  year	  they	  were	  moving	   to	   Nijmegen,	   they	   offered	   me	   a	   position	   and	   packed	   me	   up	   with	   the	  equipment.	   I	  cannot	  thank	  you	  enough	  for	  this	   invaluable	  opportunity	  alone…	  You	  have	   been	   much	   more	   than	   supervisors	   to	   me	   in	   the	   five	   years	   that	   we	   worked	  together.	  Your	  unrelenting	  support	  and	  guidance	  in	  matters	  of	  work	  and	  life	  (even	  when	   I	   challenged	   your	   patience),	   your	   enthusiasm	   for	   research,	   scientific	   vigour	  and	  worldly	  expertise,	  all	  of	  which	  you	  share	  so	  generously	  have	  made	  me	  grow	  in	  ways	  I	  couldn’t	  have	  imagined.	   I	   feel	   truly	   lucky	  to	  have	  been	  your	  student.	  Thank	  you	   both	   for	   making	   me	   a	   Somby,	   for	   being	   such	   exceptional	   supervisors	   and	  making	  me	  the	  researcher	  I	  am	  today.	  I	  am	  forever	  indebted.	  
I	   also	   thank	   the	   Sombies,	   for	   being	   a	   great	   group	   to	   be	   part	   of:	   Rob	   (Heimlich),	  Cordula	  (Cordy),	  Anne	  (Böckler),	  Janeen	  (Kerfuffle),	  Katie	  (Katherine),	  Vero,	  Dimitris	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(Dimi),	   Jesse	  and	  the	  others.	  Thank	  you	  for	  taking	  the	  time	  to	  discuss	  and	  help	  me	  develop	  some	  of	  the	  ideas	  presented	  in	  this	  thesis.	  Particularly	  Rob,	  you	  have	  been	  the	  best	  office-­‐mate	  ever!	  Thank	  you	  for	  putting	  up	  with	  my	  mood	  swings	  on	  a	  daily	  basis,	  for	  the	  chocolate	  hours	  and	  the	  pink	  air	  guitar	  which	  was	  a	  testament	  to	  how	  cool	  we	  used	   to	  be	  once.	  Thank	  you	  also	   for	  daring	   to	  write	  a	  paper	  with	  me	  and	  giving	  me	   the	   confidence	  when	   I	   needed.	  And	  Cordy	  with	  whom	   I	   shared	  many	   a	  laugh,	  tear,	  many	  a	  meal	  contemplating	  life,	  many	  a	  journey	  to	  different	  parts	  of	  the	  world…	  Thank	  you	  for	  sticking	  with	  me	  through	  the	  thick	  and	  thin	  of	  PhD	  life,	  even	  at	  the	  last	  stop	  of	  this	  journey	  by	  agreeing	  to	  be	  my	  paranyph.	  
I	   shall	  never	   forget	   the	  numerous	  Somby	  dinners	  we	  had	  at	  Natalie	  and	  Günther’s	  cool	  Nijmegen	  house	  with	  Natalie’s	  great	  cooking,	  the	  laughing	  fits,	  the	  never-­‐ending	  banters	  with	  Günther	  and	  a	  million	  other	  memories	  to	  be	  cherished.	  I	  felt	  very	  sad	  when	  the	  Nijmegen	  group	  dissolved	  last	  year,	  and	  I	  sure	  still	  miss	  our	  good	  days.	  
The	  project	   itself	  was	   realized	  with	   the	  help	  of	  many	  who	  deserve	  proper	   thanks.	  Glyn	  Humphreys,	  who	  gave	  me	  not	  one,	  but	  two	  opportunities	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Birmingham,	   where	   I	   gained	   most	   valuable	   experiences.	   My	   other	   collaborators,	  Marc	   Grosjean,	   our	   Fitts’	   expert,	   and	   especially	   Pia	   Rothstein,	   Shirley-­‐Ann	  Rueschemeyer	  and	  Floris	  de	  Lange,	  who	  taught	  me	  all	   I	  know	  about	   fMRI…	  Thank	  you	  all	  very	  much,	  I	  learned	  a	  lot	  from	  you!	  
I	   also	   thank	   the	   ERG	   gentlemen,	   particularly	   Pascal,	   Jeroen	   and	   Gerard,	   and	   Paul	  Gaalman,	   the	   scanner	  whisperer,	   who	   helped	  me	  with	   preparation	   of	  my	   stimuli,	  programming	  and	  testing.	  Thank	  you	  all	  for	  your	  patience	  with	  my	  fraction	  of	  a	  wit	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  ‘that	  stuff’.	  Your	  contribution	  is	  much	  appreciated.	  	  
This	  has	  certainly	  been	  a	  trying	  experience.	  I	  wouldn’t	  have	  reached	  the	  finish	  line	  had	   it	  not	  been	   for	   the	  kindness	  of	  so	  many	   friends	   I	  have	  met	  along	   the	  way	  and	  have	  become	  dear	  to	  me.	  If	  nothing	  else,	  they	  make	  the	  whole	  effort	  well	  worth	  the	  while.	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Carmel	  and	  Irit,	  and	  their	  beautiful	  children	  Roni	  and	  Amit,	  who	  opened	  their	  home	  for	  me	  in	  Birmingham	  when	  I	  moved	  there	  the	  second	  time	  around…	  I	  shall	  always	  be	  thankful	  for	  your	  extraordinary	  kindness.	  And	  when	  I	  first	  moved	  to	  Holland,	   it	  was	  Hilal	  (Hilo)	  and	  Berna	  (Bernito)	  who	  made	  the	  transition	  as	  smooth	  as	  possible.	  It	  still	  astonishes	  me	  that	  we	  were	  reunited	  in	  the	  Netherlands	  after	  10	  years	  with	  no	   contact	   after	   university	   in	   Istanbul.	   Then	   came	   along	   ‘the	   family’,	   with	   Berna,	  Ellen	  (Luci),	  Mark	  (Theodore)	  and	  now	  with	  our	  delightful	  little	  addition,	  Mischa.	  	  It	  is	  thanks	  to	  you	  that	  I	  felt	  at	  home	  in	  Nijmegen.	  Thank	  you	  for	  making	  me	  feel	  a	  part	  of	  something,	  for	  sharing	  your	  joy	  and	  wisdom	  with	  me	  whenever	  I	  needed.	  	  I	  miss	  you	  all	  very,	  very	  much.	  
Roemer	  (Boemertje)	  and	  Sybrine	  (Bree),	  the	  two	  Donders	  delights,	  who	  will	  have	  me	  remember	  Nijmegen	  with	   a	   smile…	   Thank	   you	   for	   your	   joyfulness,	   for	   being	   true	  friends	   to	  me	   from	   beginning	   till	   end,	   and	   the	   lengths	   you	   have	   gone	   to	   for	  me…	  Roemer	   has	   kindly	   agreed	   to	   be	  my	   paranymph	   and	   carried	   the	   job	   so	   efficiently	  that	  I	  recommend	  him	  to	  all!	  Sybrine,	  if	  only	  I	  could	  have	  three	  paranymphs…	  Sarah	  (the	   American),	   thank	   you	   for	   the	   lame	   sunday	   study	   dates	   that	   ended	   in	   us	  producing	  strange	  concoctions	  of	  food	  and	  watching	  suitably	  sappy	  movies.	  Heart?	  Heart.	   Thank	   you	   Judith	   (Judi)	   for	   being	   our	   wisdom	   bureau,	   for	   setting	   a	   great	  example	   for	   us	   and	   challenging	  me	   in	   clumsiness	   and	   in	   laughing	   fits.	   You	   are	   so	  missed.	  And	  Katja,	  thank	  you	  for	  sitting	  with	  me	  in	  that	  peaceful	  room	  of	  change.	  
And	   so	   many	   other	   mates;	   Sasha	   (Sashissimo),	   Wessel,	   Markus,	   Edita,	   Rasim	  (Baskan),	   Idil	   (Idilkus),	   Deniz	   (Yinyin),	   Emma	   (Cohen)…	   thank	   you	   for	   the	   long	  converastions,	  those	  that	  whatever	  lacked	  in	  substance,	  made	  up	  in	  silliness…	  It	  was	  a	  pleasure	  to	  know	  you	  all.	  I	  would	  also	  like	  to	  thank	  David	  (Osofaskdfjaslfksky)	  and	  Bulent	  (Cinar),	  my	  two	  remote	  service	  providers.	  David	  proofread	  all	  of	  this,	  fighting	  for	  the	  honourable	  cause	  against	  my	  ‘the’s	  and	  commas.	  Thank	  you	  for	  the	  calm	  of	  a	  third	   child.	  And	   thank	  you	  Cinar,	   for	  keeping	  me	   company	  over	   Skype	   in	   the	   long	  hours	  of	  many	  a	  dark	  night	  when	  we	  both	  kept	  working.	  Orit	  (Olit),	  you	  visited	  me	  every	  year,	  no	  matter	  where	  I	  was,	  and	  brought	  your	  big	  smile	  with	  you.	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Reyhan	   (Zevce)	   and	   Özge	   (Fecri),	   who	   have	   become	   true	   sisters	   to	  me	   and	  made	  everything	  worthwhile…	  Thank	  you	  both	  for	  the	  flowers,	  and	  the	  music,	  the	  bagels	  and	  the	  beans,	  the	  home	  cooked	  meals,	  the	  tears	  and	  the	  laughing	  fits	  that	  made	  us	  slip	   in	   and	   out	   of	   consciousness.	   	   You	   put	   up	  with	  me	   for	   years,	   took	   care	   of	  me	  when	  I	  was	   ill,	   sad,	  or	  stressed,	  or	  even	  when	  I	  was	  overly	  happy	   for	  who-­‐knows-­‐what	  idiotic	  reason.	  You	  clutched	  me	  back	  more	  than	  once	  when	  I	  wanted	  to	  check	  out.	  It’s	  impossible	  to	  think	  how	  it	  would	  be	  like	  in	  Nijmegen	  	  without	  you	  two,	  and	  I	  refuse	  to	  imagine	  a	  future	  without	  you	  either.	  You	  have	  no	  idea	  how	  life	  is	  less	  now	  when	  we	  all	  live	  far	  apart…	  	  
And	  last	  but	  not	  least,	  it	  is	  my	  parents	  to	  whom	  I	  have	  to	  thank	  the	  most.	  There	  are	  no	  words	  to	  express	  the	  depth	  of	  my	  gratitude	  for	  their	  unbounded	  generosity	  and	  love,	  and	  I	  don’t	  think	  there	  is	  any	  humanly	  way	  I	  can	  possibly	  pay	  them	  back.	  I	  am	  simply	  humbled	  to	  have	  you	  as	  parents.	  
Thank	  you	  all.	  Thank	  you,	  always.	  
	   July,	  2013,	  Paris.	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